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“Citizen-Civilians” argues that military manpower policies between the end of 
World War II in 1945 and the shift to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 separated military 
service from ideals of masculine citizenship in the United States.  Manpower policies, 
especially those that governed deferments, widened the definition of service to the state 
and encouraged men to meet their responsibilities for national defense as civilians.  They 
emphasized men’s breadwinner role and responsible fatherhood over military service and 
defined economic independence as a contribution to national defense. 
These policies, therefore, militarized the civilian sector, as fatherhood and certain 
civilian occupations were defined as national defense initiatives.  But these policies also, 
ironically, weakened the citizen-soldier ideal by ensuring that fewer men would serve in 
the military and equating these civilian pursuits with military service.  The Defense 
 
 
establishment unintentionally weakened its own manpower procurement system. 
These findings provide context for the anti-war and anti-draft protest of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Vietnam exacerbated points of friction that already existed.  The 
war highlighted assumptions about masculinity and citizenship as well as inequities in the 
draft system that had existed for a generation.  This dissertation, therefore, explains the 
growth of the mechanisms that allowed men to avoid military service, as such avoidance 
became relatively simple to accomplish and easy to justify.  Thus, when draft calls rose in 
order to support a war that many Americans did not agree with, men used the channels 
that the Defense establishment had already created for them to avoid serving in the armed 
forces. 
This work also demonstrates how policies and ideas about masculine citizenship 
affected one another.  Competing visions of manhood as well as debates over the rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship influenced policy debates.  Moreover, policies took on 
a social engineering function, as the Selective Service and Department of Defense 
actively encouraged men to enter particular occupational fields, marry, and become 
fathers.  In this way, this project is an example of the “lived Cold War.”  It suggests that 
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A good friend of mine likens producing a dissertation to giving birth.  While I’m 
not sure I would go that far, it is certainly true that it takes a village to write a 
dissertation.  I have many people to thank. 
 First and foremost, I must thank the community of academics I found myself a 
part of at the University of Maryland, College Park.  I owe a special debt of gratitude to 
my adviser, Robyn Muncy, who went above and beyond the call of duty.  Variously 
cheerleader, critic, sounding board, and mentor, she has played many roles in my life 
over the last eight years. I do not believe I could have completed this project without her 
wise counsel.  My committee – David Freund, Clare Lyons, Jennifer Mittelstadt, and 
David Segal – gave the generous gifts of time and feedback.  Their input helped me 
sharpen arguments I was not even aware I had been making.  Additionally, Ira Berlin, 
Sonya Michel, and Jon Sumida all went out of their way to help me develop as a 
historian.  Peter Albert taught me the importance of precision writing and some excellent 
research tools. 
 Second, “Citizen-Civilians” exists because of the generous financial support I 
received from the Department of History and Graduate School of the University of 
Maryland.  Grants from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation in Dumphries, Virginia; 
the United States Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; and the Harry 
S. Truman Library Institute in Independence, Missouri, further made travel to archives 
possible.  
Once at these repositories, archivists at the National Archives and Records 
Administration in College Park, Maryland; the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison, 
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Wisconsin; the Truman Library; the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas; 
the U.S. Army Military History Institute; the Swarthmore College Peace Collection in 
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; and the 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign offered invaluable help.  David Clark at the 
Truman Library, Herb Pankratz at the Eisenhower Library, Richard Sommers and David 
Keough at USAMHI, and Wendy Chmielewsky at Swarthmore deserve special mention.  
Further, I must thank J.E. McNeil of the Center on Conscience and War, who I contacted 
with the generous help of Christopher Richmond, for granting me access to the restricted 
files of the National Service Board of Religious Objectors collection at Swarthmore.  
While my project evolved in such a way that I did not end up using documents from all of 
these archives, my findings at each influenced how I thought about my research 
questions.  
 I must thank my colleagues in the graduate program at the University of 
Maryland, who pulled me through this crazy process.  At times, I think I shared a brain 
with Kimberly Welch and Christina Larocco.  Melissa Kravetz, Helena Iles Papaioannou, 
Andrew Kellett, Mary-Elizabeth Murphy, Stefan Papaioannou, Charles Reed, Reid 
Gustafson, and Stephanie Hinnershitz-Hutchinson deserve special thanks.  Beyond 
College Park, Julie Mancine, Rachel Louise Moran, and the many scholars I met at 
conferences provided insight, sources, and support.  All of these people prove that 
academia can be a fun and humane pursuit as well as intellectually challenging. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my family.  Not everyone has a parent who supports 
their child’s desire to give up a solid, lucrative career to embark on the quixotic quest for 
a Ph.D.  I was blessed with two.  Joel Rutenberg and Rebecca Becker Rutenberg both 
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offered me their love and support when I quit my job as a high school teacher at age 27 to 
return to graduate school.  They never complained, even when I did, and for that, I am 
grateful.  My brothers, Adam Rutenberg and David Rutenberg, were equally supportive.  
In our quest to be the most over-educated family ever, the three of us engaged in friendly 
competition to see who would graduate with their terminal degree last.  I am thankful that 
I did not earn that particular title, but I think all three of us won because we each have the 
others.  Gini Tate, Linda Best, Herb Best, Chris Best, Anna LaPuz Best, Abigail Best, 
and Julie MacCartee all became part of my family along this journey, and they are the 
best circle of in-laws a person could ask for.   
 This brings me to the heart of my support network.  Jeremy Best lives up to his 
name.  He is the best husband, colleague, scholar, and friend I could ever have asked for.  
Our son, Benjamin is the light of my life.  Together, they make me laugh every day.  
They gave me a reason and the strength to complete this project.  I love and thank you 
both.   
 My grandmother, Florence Becker, wanted nothing more from her final years than 
for me to be happy.  I hope that wherever she is, she can see that I am. 
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Selective Service Classification Chart (1951-1973)1 
 
Classification   Meaning 
 
I-A    Available for military service 
I-A-O    Conscientious objector available for non-combatant  
     military service 
I-C    Member of the armed forces 
I-D    Member of a reserve unit or approved officer procurement  
     program 
I-O    Conscientious objector opposed to combatant and non- 
     combatant military service; available for alternate  
     civilian service 
I-S (H)    Student administratively deferred to complete high school 
I-S (C)    College student administratively deferred to complete the  
     current academic year 
I-W    Conscientious objector assigned to alternate civilian service 
I-Y (after 1962)  Unqualified for military service except in times of war or  
     declared national emergency 
II-A    Deferred for non-agricultural occupation 
II-C    Deferred for agricultural occupation 
II-S    Student  
III-A    Deferred for reasons of dependency or hardship 
IV-A     Deferred due to previous military service or as the sole  
surviving son in a family with one or more children 
who died in military service 
IV-B    Government official 
IV-C    Foreign national not liable for military service 
IV-D    Deferred as minister or divinity student 





                                                
1 Adapted from Ann Yoder, “Military Classifications for Draftees,” Swarthmore 







 On September 11, 2001, I was a high school social studies teacher in a suburb of 
New York City. For a week after the terrorist attacks of that day, I could see the smoke 
rising off of Ground Zero from my apartment over the Hudson River. The day was both 
merciful and tragic for the community in which I taught. One of its members lost his life 
when the Twin Towers fell. Yet others, including the wife of one of my colleagues, 
escaped. Over the next couple of weeks, those students trained as emergency medical 
technicians missed school in order to dig through the rubble of the World Trade Center. 
Everyone else came to class expressing their anger, betrayal, and vulnerability. I, 
unfortunately, had the impossible job of explaining to 125 ninth graders, many of whose 
parents worked in Manhattan, what had happened and why. Terrorists had not only 
attacked my students’ country, they had attacked my students’ community and sense of 
well-being. 
 This project grew out of my experiences in the months and years that followed. 
Between 2001 and 2005, I watched class after class move through the school and 
graduate. Yet, to my knowledge, only one of my students joined the military after 
graduation, and he entered the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps in order to fulfill his 
lifelong dream of flying Marine aircraft, not out of a sense of duty to the nation. Many of 
my students, residents of a socio-economically and politically diverse town, supported 
the American mission in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they did not feel it their 
responsibility to fight for the United States, despite their very personal connection to the 
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attacks of September 11.1  I could not help but make comparisons to Americans’ response 
to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  
In the week following Japan’s surprise raid, the New York Times ran a series of 
articles chronicling the frenzied rush by American men to enlist in the nation’s armed 
services.2 New York’s Army, Navy, and Marine Corps enlistment centers extended their 
hours of operation, some to twenty-four hours a day, in order to accommodate the surge 
of potential soldiers, sailors, and marines. Sixty years later, following the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the newspaper again reported on 
citizens’ response to a surprise assault on American soil. This time, however, the Times 
explained that, despite a spike in inquiries about military service, there had been no rise 
in actual enlistments since the attack, and some who tried to convince friends to apply, 
faced mockery.3  It was not only my students who did not rush to join up.  
 At its core, then, this project asks what changed. What cultural expectation or 
perception of responsibility drove men to enlist in droves after an attack in 1941 but 
vanished in the years after?  Or, more pointedly, what motivated men to heed the call of 
conscription during World War II but weakened the institution of the draft so 
                                                
1 I am not the only one to make a similar observation. See, for example, Cheyney 
Ryan, The Chickenhawk Syndrome: War, Sacrifice, and Personal Responsibility (New 
York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 7. 
2 See, for example, “Rush of Recruits Crowds Stations,” New York Times, Dec. 9, 
1941; “Enlistments Rise to New Heights Here,” New York Times, Dec., 10, 1941; “Surge 
of Recruits Continues in City,” New York Times, Dec. 11, 1941; “Croft Men Enlist in 
Droves for War,” New York Times, Dec. 13, 1941; and “Discharged Men Besiege Fort 
Dix,” New York Times, Dec. 13, 1941.  This December spike in enlistments was directly 
related to the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Although many men enlisted in the military out of 
economic need over the course of World War II, the military had been expanding since 
1940.  It is therefore unlikely that economic necessity was the mitigating factor 
immediately after Pearl Harbor. 
3 “Despite a National Rush of Emotion, Recruiting Centers Aren’t Seeing a Rush 
to Enlist,” New York Times, Sept. 16, 2001. 
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significantly that suggestions for its reinstatement after September 11 were met with 
derision?4  The answer, of course, is complicated and many-layered. Scholars have 
examined how the civil rights, pacifist, New Left, and anti-war movements of the 1950s 
and 1960s affected Americans’ relationship with the state, as well as the disillusionment 
caused by the Vietnam War. To borrow a phrase, their explanations are not exactly 
wrong, but they are incomplete.5 
This project examines the historical relationship between American citizens and 
their state by focusing specifically on military manpower policy between 1945 and the 
end of the draft in 1973. It uses the debates over these policies to explore the question of 
what motivated men either to serve in the military or to avoid military service in the 
decades after World War II.6  It also interrogates the meaning of that service. Different 
                                                
 4 See, for example, William F. Buckley, Jr., “Who’s Fighting the War,” National 
Review, May 5, 2003: 55; “Backdraft,” The Nation, Dec. 1, 2003: 8; “Draft Dodge,” Wall 
Street Journal, Jan. 6, 2003; Carl Hulse, “A New Tactic Against War: Renew Talk About 
the Draft, New York Times, Feb. 9, 2003; Clyde Haberman, “Draft Talk, But Source is 
Antiwar, New York Times, Jan. 3, 2003.  
5 The original phrase, “That explanation is not exactly wrong, but it is 
incomplete,” comes from Margot Canaday’s argument that institutionalized 
discrimination against homosexuals did not originate in the aftermath of World War II. 
See Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century 
America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 2. 
 6 This work makes a distinction between men who avoided military service and 
men who resisted the draft. Draft resisters were men who actively protested the war by 
refusing to serve in the military. These men burned, tore up, or turned in their draft cards; 
fled to Canada; or sometimes went to prison to demonstrate their beliefs. They 
constructed their resistance to military service as a moral and/or political act. As this 
dissertation will show, however, the majority of men who did not serve avoided service 
through legal means, primarily through deferments. These men generally did not see their 
actions as political or a form of protest. They simply wished to avoid disrupting their 
lives. Draft avoidance is an umbrella term that encompasses war resisters but that also 
includes those men who did not understand their actions as a political statement. See 
Michael S. Foley, Confronting the War Machine: War Resistance during the Vietnam 
War (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 3-16. Former 
members of President Gerald Ford’s clemency program, Lawrence M. Baskir and 
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constituencies – including defense officials, members of Congress, civic organizations 
like the American Legion, and activists of all types – created a rich discourse as they 
debated who should offer service to the nation, what form that service should take, and 
what those who served – and the country itself – should gain as a result of that service. 
Ultimately, I argue, policy-makers’ decisions during the 1950s and early 1960s 
unintentionally strengthened American men’s already existent ambivalence toward 
military service. Military manpower policies weakened the relationship between military 
service and masculine citizenship obligations so thoroughly by the time of the Vietnam 
War that neither the rhetoric of protecting home and hearth through military service nor 
the threat of government reprisals could save the draft. Too many men did not feel it their 
responsibility to serve. 
* * * * * 
Anecdotally speaking, when members of the Vietnam generation talk about why 
more men did not serve in the military, they mention the character of the war itself. Those 
who avoided military service tended to see the war as an immoral or futile undertaking. 
They did not want to die, especially for a cause they cared so little about. As a result, they 
sought methods to either actively protest it or passively avoid it. Those who did serve 
frequently attribute other men’s shirking to the inequalities that were inherent in 
American society and in the Selective Service System. The conflict instilled a deep sense 
of ambivalence toward military service in middle-class Americans, who felt that the 
                                                                                                                                            
William A. Strauss also made this distinction in Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, 
the War, and The Vietnam Generation (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). 
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federal government misused its troops in an unethical and dishonorable – or at least ill-
conceived – military action.7   
 Popular representations of the war certainly support this view. Memoirs, novels, 
and movies depict the Vietnam Era as a period that started full of hope and promise but 
that ended in disappointment, frustration, anger, and loss.8  Veterans’ accounts, both 
fictional and non-fictional, like those of Ron Kovic, Tim O’Brien, Lynda Van Devanter, 
and Philip Caputo, discuss the emotional turmoil experienced by young American service 
personnel.9  They went to Southeast Asia thinking they were protecting the U.S. and 
South Vietnam from communism but found themselves mired in the moral ambiguity of a 
war whose victory would be measured by body counts. Movies about the era, from The 
                                                
7 I formulated this impression based on numerous anecdotes shared with me by 
people who were of draft age during the Vietnam War, both draft avoiders and veterans. 
It is in no way based on careful sampling or scientific method. As will be shown below, 
however, it is an impression that oral histories and cultural representations of the era 
support. As always, there is the danger that popular culture and the passage of time have 
affected the memories of the men who shared their stories with me and of those who 
participated in formal oral history projects. But even if men unintentionally altered their 
stories, how they retold their stories still shaped national memory of the Vietnam War. 
For an interesting example of how remembering or “misremembering” incidents have 
influenced national historical memory of the Vietnam War, see Jerry Lembcke, The 
Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of the Vietnam War (New York: New 
York University Press, 2000).  
8 For the purposes of this project, I define the Vietnam Era as the years between 
1965, when the United States committed its first regular ground troops, to 1973, when the 
last of those troops were pulled out of South Vietnam. 
 9 Ron Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976); Tim 
O’Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home, reprint (New York: 
Broadway Books, 1999); Lynda Van Devanter, Home Before Morning: The Story of an 
Army Nurse in Vietnam, with a new introduction (Amherst, Mass.: Sheridan Books, 
2001) ; Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977). 
See also Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Knopf, 1977); Ronald Glasser, 365 Days 
(New York: George Braziller, Inc.: 1971); Frederick Downs, The Killing Zone: My Life 
in the Vietnam War (New York: Norton, 1978); John M. Del Vecchio, The 13th Valley 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Jerome Klinkowitz and John Somer, eds, Writing 
Under Fire: Stories of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1978); James 
Webb, Fields of Fire (New York: Prentice Hall, 1978). 
 6 
Deer Hunter to Platoon, Coming Home to Full Metal Jacket, Rambo: First Blood to 
Forrest Gump, depict a similar sense of futility and disillusionment.10   Overwhelmingly, 
cultural depictions of the war created since its end told American citizens that the 
government, including the military leadership, lied to soldiers, sailors, marines, and 
airmen; used them shamefully; and then abandoned them when it was through with 
them.11  Military service scarcely seemed worth the sacrifice.  
During the war, the evening news broadcast images of Vietnam veterans throwing 
their medals on the Capitol steps rather than accept decoration for what they viewed as 
immoral actions. Life magazine reported on “Our Forgotten Wounded,” injured soldiers 
who were warehoused in rat-infested, dirty Veterans Administration hospitals and who 
felt like they had been “put in jail or punished for something.”12  Media reports direct 
from Vietnam seemed to support the futility of the endeavor. The press corps did not face 
                                                
10 The Deer Hunter, Dir. Michael Cimino, Columbia Pictures, 1979 (183 min.); 
Platoon, Dir. Oliver Stone, Herndale Film Corporation, 1986 (120 min.); Coming Home, 
Dir. Hal Ashby, United Artists, 1978 (127 min.); Full Metal Jacket, Dir. Stanley Kubrick, 
Warner Brothers, 1987 (117 min.); First Blood, Dir. Ted Kotcheff, Orion Films, 1982 (93 
min.); Forrest Gump, Dir. Robert Zemekis, Paramount Pictures, 1994 (142 min.). 
11 See, for example, Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the 
Haunted Generation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1989); Michael J. Allen, Until the 
Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Jon Roper, ed., The United States and 
the Legacy of the Vietnam War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Keith Beattie, 
The Scar that Binds: American Culture and the Vietnam War (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998); Andrew Martin, Receptions of War: Vietnam in American 
Culture (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993); Fred Turner, Echoes of 
Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory (New York: Anchor Books, 1997); 
Owen W. Gilman and Lorrie Smith, America Rediscovered: Critical Essays on the 
Literature and Film of the Vietnam War (New York: Garland, 1990); Susan Faludi, 
Stiffed: The Betrayal of the American Man (New York: W. Morrow and Co., 1990); 
Maureen Ryan, The Other Side of Grief: The Home Front and the Aftermath in American 
Narratives of the Vietnam War (Amherst, Mass: University of Massachusetts Press, 
2008). 
12 “Assignment to Neglect: From Vietnam to VA Hospital,” Life, May 22, 1970, 
24D-33. Quotes, cover, 28. 
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censorship, as it had during World War II and the Korean War. Reporters demonstrated a 
strong allegiance to the soldiers, argued historian Andrew J. Huebner, and frequently 
depicted servicemen as victims of military incompetence, circumstance, and their own 
excesses.13 In this context, when word spread that doctor’s notes or student status or 
claims of homosexuality could release a man from military service, increasingly large 
numbers of men took advantage of the system’s loopholes to find a way out.14 
Scholarship on the era complicates the picture somewhat, but most works agree 
that Vietnam was the tipping point in the relationship between American men and the 
obligation to perform military service. According to political scientist David Cortright, 
dissatisfaction with military policies, fear, and an ill-defined mission in Southeast Asia 
caused rates of desertion, absence without leave (AWOL), drug use and fragging – the 
phenomenon of enlisted men shooting or targeting their officers with explosives – to 
skyrocket and rates of enlistment and reenlistment to plummet. This “crisis within the 
ranks” led, in Cortright’s view, to the “internal disintegration of the military” and the 
“collapse of the infantry in Vietnam,” and forced the Pentagon to reevaluate its strategies 
                                                
13 This, argues Huebner, is how Lt. William Calley, who was convicted on 22 
counts of murder for his role in the My Lai Massacre of 1968, could become a national 
cause celebre as thousands of Americans agitated for his freedom. They believed that 
American soldiers had become “scapegoats for an official policy that encouraged 
brutality.” Andrew J. Huebner, The Warrior Image: Soldiers in American Culture from 
the Second World War to the Vietnam Era (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007), ch. 7-8. Quote, p. 210. 
14 See, for example, Saul Braun, “From 1-A to 4-F and All Points In Between,” 
New York Times Magazine, Nov. 29, 1970; Stephen Minot, “On Aiding and Abetting: 
The Anguish of Draft Counseling,” Sept., 1968, 161-169, reprinted in The Sixties: 
Recollections of the Decade from Harper’s Magazine, edited by Katharine Whittemore, 
Ellen Rosenbush, and Jim Nelson (New York: Franklin Square Press, 1995); Homer 
Bigart, “Draft Deferments Called Major Motivation at R.O.T.C. Camp, New York Times, 
July 24, 1970; “Beating the Draft: Counselors Who Advise How to Avoid Service 
Multiply, Draw Youths,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1968. 
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and tactics, including its system of manpower procurement.15  Military sociologist James 
Burk claimed that “widespread doubt about the legitimacy of the Vietnam War increased 
public tolerance of opposition to the draft and refusal to perform military service,” which, 
in turn, led to a new conception of military service that stressed voluntarism.16  
Sociologist David Segal tempered his evaluation somewhat, but he also acknowledged 
that “the failure of the Johnson administration and Congress to reform the Selective 
Service System…and continuing opposition to the draft probably contributed 
significantly…to the end of the draft and the advent of the all-volunteer force.”17  Most 
recently, historian Beth Bailey referred to the Vietnam War as “the perfect political 
storm,” as anti-war protest “gave legitimacy to vastly different arguments justifying the 
move to an all-volunteer force.”18 
In addition to the effects of the war on soldiers and the military establishment, 
historians, sociologists, journalists, and cultural critics have examined how the pacifist, 
anti-war, and civil rights movements as well as the New Left and the New Right 
contributed to the crisis of the war years. Although their focus varied widely, these 
scholars ultimately identified the time during the Vietnam War and immediately 
thereafter as a moment when the relationship between American citizens and the 
                                                
15 David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: G.I. Resistance during the Vietnam War, 
revised edition (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005). Quote p. 4. 
16 James Burk, “The Military Obligation of Citizens since the Vietnam War,” 
Parameters 31 (summer 2001), available at 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/01summer/burk.htm. 
17 David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower 
Policy (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 36. 
18 Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press, 2009), 3. 
 9 
American state fundamentally shifted.19  In the words of scholar and former New Left 
activist Todd Gitlin, the crucible of war and protest forged “a slackening in the loyalties 
                                                
19 Scholars of the New Deal and World War II have shown that political responses 
to these events intimately linked the citizen to the state. For example, see Lizabeth 
Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. ch. 6; Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: 
Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public-Private Welfare State (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Brinkley, “The New Deal and the 
Idea of the State,” 85-121, in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, ed. 
Steven Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); 
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963); William L. O’Neill, A Democracy at War: America’s Fight 
at Home and Abroad in World War II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1993); Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security- From 
World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2010), esp. ch. 3; James 
T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Thomas Bruscino, A Nation Forged in War: 
How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of 
Tennessee Press, 2010). For works that demonstrate how the Vietnam War and the social 
and economic changes of the late 1960s and early 1970s helped to loosen this connection, 
see Mary Sheila McMahon, “The American State and the Vietnam War,” 45-89, in The 
Sixties: From Memory to History, ed. David Farber (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1994); Jonathan Rieder, “The Rise of the ‘Silent Majority,’” 243-
268, in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, ed. Fraser and Gerstle; Thomas Byrne 
Edsall, “The Changing Shape of Power: A Realignment in Public Power,” 269-293, in 
The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, ed. Fraser and Gerstle; Lisa McGirr, Suburban 
Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), esp. ch. 5; Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in 
the Sunbelt South (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), esp. ch. 9; Arthur 
Stein, Seeds of the Seventies: Values, Work, and Commitment in Post-Vietnam America 
(Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1985); Farber, “The Torch had 
Fallen,” 9-28, and Christopher Capozzola, “’It Makes You Want to Believe in the 
Country:’ Celebrating the Bicentennial in an Age of Limits,” 29-49, both in America in 
the 70s, ed. Bailey and Farber (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2004). 
Political scientist Theda Skocpol, moreover, has argued that Vietnam also caused a 
rupture in Americans’ relationship with civic organizations. She showed that wars in 
America usually increased citizens’ membership in voluntary organizations, including 
fraternal and veterans groups. This pattern reversed itself after the Vietnam War. See 
Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American 
Civic Life (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 46-66, 182-191. 
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which bound people to the social order…Traditional authority…lost its hold.”20  Shock 
from atrocities like the massacre of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai in 1968, outrage at 
the shooting of American students at Kent State and Jackson State in 1970, dismay at the 
secret bombings of Cambodia and Laos, and disgust at the Watergate scandal – the “son 
of Vietnam” – irreparably harmed Americans’ faith in their government and, what former 
Washington Post editorial editor Philip L. Geyelin called, “all things 
establishmentarian.”21  The siphoning of resources from the War on Poverty and the 
struggle for racial justice to the war in Southeast Asia, a questionable enterprise 
undertaken against people of color, was one factor in the growing frustration of African 
Americans with the liberal establishment.22  The disproportionate number of black men 
who were conscripted to fight was another.23  Division over the war and the perceived 
excesses of some members of the New Left caused a “massive defection of the electorate 
                                                
20 Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1987), 381, 424. 
21 Philip L. Geyelin, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” 77 in Vietnam in Remission, ed. 
James F. Veninga and Harry A. Wilmer (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M Press, 
1985). See also, James Miller, Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege 
of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 237-261; Van Gosse, Rethinking the 
New Left: An Interpretive History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Maurice 
Isserman and Michael Kazin, “The Failure and Success of the New Radicalism,” 212-
242, in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, ed. Fraser and Gerstle. 
22 Gerald Gill, “From Maternal Pacifism to Revolutionary Solidarity: African-
American Women’s Opposition to the Vietnam War,” 177-195, in Sights on the Sixties, 
ed. Barbara L. Tischler (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992). 
23 James E. Westheider, Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the 
Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1997), esp. ch. 2; Kimberly L. 
Phillips, War! What is it Good For? Black Freedom Struggles and the U.S. Military from 
World War II to Iraq (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), esp. 
ch. 5-6; Gill, “Afro-American Opposition to the United States’ Wars of the Twentieth 
Century: Dissent, Discontent, and Disinterest,” (Ph.D. Diss.:Howard University,1985). 
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from the liberalism that had guided the country since 1960.”24  Former Assistant 
Secretary of State and policy expert Elliott Abrams and historian Andrew J. Bacevich 
went so far as to argue that the “changing relationship between the individual and the 
state, spurred…by the cultural revolution” of the 1960s killed the “mythic tradition of the 
citizen-soldier.”25  
According to many scholars, a new conservatism stepped into the breach. It had 
been developing for over a decade but used the upheaval of the Vietnam years to gain 
traction in the 1970s.26  Leaders of the libertarian branch of the New Right, like 
economist Milton Friedman, advocated the end of conscription on the grounds that the 
draft impinged on the liberty of individuals. They came together in common cause with 
                                                
24 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of American 
Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 395. 
25 Elliott Abrams and Andrew J. Bacevitch, “A Symposium on Citizenship and 
Military Service,” Parameters 31 (summer 2001), available at 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/01summer/bacevich.htm. 
26 On the longer development of the New Right, see McGirr, Suburban Warriors; 
Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005); Lassiter, The Silent Majority; Rebecca E. Klatch, 
Women of the New Right (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Joseph E. 
Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of 
Modern Conservatism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008); Joseph 
Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative 
Counterrevolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); Michelle M. 
Nickerson, Mothers of Conservatism: Women and the Postwar Right (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2012); Kenneth D. Durr, Behind the Backlash: White 
Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003); John A. Andrew III, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young 
Americans for Freedom and the Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1997); Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and 
the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001); Mary C. 
Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel 
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
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members of the New Left to oppose the draft.27  The combined pressure of widespread 
draft avoidance from non-activists, anti-military agitation from the Left, and political 
persuasion from the Right ultimately crushed the system of conscription and intentionally 
severed the link between citizenship and military service. With the shift to an all-
volunteer force, according to Eliot Cohen, “manpower became a commodity” on the open 
market, “an input into the machinery of national defense,” just as “weapons or 
installations were.”28  Free-market economists and libertarian thinkers, who found a 
home in the Nixon administration, replaced, in Bailey’s words, “the logic of citizenship 
with the logic of the market.”29 
* * * * * 
 My argument questions the scholarly and cultural narratives outlined above by 
challenging historians to rethink why conscription failed in the United States. I do not 
discount the importance of the Vietnam War as a catalyst for social change, but I contend 
that the patterns of draft avoidance behavior that supposedly emerged during the Vietnam 
War – marrying young, entering particular occupations, going back to school – were not 
the direct result of the war in Southeast Asia. Rather, they were the product of two 
decades of specific military manpower polices that defined a wide range of civilian roles 
as service to the state and imbued those roles with a value equivalent to that of military 
service. The Vietnam War, with its heightened draft calls, exacerbated points of friction 
                                                
27 Members of Students for a Democratic Society worked with former members of 
Young Americans for Freedom, after the latter were expelled from YAF over their 
opposition to the draft. See Klatch, A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, 
and the 1960s (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999). 
28 Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 168. 
29 Bailey, America’s Army, 4. 
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caused by these policies, but it did not cause them. This focus on policy helps explain 
why so many men could avoid military service during the Vietnam War. It explains the 
origins of deferments, the most common method for draft avoidance.  
To be clear, there has always been resistance to military service in the United 
States, even during times of war. As early as the nation’s founding, Thomas Paine praised 
the men who remained at the continental army’s 1776 encampment at Valley Forge 
because so many “summer soldier[s]” and “sunshine patriot[s]” had “shr[u]unk from the 
service of their country.”30  The draft was a major source of contention during the Civil 
War in both the North and the South, as the 1863 New York draft riots famously 
reflected, and during World War I.31 Perhaps most tellingly, conscription during wartime 
has been necessary because men have rarely been eager to put themselves into mortal 
danger, regardless of the cause.  
Nevertheless, during the twentieth century, most eligible men who received draft 
notices served without public comment.32  Inductees may have grumbled, they may have 
                                                
30 Thomas Paine, “The Crisis,” 91, in Thomas Paine: Collected Writings, ed. Eric 
Foner (New York: Library of America, 1995). 
31 For an overview on the history of the draft, see Peter Karsten, “The 
U.S.Citizen-Soldier’s Past, Present, and Likely Future,” Parameters 31 ( summer 2001), 
available at 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/01summer/karsten.htm and 
David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy 
(Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 17-38. On the New York City draft 
riots, see Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance for American 
Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990). For a description of opposition to the draft and the problems it presented the U.S. 
government during World War I, see Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I 
and the Making of the Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), ch. 1-2. 
32 As historian James Sparrow has recently argued, widespread participation in the 
military during World War II created a particularly strong relationship between male 
citizenship, the state, and military service. See Sparrow, Warfare State.  
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complained, but they served. They had complex reasons for doing so, but these reasons 
tended to boil down to a combination of public pressure, legal coercion, and personal 
responsibility.33 Those men who wilfully failed to answer the Selective Service faced the 
possibility of jail time, but those who held legal deferments often encountered ridicule. 
Most men, therefore, felt some obligation as citizens and as men to defend their homes, 
their communities, their comrades-in-arms, and their nation. They may not have 
volunteered for military service, but if their country called them, most men served.34  
Those who sought methods to avoid induction tended to do so quietly and as individuals. 
The Vietnam War was different. Once again, most men who were drafted served, 
but a much higher proportion of eligible men did not, frequently because they actively 
sought legal means to avoid military service.35  One survey of 1,586 men found that 60 
percent of draft-eligible men took some sort of action to escape conscription during the 
                                                
33 Other reasons also included economic necessity, adventure, and eventually, 
survival. For example, see John Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World 
War II (London: Corgi, 1982); Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American 
Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
1993); Wallace Terry, Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War (New York: Random 
House, 1984); Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1997); Christopher H. Hamner, Enduring Battle: American 
Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776-1945 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 2011); 
Robert B. Westbrook, Why We Fought: Forging American Obligations in World War II 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2004), especially ch. 2.. 
34 Exact numbers are difficult to obtain, but for example, historian George Q. 
Flynn estimates that 75 percent of the draft-age cohort of men served during the Korean 
War, an unpopular war in American history, and of the 25 percent who did not, 2/3 were 
classified as IV-F, and only 1/3 sought deferments. See George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 
1940-1973 (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 143. 
35 Baskir and Strauss estimated that approximately 570,000 men broke the law to 
avoid the draft, of whom only 209,517 were accused and 8,750 were convicted. In 
contrast, 15,410,000 were deferred, exempted, or disqualified from military service. 
Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 5. See also James Fallows, “What Did 
You Do in the Class War, Daddy?” Washington Monthly 7, no. 8 (October 1975): 5-20.  
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conflict.36  According to another study, 26 percent of draft-age men altered their 
educational plans in order to gain a student deferment, 21 percent spoke to a doctor to 
learn how to qualify for a medical deferment, 11 percent allowed their desire to avoid the 
draft to influence their career choice, and four percent chose to alter their bodies in some 
way to avoid military service.37  Men also shared information with one another about 
how to escape military service. They sought help from organizations. They consulted 
manuals published to help them. New Left and pacifist organizations with nation-wide 
followings such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Central Committee 
for Conscientious Objectors (CCCO) along with hundreds of smaller, local anti-war 
groups and organizations, helped foment what historian John Whiteclay Chambers, II, 
termed “a massive campaign of public disobedience.”38 My work explains the 
mechanisms men used to avoid the armed forces – especially the Selective Service 
System’s policies related to deferments – and why those mechanisms existed. It also 
explores their unintended consequences. Ultimately, decisions made by the Selective 
                                                
36 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, xviii, 7. 
37 It should be noted that the survey cited asked men to list all of the methods they 
used to evade the draft, and, on average, those respondents who took action to avoid 
military service tried 2.3 different methods. Thus, the percentages of men who tried the 
various methods add up to greater than 100 percent of respondents. See G. David Curry, 
Sunshine Patriots: Punishment and the Vietnam Offender (Notre Dame, Ind.: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 65-66; John Whiteclay Chambers, II, estimates that between 
1964 and 1973, 27 million young men reached draft age, of whom 16 million, or sixty per 
cent, of those eligible did not serve. Of these, 15 million received legal exemptions or 
deferments and approximately 570,000 evaded the draft illegally. See Chambers, 
“Conscientious Objectors and the American State,” 41, in The New Conscientious 
Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance, ed. Charles C. Moskos and Chambers 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
38 Chambers “Conscientious Objectors and the American State,” 40; Charles 
DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the 
Vietnam Era (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 199), 163-167, 183-185; Amy 
Swerdlow, “’Not My Son, Not Your Son, Not Their Sons’: Mothers Against the Draft for 
Vietnam,” 163-176, in Sights on the Sixties, ed. Tischler;. 
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Service, the Pentagon, Congress, and the presidents in the years prior to the Vietnam War 
allowed men to stop understanding military service as an obligation of American 
citizenship, even during wartime. 
* * * * * 
“Citizen-Civilians,” therefore, examines the relationship between the concept of 
citizenship and the ideal of the citizen-soldier, a flexible and culturally resonant symbol 
in American history, in post-war America.  The concept of the citizen-soldier, as political 
scientist Ronald R. Krebs has argued, exists in two realms.39  The first is historical, firmly 
rooted to American institutions and historical events. This “institutional manifestation” 
originated in the fact that all free, white, able-bodied men were liable for service in local 
militias from the founding of each of the thirteen original colonies.40  While the 
composition of each colony’s militia was different, all were charged with protecting local 
English settlements. Because militias were limited to fighting inside the borders of their 
respective colonies and could only be used for defensive purposes, George Washington 
and Federalists championed a national, federally-controlled, fighting force.41  Anti-
                                                
39 Ronald R. Krebs, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition in the United States: Has Its 
Demise Been Greatly Exaggerated?” Armed Forces and Society 36, no. 153 (2009):153-
174. 
40 Ibid., 154. 
41 In a Sept. 25, 1776 letter to John Hancock, Washington famously complained, 
“To place any dependance [sic] upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff.” 
He lamented the lack of discipline inherent in a fighting force “dragged from the tender 
Scenes of Domestick life” and “unaccustomed to the din of Arms.”  He argued that “to 
bring men to a proper degree of Subordination is not the work of a day – a Month – or 
even a year – and unhappily for us, and the cause we are Ingaged in, the little I have been 
labouring to establish in the Army under my immediate Command, is in a manner done 
away by having such a mixture of Troops as have been called together within these few 
Months.”  He further complained that militia men, who served under limited contracts, 
vanished when most needed, taking arms and equipment with them, making them a 
financial as well as an emotional drain on limited resources. George Washington to John 
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Federalists, however, believed a strong, centralized army was representative of the 
tyranny and despotism of the British crown and rejected Federalist thinking when it came 
time to formulate the new country’s government. Militiamen had captured the 
imagination of the would-be nation by defeating the British at the battles of Lexington 
and Concord in 1775.  Many early legislators, therefore, remained rhetorically committed 
to the notions that military service should be spread equally among citizens and should be 
locally controlled. 
 The Articles of Confederation preserved the ascendancy of local militias. It 
invested the central government with the sole right to declare war, but did not provide for 
a national army. Instead, it enjoined each state to “keep up a well-regulated and 
disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered,” and to “provide and constantly 
have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper 
quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage” in case of a national emergency. 42 Yet 
it provided no mechanism for the federal government to access either men or equipment 
without the approval of each state’s governor. To rectify this problem, the Constitution 
granted Congress the rights to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a 
Navy,” but, again, militias remained an integral part of the United States’ defense plan. 
Congress could call “forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions” and it was authorized to organize, arm, and discipline 
                                                                                                                                            
Hancock, Sept. 25, 1776, The Papers of George Washington, edited by Dorothy Twohig, 
et al. Revolutionary War Series, vol. 6, August-October 1776, edited by Philander D. 
Chase and Frank E. Grizzard, Jr. (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virigina Press, 
1994), 396-397. 
42 Articles of Confederation, Article VI, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp#art6 
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militias when specifically under federal command. But states retained the responsibility 
for training the militias and appointing officers.43  
 The Militia Act of 1792 allowed states to enact the relevant portions of the 
Constitution into law. It mandated that every free, able-bodied, white man between the 
ages of 18 and 45 should serve in the militia at his own expense. In theory, this law 
provided for national defense by training a significant proportion of the country’s 
population and keeping trained citizens at the ready while avoiding a large standing army 
and protecting republican liberties. Military power would be reserved to the states, except 
in times of national emergency, and all free men would earn their right to citizenship 
through service in the militia. In reality, however, this system proved unworkable from 
the beginning. 
 The Act left control of the militias in the hands of the states. It did not include any 
federal enforcement mechanism. It provided no federal funding for state militias or 
means to coordinate state systems. States were left to enforce the law, which they 
frequently did not do, and they were given the right to decide service requirements, 
including who could or should be deferred or exempted from training.  Governors often 
appointed political allies as officers rather than men with any military qualifications, 
creating a sense of partisanship throughout the militia system.44 Overall, militia units 
remained staunchly local in orientation and constrained by the constitutional limits placed 
                                                
43 United States Constitution, Article I, section 8, available at 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html 
44 As one example, Republican militia units refused to escort newly-elected 
Federalist President John Adams through Philadelphia in 1796. See Jeffrey A. Jacobs, 
The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues and Answers (Lexington, Ky.: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1994), 29. 
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on their use.45  Elsewhere, individual men simply did not respond when called. 
Nevertheless, states maintained the political structures needed to administer state-wide 
militia systems throughout the antebellum era and continued to pay lip-service to the 
republican virtues of the citizen-soldier.46  But in reality, militia service diminished 
considerably.47  Brooms filled in for muskets at drill and private volunteer units started to 
replace mandatory units. Men simply stopped training without fear of local, state, or 
national reprisal. The Militia Act of 1792 was finally repealed as part of the Militia Act 
of 1903.48 
In short, militias as a form of universal military training and service were never 
truly universal and became still less so over time. American citizenship as it applied to 
white, freeborn men, never truly rested on an obligation to serve.49  Nevertheless, the 
                                                
45 For example, during the War of 1812, Governor John Cotton Smith of 
Connecticut declared the federal mobilization of militia units unconstitutional, claiming 
that the presence of British ships off the American coast did not constitute an invasion, 
while members of the Ohio and New York militias refused to cross the border into 
Canada, citing the provision that militia units were to be used as a defensive force only. 
See John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: 
MacMillan Publishing Company: 1983), 67-69. 
46 Jerry Cooper, The Militia and the National Guard in America Since Colonial 
Times: A Research Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 69. 
47 According to Mahon, by the late 1820s, Ohio had the largest proportion of 
militiamen to general population at one in five, while South Carolina had the lowest at 
one in nineteen. In 1830, the War Department issued enough weapons to states to equip 
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Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 83. 
48 Popularly known as the Dick Act, after Representative Charles Dick of Ohio, 
the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, the Militia Act of 1903 
created a voluntary “organized militia,” otherwise known as the National Guard, which 
would be equipped and at least marginally funded by the federal government, would have 
to conform to certain government standards, and which could be federalized in the case 
of a national emergency, but which would otherwise remain under the control of the 
individual states. 
49 For a larger discussion of exclusionary definitions of the citizen-soldier, see 
Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, ch. 5.  
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ideal of the citizen-soldier as an arbiter of citizenship and virtue, the “civic-minded 
willingness to set aside private interests for the sake of the common good” against the 
corrupting influences of concentrated power, resonated with the American populace 
during the nineteenth century, when concepts of citizenship increasingly depended on 
broad civic participation.50 As men – middle- and working-class, native-born and 
immigrant – voted, ran for office, marched in parades, debated one another, and joined 
civic organizations, they created ritual practices that united them as citizens of a nation 
rather than simply inhabitants of a locality or state. In the words of historian Thomas 
Watson, “Republicanism…was not an abstraction for the typical American freeholder.”51  
Militia service was part of this broad political participation. The symbolic value of the 
citizen-soldier as a strong, virtuous, patriotic, masculine ideal that was on display during 
military drill far outweighed the reality that relatively few men actually served in militias 
and those who did frequently did so in exclusionary units as a means to gain social status.  
The ideal of the citizen-soldier took on additional symbolic power in the twentieth 
century with the advent of mass armies, especially in the wake of World War II, the high 
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point of mass citizen participation in the American military. Approximately 12 million 
men – including 80 percent of men born in the 1920s – served in the armed forces during 
the war.52  The majority was drafted. But whether each individual enlisted or was 
conscripted, military service was, for that generation, a common experience. World War 
II veterans, just like veterans of every other American war from the Revolution to the 
present, earned special benefits – variously, pensions, preferential hiring status, health 
care, low-interest loans, and access to education – that remained unavailable to 
Americans who did not enter the armed forces. The passage of the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, more popularly known as the G.I. Bill, allowed almost an 
entire generation of American men access to these benefits, a phenomenon historian 
Patrick J. Kelly has termed “martial citizenship.”53  Volunteers and draftees alike – both 
citizen-soldiers – gained special status through their military service.  
But the depth of the myth after World War II went beyond mass participation, for 
the second realm inhabited by the citizen-soldier is symbolic. In Krebs’ words, the 
citizen-soldier is “a set of rhetorical conventions.”54  As this dissertation will show, 
politicians, the media, and individuals used the symbol of the citizen-soldier to embody 
America’s best values, although how they defined these values varied by time and place. 
Most commonly, the citizen-soldier has been portrayed as a man who sacrificed – his 
time, his property, his family life, his health, his life – in order to protect his loved ones 
and his nation. For example, as chapter one will show, President Harry Truman, in 
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advocating for a system of universal military training for all American men, used the 
symbol of the minuteman who grabbed his musket from the mantel to defend his infant 
country’s liberty as shorthand. Truman expected Americans to recognize this citizen-
soldier as a virtuous, honorable, courageous, strong, and resourceful man, willing to 
sacrifice his time and his life for the good of the nation. The symbolic language used by 
Truman and others through the period under study, also encompassed that which the 
soldier was supposed to gain from his service to the nation, including a sense of 
belonging, self-discipline, and respect for the diversity of the American populace. In 
short, many of the individuals discussed in this work assumed that military service was a 
great leveler. Through their service to the country, men were to gain an appreciation for 
their nation and their fellow citizens and improve as individuals and citizens.55  The 
symbol of the citizen-soldier incorporated all of these values.  
The ideal of the citizen-soldier has also been gendered.56  According to the myth, 
military service, which, historically, has been available only to (free, white) men, 
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transformed boys into manly citizens. Political scientist R. Claire Snyder, for example, 
argued that the voluntary militia units formed by private citizens to replace dying public 
units in the antebellum era helped unify American manhood. Although individual men 
joined outfits based on their social class, race, and ethnicity, volunteers in all of these 
units participated in drill, wore similar uniforms, and professed a commitment to the 
public good. “The myth of the Citizen-Soldier,” she wrote, “demanded that a diversity of 
male individuals participate in the martial rituals that would constitute them as a 
fraternity of masculine republican citizens.”57  Thus, all of the qualities associated with 
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the ideal – duty, independence, patriotism, honor, self-discipline, and so on – were 
associated with masculinity. These manly characteristics infused cultural representations 
of military service.58  Moreover, since, through most of American history, women (and 
non-white and homosexual men) have been excluded from the military, martial 
citizenship has accrued only to (white, heterosexual) men.59  The feminized social 
position of conscientious objectors, who were branded as sissies, weaklings, cowards, 
and traitors during both World Wars, underscores this point.60  Men, therefore, have also 
served in order to protect their masculinity.61   
The citizen-soldier has been a malleable symbol because it has resonated widely 
across the political spectrum. On one hand, it has been intimately linked to the ideal 
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civic-republican definition of citizenship, which historically stressed the pursuit of the 
public good over private interests. According to this tradition, the citizen-soldier 
performed military service in order to earn the right to political participation. The act of 
soldiering constituted citizenship.  Service in the military built the qualities – honor, duty, 
self-sacrifice, independence, patriotism, courage – that composed the civic virtue 
required of all citizens in a republic.62  “Equal rights,” in the words of scholar Francine 
D’Amico, “demand[ed] equal responsibilities.”63 Moreover, following the Anti-
Federalists of the Revolutionary era, universal (male) participation in the military was 
supposed to prevent the establishment of a warrior elite and eliminate the potential for 
tyranny that could accompany a standing army.64    
But liberals in the classical tradition have also utilized the myth of the citizen-
soldier, if somewhat differently. The classically liberal conception of citizenship has 
historically privileged individual liberties over obligation to the polity and rejected the 
idea of military service as a prerequisite for citizenship. Rather than citizens owing an 
obligation to the state, therefore, classical liberalism has stressed the state’s responsibility 
to protect the rights of citizens. Ideally, citizens have only a limited liability to the state 
that can be discharged through the payment of taxes. According to political scientist Eliot 
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A. Cohen, model liberals believe “life is a natural right.”  Thus, a man cannot “rightfully 
be required to die for his country” unless “peril [is] immediate and mortal,” in which case 
the state must be defended so that it can survive to protect individual rights in the 
future.65  In the words of political scientist Derek Heater, the “liberal citizen is expected 
to feel only a limited obligation to the state,” and “the state is expected to impinge on the 
citizen’s life in only a feeble way.”66  Liberalism historically rejected the compulsion 
inherent in civic-republicanism, but treated voluntary participation in the armed forces as 
a moral obligation, nonetheless.67  Liberals worked to create a military controlled by 
civilian officials and staffed by non-professional soldiers who freely offered their time 
and service.68  This is why, through most of their history, American military forces have 
been constituted solely by volunteers. Both models, however, have used the figure of a 
moral, virtuous, soldier who served to protect his home, family, and nation to show how 
civilian values should infuse the military and rein in its power. 
                                                
65 Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, 134-36. Quote p. 136. 
66 Heater, What is Citizenship?, 7. 
67 Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, 137. 
68 For more on the ideological differences between civic republican and liberal 
conceptions of citizenship, see Ruth H. Bloch, “The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in 
Revolutionary America,” Signs 13 (Fall 1987): 37-58; Isaac Kramnick, “The ‘Great 
National Discussion’: The Discourse of Politics in 1787,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 45, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 3-32; Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution. For more on how these ideologies affected the ideal of the citizen-soldier in 
the United States, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and 
Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1957); Eliot A. 
Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, ch. 5-6; Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors; 
Michael S. Neiberg, Making Citizen Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American 
Military Service (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Ronald R. Krebs, 
Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2006); Lawrence Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia 
in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982). 
 27 
My work indicates some of the ways these varied visions of military service 
functioned in the American political realm between 1945 and 1973. Politicians’ and 
officials’ positions in debates over military manpower policy rarely broke along party 
lines. Instead, planners, interest groups, and ordinary citizens tended to support or reject 
proposals based on how they defined citizenship. This is how, for example, Director of 
Selective Service Lewis B. Hershey, a Republican who believed strongly in civic 
republican definitions of citizenship, could support Democrat Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society proposals. As I argue, Hershey hoped programs designed to identify and 
rehabilitate poor men who could not pass their induction exams would give those men the 
tools they needed to serve their nation in some capacity. It also explains how, in 1966, 
James Farmer, a founder and former director of the civil rights organization Congress of 
Racial Equality; Norman Thomas, a co-founder of the American Civil Liberties Union 
and perennial presidential candidate for the Socialist Party of America; Karl Hess, an 
advisor and speech writer for Republican Senator and presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater; and Milton Friedman, among others, could come together to sponsor an 
organization dedicated to ending the draft.69  Although these men inhabited vastly 
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different positions on the political spectrum, from socialist to libertarian, they all favored 
a liberal interpretation of citizenship with regard to military service. They all believed 
that Selective Service, as it functioned during the Vietnam War, infringed on men’s rights 
and therefore harmed American liberty.  
* * * * * 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, politicians and defense officials blended 
pragmatic policy decisions with a desire to use the military establishment to affect social 
change. This combination widened the definition of what constituted service to the state, 
and, I argue, emphasized the importance of men’s breadwinner role and responsible 
fatherhood rather than military obligation. As a result, however individual men chose to 
define their own masculinity and citizenship, these policies conveyed the message that 
men did not need to serve in the armed forces to prove themselves responsible men or 
good citizens.  
This argument adds a new dimension to the scholarly use of the term “economic 
citizenship.”  Recent historians have used it to signify the system of benefits workers 
earned from the state through their employment, including the right to Social Security’s 
old age pensions, unemployment compensation, and disability insurance. Such 
entitlements offered workers a measure of economic stability and marked them as full 
participants in the political economy.70  It also afforded them the ability to consume, for, 
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as historian Meg Jacobs has argued, consumption replaced “production as the foundation 
of American civic identity,” in the twentieth century. Economic citizenship became 
“essential to the definition of modern liberalism.”71 This was evident even on U.S. 
military bases in Vietnam, where soldiers demanded the right to consumer goods, 
including American steak and Coca-Cola.72  
In my work, I use “economic citizenship” to refer to a set of citizens’ 
responsibilities to the state in addition to the benefits workers expected from the state. 
Economic markers, including a high gross national product, full employment, and a 
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consumerist lifestyle, became, in the minds of some, weapons of the Cold War in the 
1950s and 1960s.73  Men’s ability to earn a living for their families not only earned them 
the right to federal entitlements, but, as I will show, also became a matter of national 
security in the minds of significant policymakers. A democratic, capitalist system could 
not prove its superiority if a significant segment of the population lived in poverty and 
was therefore dependent on handouts.74  Breadwinning fathers kept families off of the 
dole and earned the federal benefits they gained. But their labor – and therefore their 
economic independence – was also defined by the Selective Service as a contribution to 
the nation’s defense. Self-sufficient workers strengthened the United States. Deferments 
in the 1950s and Department of Defense initiatives in the 1960s designed to locate and 
“rehabilitate” poor and minority men worked to encourage and train men to enter the 
civilian workforce. These programs sent the message that military service was only one 
way for men to defend and serve the nation. Supporting their families was another. For 
certain defense planners, including Hershey and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
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and Great Society Liberals like Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, helping men earn 
full economic citizenship eclipsed the masculine obligation to perform military service.75 
This finding has an important implication for the historiography of militarization 
in the United States.76 Military manpower policies that defined non-military pursuits as 
essential to national defense clearly served to militarize the civilian sector, as certain 
occupations and domestic arrangements were portrayed as aiding the country’s national 
defense against communism. As scholars have shown, civilian scientists conducted the 
research necessary to build a better bomb. Fathers financially supported their families, 
which helped Americans achieve the consumerist lifestyle that was supposed to 
characterize a capitalist democracy, and led their families’ civil defense efforts.77  By 
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associating national security with civilian pursuits, these policies helped militarize huge 
swaths of civilian life. Surprisingly, however, by identifying non-military pursuits as 
essential to national defense, these same military manpower policies weakened the 
citizen-soldier ideal by ensuring that a shrinking proportion of men would serve in the 
military and by defining civilian pursuits as the equivalent of military service. The 
defense establishment, therefore, unintentionally undermined its own manpower 
procurement system, leading to the eventual disestablishment of the draft. 
* * * * * 
 In addition to explaining the mechanisms men used to avoid military service 
during the Vietnam War, this work joins a new and growing body of literature that 
highlights how assumptions about gender, race, sexuality, and class shaped public policy 
and how, in turn, public policy shaped identities and social relations. Policy both 
reinforced existing beliefs about America’s social structure and caused those beliefs to 
evolve and change.78   
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This project argues that debates over men’s proper role in society influenced 
military manpower policy. As they discussed and argued over which men should serve in 
the armed forces and which should not, politicians, military officials, and ordinary 
Americans betrayed a strong attachment to the masculine citizen-soldier. Those who 
subscribed to civic republican ideology tended to believe that military service could 
transform boys into men by teaching them the rudiments of citizenship, hardening their 
bodies, and inculcating self-discipline. They believed that martial masculinity was the 
key to national improvement, and military service should be a rite of passage for all 
young men. Others, however, argued that universal service would corrupt male youth, 
regiment it, and ultimately undermine American freedom. These critics highlighted the 
importance of domestic forms of masculinity. They understood the family as the center of 
a man’s life. They argued that parents nurtured boys into men, and then the families that 
mature men headed constituted their most important contribution to the state. Still other 
critics of military service, especially those who believed in the importance of classically 
liberal forms of citizenship, focused on the male role of breadwinner. Compulsory 
military service, they believed, robbed men of their ability to choose how to support their 
families and contribute to national strength in the manner that they saw fit. As the modern 
liberal state grew through the twentieth-century, the influence of civic republicanism 
waned. Military manpower policy, as a reflection of national values, increasingly 
privileged individuals’ rights to pursue masculine citizenship in a variety of ways, both 
within and outside of the military establishment.79 
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 This project also explores what one scholar has called “the lived Cold War.”80  
Military manpower policy affected the life choices of some men and their families. As I 
will argue, deferments from military service became normalized through the 1950s and 
1960s. They became significantly easier to obtain and excuse, which in turn, influenced 
the career choices of some men, when they married, and the circumstances under which 
they decided to have children. For a few, the availability of deferments affected how they 
treated their bodies, including whether they sought treatment for medical conditions. The 
laws and regulations that governed deferments evolved in response to America’s foreign 
policy and defense needs. Policy shaped in reaction to Cold War strategy, therefore, 
directly impacted individual lives. 
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The long view of manpower policy helps contextualize the anti-draft and anti-
military protest of the late 1960s and early 1970s. As previously explained, scholars who 
have examined the failure of conscription and the shift to the All-Volunteer Force have 
identified the unique circumstances of the Vietnam War as the main cause of anti-
military sentiment. I argue that it has a longer history. Historians of the pacifist 
movement have identified a longer history of anti-military activism, but tend to view 
draft resistance as a tool of activists, when, quite often, it was men who would not 
consider themselves politically active who sought legal ways to avoid the draft.81  Works 
that look at Cold War culture have identified a weakening of “the warrior image” in the 
decades before the Vietnam War but have not adequately identified either the causes or 
implications of this change.82  Scholars of gender have used anti-military sentiment 
during the Vietnam War to explain the nation’s so-called “crisis of masculinity” in the 
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the Fifties,” 74-105, in Rethinking Cold War Culture, ed. Peter J. Kuznick and James 
Gilbert (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). 
 36 
1970s and 1980s but have not explained the origin of this sentiment.83 My work pulls all 
of these threads together, and, by asking new questions about the meanings of national 
service and citizenship, helps explain a phenomenon that no one else has been able to. 
Most importantly, I demonstrate the surprising ways that military policy itself promoted 
men’s ambivalence toward military service and how it influenced the way individuals 
thought about the relationship among citizenship, masculinity, and military service. 
* * * * * 
 Finally, a note explaining the process by which men entered the military is in 
order. Between 1948 and 1973, men became soldiers in one of two ways. The first was 
by volunteering.84 If a man chose to enlist, he signed up for the service branch and 
program of his choice through local recruiting stations. He would then undergo a physical 
exam, aptitude testing, and an interview at an Armed Forces Examining Station (AFES) 
in his home state.85  If he met the entrance requirements for his desired service branch, he 
was sent to basic training, upon the satisfactory completion of which, he would be a 
soldier, sailor, airman, or marine. The different service branches had different methods of 
handling men who could not pass their basic training, including “recycling,” whereby 
                                                
83 Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinzation of America: Gender and the Vietnam 
War (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1989); Faludi, Stiffed; Natasha 
Zaretskey, No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 
1968-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Cynthia Enloe, The 
Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley, Calif.: University 
of California Press, 1993), ch. 3; Ehrenreich, The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and 
the Flight from Commitment (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1983). 
84 The “choice” to volunteer can be misleading throughout the period when the 
draft operated. As will be demonstrated throughout “Citizen-Civilians,” especially in 
chapters two and three, one of the main purposes of conscription was to pressure men to 
choose to enlist before they could be drafted.  
85 Armed Forces Examination Stations are sometimes referred to as Armed Forces 
Examining and Induction Stations (AFEIS) or Armed Forces Examining and Entrance 
Station (AFEES). For the sake of consistency, this work will use the acronym AFES. 
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recruits would redo certain portions of the program. It was rare but possible to wash out 
of training for physical or mental reasons. It was more common, however, for a trainee to 
be discharged for disciplinary infractions, a status that carried with it lasting 
repercussions since men were required to share their military discharge status with 
prospective employers. College men could also volunteer for the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (ROTC), which, if successfully completed, would lead to a commission 
in the reserves or active duty forces.86 
 The second option for entering the military was to wait to be drafted through the 
Selective Service System.87  Most men registered at their local Selective Service boards 
in person upon their eighteenth birthdays. Those with obvious disabilities, like a missing 
limb, or who required institutionalization, would not have to travel to their local boards 
but would be immediately classified as ineligible for military service. Through the 1950s 
and early 1960s, as deferment standards became more lenient, those who could 
demonstrate physical disabilities such as asthma or cardiac defects with a note from a 
physician could also be classified as IV-F upon their initial contact with the Selective 
Service. Everyone else received a questionnaire designed to provide the local board 
members with information about the registrant’s dependents, educational status, 
occupation, and religion. Based on the man’s answers, members of the man’s local board 
                                                
86 Between its creation in 1916 and the early 1960s, two years of ROTC training 
were compulsory on many college campuses, including almost all of the nation’s land-
grant universities. In the years just prior to America’s entry into the Vietnam War, as part 
of a larger program of revamping the country’s reserve programs, universities began to 
drop the compulsory aspect of military training. Between 1961 and 1965, sixty Army 
ROTC and 59 Air Force ROTC units switched to an all-volunteer status. For more 
information, see Neiberg, Making Citizen Soldiers, 58. 
87 Through most of the period under study, this meant induction into the Army, 
which during times of peace was the only service branch directly utilizing conscription to 
meet its manpower quotas.  
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– unpaid volunteers who were overwhelmingly veterans and who were all men – would 
provisionally classify the man as I-A (available for service), begin proceedings to 
determine if he could be considered a conscientious objector, or provide a deferment 
according to the current Selective Service regulations. Those who received deferments 
would have their files reviewed once per year to determine if the mitigating factor 
remained. If a man graduated from college, lost his job, or experienced some change in 
his dependency status – if an elderly parent whom he supported died, for example – he 
would be provisionally reclassified as I-A. 
 Those whom local boards provisionally classified as I-A eventually would be 
called to their nearest AFES for their preinduction exam, a procedure identical to the 
induction exam taken by volunteers.88  Men were asked to strip down to their underwear 
and move from station to station to have various parts of their bodies physically 
examined. They would also receive a chest X-ray, urinalysis, and blood work. After the 
physical exam was completed, men would dress and move on for what the Army 
described as a mental test – an aptitude test designed to measure a potential recruit’s 
ability to absorb military training.89  A man’s score on the exam would determine into 
which mental category he would be placed. In theory, the Army drafted men from each 
                                                
88 Until 1967, the Selective Service inducted the oldest eligible men first. When 
draft calls, as set by the Selective Service, were low, this process could be very slow. In 
1963, for example, most men were not called for preinduction exams until the age of 21 
and did not face induction until at least their 22nd birthdays, if not later. For a colorful 
description of the preinduction exam process, see George Walton, The Wasted 
Generation (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1965), 9-15. 
89 Between 1950 and 1972, men took the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT), which included sections that measured verbal ability, mathematical ability, and 
spatial reasoning. 
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mental category in proportion to the population at large.90 After a full day, men returned 
home to wait. If and when the military needed them, they would receive an induction 
notice and be returned to the AFES for an induction exam. If a man was inducted within 
180 days of his preinduction exam, this second exam would be a cursory inspection for 
any diseases or injuries he may have sustained since the initial inspection. If he received 
his induction notice more than 180 days after the first physical, he would receive a 
second full examination. After that, if he passed muster, he would be sworn into a 
particular service branch – the Army for most of the period under study – and be sent to 
basic training. Between 1948 and 1973, the preinduction exam was a common and nerve-
wracking process for almost all American men. 
* * * * * 
 “Citizen-Civilians” uses sources from a variety of archival, government, military, 
and civilian sources to build its arguments. It draws heavily from the records of 
presidential advisory commissions held at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, 
Missouri, and the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, 
Maryland, as well as from the Records of the Selective Service, also at the National 
Archives. Documents from these collections provide a window into internal discussions 
on the development of military manpower policies. Transcripts from congressional 
hearings, published reports from government and military fact-finding committees, and 
                                                
90 Scores between 93 and 100 were considered Mental Group I, between 65 and 
92 were Mental Group II, between 31 and 64 were Mental Group III, between 10 and 30 
were Mental Group IV, and scores below 10 were Mental Group V. In theory, seven 
percent of draftees were to be from Category I, 28 percent from Category II, 34 percent 
from Category III, 21 percent from Category IV, and 10 percent from Category V. 
However, as chapter four will show, this was not always the case. See Walton, The 
Wasted Generation, 14. 
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publicity materials produced by the Army and Department of Defense illustrate the ways 
in which policy debates and decisions were disseminated to the public. Sociological 
studies, pilot-programs, and published position papers from private organizations, think 
tanks, and scholars show how these groups influenced policy decisions and public 
opinion. And finally, letters to the president and Selective Service found in archival 
collections, articles in the popular press, and public opinion polls indicate how Americans 
reacted to military manpower policy. I have supplemented archival and other primary 
sources with a rich body of secondary works on military policy, the Cold War, and 
gender in the United States. 
 Chapter one examines debates surrounding the push for universal military training 
(UMT) in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Proposals called for the military training of all 
eighteen year-old men, but as civilians rather than as soldiers. The measure was designed 
to return men to their civilian lives after their year of training but as members of a large, 
unorganized, civilian reserve. Planners believed that the knowledge men gained in that 
year would allow the military to mobilize quickly and efficiently in the event of nuclear 
attack or another war. Despite the support of the War Department, three presidents, and 
the majority of American citizens, UMT failed to gain legislative traction, in part because 
Americans did not share a common definition of masculine citizenship. This chapter 
argues that competing visions of manhood clashed in UMT proposals. Supporters hoped 
universal training would become a rite of passage that would teach patriotism and duty to 
American men at the same time that it remediated healthcare deficiencies and offered 
vocational training. A year with the military would put all American men, regardless of 
background, on a common path toward full citizenship in the civic-republican model. 
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Opponents, on the other hand, believed UMT would undermine the very foundations of 
American citizenship. Using a classically liberal interpretation, they believed compulsory 
training would violate trainees’ rights, corrupt their moral virtue, and militarize the 
nation. Domestic and economic citizenship, they argued, was best achieved outside of the 
military establishment. Ultimately, I contend, UMT’s failure confirmed the nation’s 
commitment to selective rather than universal military service. Not all young men would 
serve in the military, even if all were ostensibly liable for such service under the draft. 
The failure of UMT also outlined the limits of militarization in Cold War America. 
 Chapter two, which examines the public debate over draft deferments 
immediately before and during the Korean War, argues that American commitment to 
selective military liability deepened in the early 1950s. The Selective Service faced a 
particularly difficult task during the conflict, as low birth rates during the Great 
Depression resulted in a smaller than usual pool of draft age men in the early 1950s. 
Nevertheless, it was during an active hot war that Congress instituted a deferment for 
college students. Members also postponed the induction of married men with children up 
until the very last days of the war. I contend that they – and other elements of American 
society – were reluctant to draft students and fathers because they believed that the 
Korean War was just the opening salvo of a much longer Cold War. America was 
entering an indeterminate period of militarized peace, during which conscription would 
remain necessary.91  Therefore, regulations instituted during the Korean War could not 
disrupt American society overmuch because, planners believed, such regulations were 
creating a new normalcy. The nation’s economic and domestic future depended on 
                                                
91 See chapter two for a discussion of what I mean by “militarized peace.” 
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careful and reasoned deliberation over who to draft and who to defer. The draft law that 
emerged during the Korean War, the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 
1951, confirmed the importance of student, occupational, and dependency deferments. In 
the process of deferring tens of thousands of men under its provisions, however, the law 
militarized fatherhood and civilian occupations defined as in the national health, safety, 
or interest. Yet, by keeping certain groups of men out of the armed forces in the name of 
national security, the law broadened the definition of service to the state and limited the 
reach of the military itself. 
 Chapter three extends the argument developed in chapter two by focusing on the 
development of the Selective Service System’s decision to “channel” men into certain 
occupations and domestic arrangements. Under the policy of “manpower channeling,” the 
Selective Service offered deferments to those men who enlisted in the Reserves and 
National Guard, who pursued jobs deemed to be in the national interest, and who married 
and had children. In granting these deferments, the Selective Service altered its mission – 
defining itself as a civil defense agency as well as a procurer of military manpower – and 
the definition of service to the state. Not only did it accept civilian pursuits as national 
service as it had during the Korean War, but by the late 1950s, it explicitly encouraged 
certain men to fulfill their citizenship obligations by remaining civilians. Hershey and his 
staff believed that scientists, engineers, teachers, students, fathers, and others could 
contribute more to the nation as civilians than as soldiers. Through the policy of 
channeling, the Selective Service made social engineering one of its main priorities. Men 
themselves, whether aware of the policy’s rationale or not, used their deferments to avoid 
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the military. As fewer and fewer men faced the threat of conscription, commitment to 
military service diminished. It became something that “other men” did. 
 Finally, chapter four returns to some of the same themes as chapter one. It 
examines other ways the military establishment became an agent of social engineering. 
Where manpower channeling primarily affected middle-class (often white) men who 
could afford the college educations necessary to enter the professions that would earn 
them deferments, other programs specifically targeted poor and minority men. The 
Selective Service and Department of Defense became soldiers in the War on Poverty. 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, in an effort to eradicate poverty and bolster America’s 
ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, turned to the Selective Service to identify 
men in need of vocational and educational help. Working with the Departments of 
Defense; Labor; and Health, Education, and Welfare, Hershey’s agency hoped to 
“salvage” those men believed to be incapable of service to the state.  It first tried 
voluntary referral and rehabilitation programs, and then in 1966, the Defense Department 
initiated a compulsory program known as Project 100,000, designed to offer 
rehabilitation services to conscripts. These measures focused on creating productive 
economic citizens. They either kept men in the civilian world or highlighted military 
service as a means of achieving economic independence. The civic-republican notion of 
military service as a universal path to citizenship formerly stressed in the debates over 
UMT fell away. The message was that military service would not benefit all men. It 
would improve poor or otherwise marginalized men, but middle-class men were left to 
their own devices. 
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 In all, I conclude, America’s system of conscription was already in trouble by 
1964, the year of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Many men simply did not feel it their 
responsibility to serve. As draft calls rose between 1964 and 1968, many resented the 
intrusion of Selective Service into their lives. Where the same might have been true 
during earlier conflicts, men were able to avoid service in large numbers during the 
Vietnam War because the mechanisms that allowed them – and even encouraged them – 
to do so were well-entrenched. The policies of the previous twenty-five years had 
provided both a rationale and a method for American men to avoid military service 







“To Rub Smooth the Sharp Edges”:  
Universal Military Training and the Meaning of Masculine Citizenship, 
1945-1951 
 
 On January 13, 1947, the Army opened an Experimental Training Unit at Fort 
Knox, Kentucky. It was designed to test the War Department’s proposal for universal 
military training (UMT), a plan that would have required military training in a civilian 
capacity for all able-bodied American men. The plan proposed that eighteen-year-olds 
would train under regular military officers, but remain civilians themselves. The Army 
intended this new unit to demonstrate the feasibility and value of such training. Its 
commander, Brigadier General John M. Devine, who had spent the last year of World 
War II leading the Army’s 8th Armored Division across France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Germany, now found himself in the middle of a public relations war. 
Despite widespread political support for UMT, the measure faced stiff opposition from 
religious, pacifist, educational, farming, and labor organizations and some members of 
Congress. They worried that widespread military training would infringe on the rights of 
individual men, militarize the nation, and destroy its moral foundations. The Army, 
detractors believed, was not the place to develop democratic citizens or virtuous men. 
Devine’s mission, therefore, was to oversee the military education of trainees in the 
experimental unit while also reassuring UMT’s critics. This meant keeping a close eye on 
the physical, moral, and religious welfare of the men as well as devising disciplinary and 
training procedures suitable for civilians within a military establishment. It was no easy 
task.  
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 Despite Devine’s assurances that he had “no intentions of handling…trainees with 
gloves,” he found it necessary to remind his commanders that they were “dealing with 
boys.”1  The general understood his “primary object” as the production of “disciplined, 
well trained, and self-reliant basic soldiers” despite the civilian nature of the program. He 
proposed “to train them like men (always remembering that they are boys).”2  His 
statements indicate two of the central dilemmas of universal military training in the 
United States. In order to gain support for UMT legislation, promoters needed to appeal 
to constituents who wanted the “boys” protected and the “men” hardened, to those who 
hoped it would train soldiers physically to defend the nation and those who wanted to 
develop civilians willing to sustain the nation’s democratic values.  
Universal military training, as indicated by Devine’s comments, was never 
envisioned as a straight-forward defense measure. Proponents argued that universal 
military training could eradicate illiteracy, remediate healthcare deficiencies, provide 
vocational training, and teach moral values. In short, the Army, through a program of 
UMT, could turn boys into productive American men. It would promote both martial 
citizenship and economic citizenship among traininees. Opponents vehemently disagreed. 
They could not accept military training as an essential component of male citizenship or 
the military as the best place to teach economic or domestic responsibility.  
                                                
 1 John M. Devine to Lt. General Raymond S. McLain, 27 Jan. 1947, Commission 
Kit – 7th meeting, 1-31-47, Box 3, Records of the President’s Advisory Commission on 
Universal Training [hereafter PACUT], Records of Temporary Committees, 
Commissions, and Boards (RG 220), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri 
[hereafter HST]; Devine, John M., Interrim Report: U.M.T. Experimental Unit, Fort 
Knox, Ky., 1947, 4, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania [hereafter USAMHI]. 
 2 Devine to McLain. 
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Congressional refusal to enact a program of universal military training, therefore, 
was significant for two main reasons. First it indicated the limits of militarization in the 
immediate post-war United States. As the Cold War took shape and the nation sought to 
deploy the ideology of democracy as a weapon against communism, it became 
increasingly important that defense policy, including key manpower decisions like 
universal military training, reflect democratic American principles. For too many people, 
compulsory military training reeked of totalitarianism.3  Militarization in the United 
States was an ambivalent process, and it would require a defter hand. Secondly, the 
failure of UMT confirmed the nation’s commitment to a system of selective rather than 
universal service. From 1948 until the end of the draft in 1973, the Department of 
Defense would struggle with a system of conscription that paid lip service to the concept 
of universal military obligation but did not compel military service of every man. As later 
chapters of this dissertation will show, deciding which men to select for military service 
and which men to defer or exempt became an increasingly time-consuming and 
problematic task for the agencies responsible for classifying the nation’s manpower. 
Universal military training was important for more than just its failure, however. 
As this chapter argues, the terms of the debate illustrated the contested nature of 
American citizenship and masculinity and their difficult relationship with military service 
in the second half of the twentieth century. Politicians, military officials, and members of 
the public sparred over the best ways to build masculinity, develop citizenship, and grow 
the military. UMT’s supporters and detractors grounded their positions in different 
                                                
3 It should be noted that opponents of UMT in the early years of the Cold War 
used the terms “fascism,” “totalitarianism,” “communism,” and “Prussianism” 
interchangeably to connote a system of government that stressed regimentation, 
militarism, and lack of freedom for its citizens. 
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theoretical bases for citizenship. For those who preferred a civic republican definition of 
citizenship, universal experience in the armed services seemed the most democratic way 
to forge male citizens. They believed that a year of common training would create 
common opportunities for all American men, provide a measure of equality to men from 
diverse backgrounds, and teach individuals how to function as informed citizens in a 
democratic republic. Those who defined citizenship more liberally viewed UMT as the 
first step along the path to fascism and totalitarianism. They thought that the 
regimentation of military life would destroy America’s independent manhood, undermine 
the liberty on which American citizenship was based, and arrest the moral development 
of boys as they grew into men.  
UMT failed, in part, because the political and military events of the early Cold 
War introduced new geopolitical realities that made the program seem outmoded. But it 
also failed because many Americans opposed universal compulsion in peace time. They 
worried about the possible consequences of using the military a major socializing agent 
for all young men. Classically liberal ideals of the citizen-soldier clashed with civic-
republican ones in debates over instituting the program. By late 1946 and early 1947, 
planners from the War Department and the Army had settled on a publicity strategy that 
addressed opponents’ concerns about the morality and democratic nature of compulsory 
military training. Such a strategy, however, created some peculiar problems for a military 
establishment whose first priority was maintaining national security by training men for 
war within a regimented and hierarchical organization. Moreover, the image of inclusive 
citizenship UMT proponents tried to project did not include all Americans. Such 
contradictions eventually proved too much for the military to handle. The campaign 
 49 
failed to convince Congress, detractors, or the American public that the Army was the 
proper place to instill the virtues of citizenship or masculinity into American men. 
Ultimately, the defeat of UMT limited the reach of militarization in the immediate post-
war era and confirmed the nation’s commitment to military service as a selective rather 
than a universal obligation. 
* * * * * 
The modern idea of universal male military training did not originate with the 
Cold War. Rather, it grew out of the preparedness movement of the pre-World War I 
years. Advocates believed American involvement in World War I was inevitable and that 
the only response to the threat of war was a program of readiness, including the 
development of a large, well-trained army. A few newly-formed preparedness 
organizations, including the Association for National Service, the Universal Military 
Training League, the Business Men’s National Service League, and the Army League, 
went one step further and became champions of universal military training. Of these 
groups, the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA) became the most visible and 
vocal. By 1916 it counted among its ranks more than 17,000 veterans of civilian military 
training camps that it established with support from the U.S. Army.4  Members, most of 
whom were wealthy and powerful eastern and mid-western businessmen, argued that the 
burden of military service should be spread equally throughout the populace and that 
prepared citizens could constitute a large fighting force if necessary.  The MTCA gained 
enough publicity that the entire UMT lobby became known as the “Plattsburg 
                                                
 4 John Gary Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp 
Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1972), 152. 
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Movement,” after the civilian training camp it established at Plattsburg Barracks, New 
York.5 
Just before American entry into the war, the War Plans Division of the Army 
General Staff established a four-man committee, chaired by Colonel (later Brigadier 
General) John MacAuley Palmer, to examine the feasibility of UMT. The committee’s 
report recommended adopting the program as part of a larger plan of Army 
reorganization, but involvement in the European conflagration placed all such plans on 
hold.6  The issue of reorganization resurfaced in early 1919, after the war had been won 
                                                
5 The Plattsburg training camp began as public/private hybrid, but eventually 
became wholly financed by the U.S. military. Major General Leonard Wood, as Army 
Chief of Staff, had pioneered the idea of summer training camps for college students in 
1913 and 1914. In 1915, when he became the commanding general of the Eastern 
Department of the Army, he partnered with New York lawyer and preparedness activist 
Grenville Clark on a plan to expand the camps to professionals and businessmen. 
Plattsburg was the first of these training facilities. It was underwritten by a private 
donation from financier Bernard Baruch and supplied by the U.S. Army. Its 
approximately 1,200 recruits each paid thirty dollars to attend. The political clout of 
camp veterans such as Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Elihu Root, Jr., Henry Stimson’s law 
partner Bronson Winthrop, Delaware congressman Thomas W. Miller, and New York 
City mayor John Purroy Mitchel helped preparedness advocates succesfully influence 
Congress to include Section 54 in the National Defense Act of 1916. It authorized the 
establishment of civilian training camps under the direct supervision of the Army and 
provided uniforms, food, and transportation for recruits at government expense. For more 
information, see Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers, 60-66.   
 6 Memorandum “Outline of a National Military Policy Based on Universal 
Military Training” attached to letter from John McAuley Palmer to James W. 
Wadsworth, 6 July 1942, UMT Folder, James W. Wadsworth Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. Quoted in Frank Dale Cunningham, “The Army and 
Universal Military Training, 1942-1948” (Ph.D. Diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 
1976), 44.  Before American entry into World War I placed plans on hold, several bills 
were introduced in Congress to adopt UMT, including 64 S. 1695, introduced by 
Democrat George E. Chamberlain of Oregon on December 15, 1918, which called for the 
training of all “able-bodied male inhabitants” of the United States between the ages of 
twelve and twenty-three; and 65 S. 5485, introduced by Republican Harry New of 
Indiana on January 31, 1919, which required one year of continuous training for all 
American men at the age of eighteen. Bill quoted in “Detailed Summary of Bills 
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but before the shape of the international community had yet been decided. At least three 
congressional proposals contained provisions for UMT.7 
By early 1920, however, public and political opinion had turned against the idea 
of compulsory training for all male citizens.8  House Democrats decided to throw their 
weight behind President Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations as the best way to settle 
international disputes. Seeing a system of UMT and a large army as antithetical to the 
principles of global peace and cooperation, they voted to oppose UMT in any plan for 
reorganization.9  Once this occurred, House Republicans opted to wait until after the 
1920 elections to push the issue. In the Senate, Joseph Freylinghuysen, a Republican 
from New Jersey, introduced an amendment that called for voluntary training at civilian 
camps for all citizens who requested it, which ultimately became part of the National 
Defense Act of 1920.10  UMT proponents had lost. 
Despite their defeat, the MCTA and other UMT lobbying organizations proved an 
important precursor to the post-World War II UMT movement. Advocates like Palmer, 
who went on to advise the Senate Military Affairs Committee, played a crucial role in 
                                                                                                                                            
Introduced in Congress on Universal Military Training, 1915-1947,” Staff Studies, 
Summary of Bills Introduced in Congress on UMT, Box 7, PACUT, HST. 
7 On Aug. 5, 1919, Republican James Wadsworth of New York introduced 66 S. 
2715 and Republican Julius Kahn of California introduced 66 H.R. 8287, both of which 
reflected the War Department’s plan for a three-month training period; 66 S. 2691, 
introduced by Chamberlain and 66 H.R. 8068, introduced by Kahn, reflected the 
MCTA’s plan and contained provision for a longer training period and a reserve 
obligation; 66 S. 3792 was introduced by Wadsworth as a result of hearings of the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee he chaired between August 1919 and January 1920. It would 
have required four months of training. 
 8 Cunningham, “The Army and Universal Military Training,” 48. 
9 66 S. 3792.  
 10 P.L. 66-242; Chase C. Mooney and Martha E. Layman, “Some Phases of the 
Compulsory Military Training Movement, 1914-1920,” Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 38, no. 4 (March 1952): 655.  
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later debates, as did the more than 500,000 men who received voluntary training at the 
Citizens’ Military Training Camps in the two decades after World War I.11 George 
Marshall, Henry Stimson, and Palmer were all veterans of the Plattsburg Movement. 
Moreover, these activists pioneered many of the arguments that would be used in 
favor of UMT in the 1940s and 1950s. Although the primary focus of the campaign for 
UMT had been preparedness for World War I, advocates had highlighted secondary 
benefits of training as well. Members of the MCTA called for a male citizenship based on 
universal male military training and service, emphasizing what they saw as the 
democratic nature of such a program. UMT would not “militarize the nation,” a 1915 
New Republic article on the camp at Plattsburg stated. “Rather…[it would] civilize the 
American military system.”  Military training camps would not “turn civilians into mere 
automatons. They [would] attach soldiering to citizenship; and … do it in such a way as 
to make a soldier really a civilian.”12  MCTA members understood a civilian reserve as a 
deterrent to militarism rather than as a potential threat to American liberty. They believed 
training would enhance Americans’ commitment to liberty by underscoring the principles 
of duty, responsibility, and patriotism. They also used the perceived non-military benefits 
of UMT as selling points. Former Assistant Secretary of War Henry Breckinridge, for 
example, told an audience at the Academy of Political Science in 1916 that the extra 
training illiterate and non-English-speaking trainees would receive within the MCTA’s 
UMT program would “yank the hyphen out of America.”13  The organization’s plan 
included provisions for naturalizing immigrant aliens who completed training, teaching 
                                                
 11 Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers, 296. 
 12 “The Plattsburg Idea,” New Republic, Oct. 9, 1915: 247-249, cited in Clifford, 
The Citizen Soldiers, 195. 
 13 “Sees End of Hyphen in Universal Drill,” New York Times, May 19, 1916. 
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illiterate trainees how to read, and providing vocational training to those men who needed 
it.14  According to enthusiasts, universal training could unify a divided nation, create an 
educated populace, and protect American liberty.  
Members of the MCTA were content to bide their time with voluntary camps 
during the interwar years, managing to keep them safe from budget cuts, even during the 
austere years of the Great Depression. They understood their plans for UMT as a victim 
of poor timing. Rather than revise their arguments, they and other UMT supporters 
resurrected them in 1940.15 In June of that year, the organization drafted a bill that found 
sponsorship in Congress amidst a new flurry of preparedness measures.16  But the idea 
once again took a back seat to war planning, as Congress, under pressure from President 
Franklin Roosevelt, passed a controversial measure to instate a draft before a formal 
declaration of war for the first time in U.S. history.17 
* * * * * 
The second push for UMT began during World War II, and as in the first, 
proponents focused primarily on national security with only a secondary emphasis on 
                                                
 14 See McIlvaine’s testimony, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
Reorganization of the Army: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
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other benefits.18  Long-time advocates like Marshall, Stimson, and Palmer believed that a 
lack of centralized post-war planning had severely weakened the American military and 
the United States’ position in global politics, leading to what Marshall, now Army Chief 
of Staff, termed the Army’s “Dark Ages.”19  They treated congressional failure to include 
UMT in the National Defense Act of 1920 as a deficiency of political will and blamed the 
measure’s defeat on the wild swings in public opinion that followed the 1919 armistice. 
They argued that if Congress had acted with greater expediency in 1918, prior to the 
Fourteen Points and the introduction of the League of Nations, Americans would have 
enthusiastically supported a plan of universal military training. In turn, they reasoned, the 
large, trained reserve that would have resulted from the law would have deterred German 
and Japanese aggression in the late 1930s. According to Marshall, if the country had only 
“followed through” with the 1920 Defense Act by training a large civilian reserve, 
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Haven, Yale University Press, 1977), 3. 
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“Germany would not have dared to involve herself in a war that would draw the United 
States into the conflict.”20   
Supporters claimed that a civilian population with military training would reduce 
the amount of time needed for mobilization should another war occur and eliminate the 
need for a substantial, expensive, force-in-being. Articles written by high-ranking 
military and government officials in 1944 and 1945 stressed the strategic benefits of a 
large reserve. While they acknowledged UMT’s secondary advantages, like common 
education and universal healthcare for trainees, and highlighted American men’s 
citizenship obligations, they underscored the point that “the ultimate purpose of all 
Military Training is the assurance of victory in the event of war.”21  They claimed 
adopting UMT would act as a bargaining chip at peace negotiations, deter enemies from 
attacking American interests by providing the means for a quick U.S. counterstrike, and 
strengthen the United Nations through a show of American commitment. According to 
former New Dealer and presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, “such a force would be a 
powerful influence in discouraging aggression.”  Secretary of War Stimson explained, “If 
the American people should adopt the principle of universal military training, it would be 
the strongest possible assurance to the rest of the world that, in the future, America will 
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be not only willing but able and ready to take its part with the peace-loving nations in 
resisting lawless aggression and in assuring peaceful world order.”22   
These viewpoints were all aired during hearings before the House Select 
Committee on Postwar Military Policy held in June 1945. The Committee, chaired by 
Clifton A. Woodrum, a Democrat from Virginia, consisted of seven members of the 
Military Affairs Committee, seven members of the Naval Affairs Committee, and seven 
members at large. It was charged with recommending “a broad general policy” for 
postwar national defense, including evaluating the efficacy of a universal military 
training program.23  Over 150 witnesses, including government and military officials, 
representatives of concerned organizations, and private citizens presented testimony or 
prepared statements outlining their positions on a program of compulsory military 
training.  
Witnesses representing the military and civilian arms of the federal government 
overwhelmingly focused on universal military training as a key element to the United 
States’ national security policy, emphasizing their belief that America would not enjoy “a 
reasonable degree of national security” without it.24  Several themes ran through their 
testimony. First, although the shape of the postwar world had not yet been determined, 
they assumed that another war would occur if the United States appeared weak.25  
                                                
22 Henry L. Hopkins, “Tomorrow’s Army and Your Boy,” The American, March 
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 24 Testimony of Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs, ibid., 533-34. 
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Second, any future war would begin with a surprise aerial or missile attack on the United 
States. In that case, America would not have the luxury of time to marshal its resources 
and train its men. Instead, the military response would have to be immediate. Although 
they admitted that some retraining would be necessary, the military men felt that the 
knowledge citizens would gain during the year of civilian training would invaluably 
speed up mobilization in the event of a war. 26  Finally, although government witnesses 
vocalized their support for the United Nations, then in its infancy, they strongly 
recommended a show of military strength from the U.S. as the best way for America to 
back up its commitment to the new international body. The U.S. would only be able to 
act as the U.N.’s moral anchor if it had the military strength to support its claim to world 
leadership. Further, should the U.N. require its member nations to commit a 
peacekeeping force in the future, the United States needed to have enough troops to 
spare.27 
With the exception of Stimson, a former participant in the Plattsburg movement 
and member of the MCTA, government witnesses limited their discussion of UMT’s 
social benefits. Although they acknowledged the education and training men would 
receive as applicable to civilian life, they purposely kept the defensive goals of UMT as a 
security program at the fore of their statements. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz wrote a 
letter to the committee in which he called these educational and vocational “byproducts,” 
                                                
 26 See the testimony of Major General William F. Tompkins, 498, and General 
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“entirely beside the point.”  Vice Admiral Aubrey Fitch, the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (Air), complained that focus on the civilian benefits of military training 
tended to “confuse the issue.”28  
Witnesses with no connection to the government were more likely to extoll the 
non-military virtues of UMT, but nevertheless they argued primarily from a national 
security vantage point, albeit with heightened rhetorical flourish. According to John 
Thomas Taylor, of the American Legion’s national legislative committee, UMT’s 
opponents were the “one group to bear the blame” for American involvement in World 
War II. Anyone who failed to support UMT would be responsible for the next war.29  Jay 
Cooke, the president of the Citizens Committee for Military Training of Young Men, an 
ad-hoc lobbying organization that claimed chapters in 42 states, colorfully highlighted the 
protective benefits of UMT. “Few people rush up to [boxers] Joe Louis or Jack Dempsey 
and slap them in the face,” he asserted.30  No one would attack the United States if it 
appeared suitably strong. UMT, in these witnesses’ eyes, was required primarily to guard 
the nation. 
Though not a legislative committee with the power to propose bills, the Woodrum 
Committee’s July 1945 report endorsed these arguments and recommended a plan of 
universal military training as part of a larger program of national security. It contended 
that along with a federally-funded program of scientific research and development, a 
flexible industrial system that was able to convert quickly to wartime production, and a 
well-trained nucleus of regular soldiers, postwar preparedness required a trained citizenry 
                                                
 28 Ibid., 529, 533. 
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as “the most vital element of all.”31 The report alluded to the educational benefits such 
training would bring to trainees, but focused primarily on UMT as a security measure. 
Truman encapsulated the national security arguments in an address to Congress 
on October 23, 1945. He called the joint session to introduce his preferred plan for UMT 
– one full year of training after high school with a six-year reserve commitment – and to 
urge passage of legislation based on the Woodrum Committee’s report. In so doing, he 
invoked the historical citizen-soldier. “The days of the minuteman who sprang to the 
flintlock hanging on his wall are over,” worried the president. Modern warriors required 
training and drill with the latest equipment and technology, skills that a military force 
conscripted at the outset of hostilities would not have time to learn before heading into 
battle. He assured the assembled congressmen that the ability to forgo basic training in 
the event of war “may be the margin between the survival and the destruction of this 
great Nation.”32  Although he acknowledged that military training could “provide ample 
opportunity for self-improvement” and teach “skills useful in the civilian world,” he was 
adamant that the main purpose of the program would be national defense. “The other 
benefits are all byproducts,” he explained, “useful indeed, but still byproducts.”33 
* * * * * 
Despite the fame and power of its supporters, opposition to universal military 
training was strong and well organized. UMT’s detractors worked to reframe the debate 
over the measure. They, too, focused on national security, but they defined the issue 
                                                
 31 House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy. Universal Military 
Training, H. Rpt. 857, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 2. 
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differently. Rather than emphasize UMT as a possible deterrent against external threats, 
activists from educational, civil rights, pacifist, and religious organizations tended to 
view it as a threat to American values. As early as November 1944, staff representatives 
from a number of organizations, including the National Education Association, the 
National Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the Friends Committee, the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the National Council for 
Prevention of War, and the newly formed National Council Against Conscription, met to 
coordinate a defense against UMT proposals. As a result of their efforts, including 
organized outreach sessions, the chorus of voices attacking the policy based on its 
destructive characteristics steadily expanded. 34  
In November 1945, the House renewed hearings on UMT, this time weighing a 
specific plan outlined by Representative Andrew May, a Democrat from Kentucky and 
the chair of the Committee on Military Affairs.35 The May hearings offered opponents a 
national forum for their objections. So many private citizens and organizations demanded 
time to testify that May reopened the hearings in February 1946.36 
Many of the hostile witnesses at both the Woodrum and May committee hearings 
grounded their objections to UMT in the unstable international political climate of the 
immediate postwar period. They argued that it would be impossible to know the United 
States’ military needs until the war with Japan ended, American soldiers stationed in both 
Asia and Europe could rotate home, provisional governments could be established in the 
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countries under occupation, and the organization and mission of the United Nations could 
be established.37  The detonation of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 
1945 further bolstered opponents’ hostility to UMT. If any nation possessed the ability to 
obliterate another with one weapon, they reasoned, then international cooperation through 
the United Nations was the only way to prevent global destruction.  
Arguments of this ilk spoke as much to the defense of the United States as those 
that called for universal military training. Pacifists, like Dorothy Detzer of WILPF; 
educators, like George F. Zook, the president of the American Council on Education; and 
civil rights activists like federal judge and former Dean of Howard University Law 
School William Hastie; all advocated international cooperation, primarily through the 
United Nations, as a safer, more effective means of national defense. Zook told the May 
Committee that the United States could not “hold, or even merit, the confidence of other 
nations” if it paid “lip service” to the ideals of international peace and cooperation” but 
“at the same time repudiate[d] them with [its] actions.”38 Hastie warned, “There is no 
tolerable future in an international jungle in which each lion calls himself the king of the 
beasts and keeps sharpening his claws to prove it.”39  These detractors clearly believed 
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that training the nation, even through a so-called civilian program, was akin to arming it. 
Such a program would not disarm the world but could endanger the United States rather 
than protect it.  
Although witnesses at both sets of hearings focused primarily on UMT as a 
national security measure, it is clear that they believed it was more than a simple 
defensive expedient. Rather, opponents and proponents equally used it as a symbol for 
the America they wished to create in the aftermath of World War II. Civilian and military 
leaders, educators, labor and civil rights activists, Congresspeople, American 
Legionnaires, representatives from religious organizations, and concerned citizens of all 
stripes grounded their arguments in differing definitions of American democracy and 
citizenship. Those who favored universal military training tended to base their opinions 
on a civic republican understanding of citizenship, framing their support with the 
obligation of the male citizen to defend his nation. Detractors, on the other hand, rooted 
their arguments in a more classically liberal interpretation of citizenship. They 
concentrated on the right of the individual in a free society to make choices for himself. 
These differing visions of citizenship led witnesses to define universal military training as 
either a democratic measure or a totalitarian one. 
 Supporters justified the compulsory nature of the training based on their belief 
that citizens owed service of some type to the nation that nurtured them. They stressed 
duty, obligation, and responsibility. “All American citizens and resident aliens enjoy the 
protection and freedom of our way of life,” wrote Admiral Nimitz in his letter to the 
Woodrum Committee. “They must share the obligation to defend that freedom.”40  
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Republican representative Frances Bolton of Ohio declared, “Citizenship in a free society 
holds within it the responsibility, and the duty on the part of the individual to protect it, 
and the principles for which it stands.”41 This framework emphasized a government of, 
for, and by the people. It could not survive, especially in an unstable global geopolitical 
climate, without the active participation – in this case through military training – of its 
citizens.  
 Training would be worth the temporary sacrifice of time, individual choice, and 
life, if mobilization ever proved necessary. It would deter outside aggression and provide 
security to the nation, allowing the United States – and thus its citizens – to thrive and 
prosper. But more importantly, it would “provide the trainee with a larger return than [he] 
would give to his Nation.”42  Proponents cited remedial healthcare, educational and 
vocational training, self-reliance, a sense of responsibility, leadership skills, the 
opportunity “to rub smooth the sharp edges of prejudice, sectionalism, and lack of 
understanding between groups,” and the physical strength brought on by basic training as 
some of the benefits to be reaped from a system of universal military training.43 Taken 
together, these advantages would help equalize many of the inequalities that existed 
within American society. Graduates of the training system would begin their adult lives 
on more equal footing than they would have without training. Such equality epitomized 
the promise of American democracy. 
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 Moreover, a program that took all young men, regardless of background, social or 
economic status, educational attainment, IQ, or religious belief would ensure that all men 
exited the program with a common, unifying experience. No one would be able to claim 
special privilege. As a result, claimed proponents, UMT could not be considered a 
totalitarian program, despite its compulsory nature. It would apply to all young men 
equally and supply them with common advantages. It would call for the same “sacrifices 
from a people that are not accustomed to such sacrifices.”44  It was, therefore, a 
democratic measure. 
 Detractors, on the other hand, relied on a more liberal interpretation of 
citizenship. Rather than emphasizing the responsibilities of the citizen to the state, they 
highlighted the obligation of the state to guarantee the rights of the citizen. They focused 
on the ideals of individual liberty, free choice, and independence as the essence of 
American democracy. Therefore, they argued, UMT, because of its compulsory nature, 
was not democratic. It infringed on the free choice of the men who would be “dragooned” 
into service, and it encouraged a militarized society in which citizens would be 
discouraged from thinking for themselves.45  This would be particularly onerous for those 
with religious objections. Samuel L. Harrison, representing the Michigan Council to 
Oppose Peacetime Military Conscription, pointed out, “American tradition has always 
held to the rights of religious liberty and that recognition that…men must obey God and 
conscience rather than men.”  He worried that for many, “universal conscription would 
be a complete violation of their own best conscience,” and therefore the antithesis of 
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everything America stood for.46  “We consider it the last vestige of slavery,” opined 
Detzer of WILPF in no uncertain terms.47   
 Compulsory military training, which was “largely authoritarian in its methods,” 
would make the United States no better than Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia.48  “To 
adopt the essence of the system we are fighting to destroy is to be victimized by victory,” 
stated President of the University of Detroit William J. Miller, representing the Michigan 
Council to Oppose Peacetime Military Conscription. “Nothing is more dangerous to 
democracy than the conditioning, regimentation, and uncritical obedience to arbitrary 
authority that most compulsory military training induces,” he warned. Moreover, he 
observed, the regimentation and authoritarian nature of UMT would destroy the values of 
discipline and self-control that supporters proclaimed would be gained through military 
training. These principles, he noted, “are inwardly induced by voluntary 
acceptance….They cannot be externally superimposed or cultivated under compulsion.”49  
Rather, it was freedom of thought and action that led to the innovations that fueled 
America’s greatness. UMT would infringe on these freedoms and lead to the “death and 
destruction” that befell all militarized nations, contended Guy E. Snavely, the Executive 
Director of the Association of American Colleges. “The best brains of country,” he 
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declared, would be “occupied continuously with devising weapons of destruction instead 
of developing plans for the happier, fuller life.”50  
 The meaning of a happy, full, American life was of great concern to the 
opponents of UMT. Daniel Marsh, the President of Boston University, outright rejected 
the notion that military training would improve the nation’s male citizenry. “We go to 
war when we have to,” he admitted, “but there is no reason why we should lie about it 
and pretend that it makes for finer manhood.”51  Exposure to the alcohol and sex on 
which military encampments supposedly thrived would corrupt the nation’s youth, 
assured some witnesses at the Woodrum and May hearings, but more importantly, 
claimed others, compulsory training would interrupt their proper, rightful civilian 
pursuits.52  Educational activists worried that if men did not complete their vocational and 
higher education immediately after graduating high school, they would not resume 
training for civilian careers after life in the military.53  Fewer men would either have the 
training to produce weapons and material in wartime or secure the best jobs in peacetime 
if all men were subjected to compulsory military training.  
 African Americans had further reason to reject UMT as a democratic measure. 
For them, the issue of equal opportunity was not theoretical. So long as America’s 
military remained racially segregated, activists contended, universal military training 
could not and would not “rub smooth the sharp edges of prejudice.”  Rather, it would 
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further entrench institutional discrimination based on racial difference and spread the idea 
that black men were not entitled to full, equal citizenship on the same terms as white 
men. While not necessarily opposed to UMT in principle, the witnesses from civil rights 
and African American organizations who testified at both the Woodrum and May 
committee hearings unanimously rejected any program that did not explicitly outlaw 
segregation.  
 Judge Hastie, who had worked as a civilian aide with the War Department during 
the Second World War, described the logistical nightmare of administering a segregated 
program. At the moment of his testimony in 1945, the Navy barely tolerated African 
Americans, limiting them to positions as messmen, and only five states and the District of 
Columbia accepted black soldiers into their National Guard Units. Similarly, most 
African Americans who graduated from ROTC programs were not granted commissions 
since the military had limited need of black officers. As UMT was supposed to serve as a 
feeder for these programs, African American trainees would have fewer choices than 
their white counterparts.54   
 Administrative details aside, most African American witnesses used both civic 
republican and liberal definitions of citizenship to demonstrate the contradictions inherent 
in a universal program that discriminated against ten percent of its participants. To 
Thomasina W. Johnson, the legislative representative of the National Non-Partisan 
Council on Public Affairs of the Alpha Kappa Alpha sorority, democracy included “the 
priceless rights, worth, and equality of every man regardless of race, color, creed, or 
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national origin.” Therefore, black men had the liberal right as individuals and as members 
of the “brotherhood of man” to demand equal treatment and opportunity. She forewarned, 
“If he [the African American] is going to die for democracy in Burma, he will have it in 
Birmingham. If he is going to fight for it in Europe, he will have it in Washington.”55  
Dorothy K. Funn, the Labor Secretary for the National Negro Congress, stressed the civic 
republican obligation to “defend and protect” the country that UMT would foster in 
African American youths, but only if “democracy [were] present in every institution,” 
including the military.56  Field Organizer for the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters 
B.F. McLaurin brought these ideas together, calling for both “opportunity and 
responsibility.”57 Regardless of theoretical interpretation, implied these witnesses, UMT 
would fail as a democratic measure so long as it discriminated against black men. 
 Finally, opponents of UMT recognized that military training under all of the 
proposed plans was not to be truly universal. In addition to discriminating against African 
Americans and not reaching conscientious objectors or those with severe physical or 
psychological disorders, UMT would not include women. These detractors, however, did 
not base their objections to UMT on its sexism. In fact, very few activists – either for or 
against UMT – specifically considered the citizenship rights or obligations of women. 58  
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When they did complain about the exclusivity of UMT’s benefits, they based their 
arguments in carefully gender-neutral terms. For example, the Executive Committee of 
the Department of Supervision and Curriculum Development of the NEA resolved that 
“health, discipline, citizenship, and other outcomes claimed for military training are 
needs of our entire population and should be made possible to all of all ages. These 
matters are the rights of citizens and the obligations of their Government. As such, they 
are of civilian concern and should be provided for through civilian means.”59  In other 
words, the NEA believed these principles were civilian values that should accrue to all 
citizens, whether in the military or not. As such, they should be administered and 
encouraged through civilian authorities rather than through the military. In theory, this 
interpretation of “citizen” included women, but in reality, it is difficult to know for 
certain. 
 In truth, the one thing that brought both opponents and proponents of universal 
military training together was their common emphasis on citizenship as a masculine 
prerogative. They indicated this through their language – their discussion of “boys,” 
“men,” and “youths,” who were always gendered male.60  But more importantly, none of 
the plans proposed to or considered in Congress required any type of contribution from 
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the nation’s women. Therefore, the differing versions of citizenship emphasized by 
supporters and detractors were, by virtue of their exclusivity, masculine. Women would 
not be obliged to sacrifice their time or their bodies to earn the rights of citizenship, nor 
was it the state’s responsibility to defend their rights against the infringement of universal 
training.  
 Even more telling, not one witness in either of the two sets of hearings – or in 
subsequent hearings – complained that the educational, health, vocational, and moral 
benefits of military training would accrue only to men. Those in favor of the measure 
argued that UMT would strengthen the nation by strengthening its men – bodily, 
economically, and morally. In this, they had the precedent set by the recent Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act or G.I. Bill of Rights, which granted unemployment insurance, low-
interest home and business loans, and educational benefits to veterans after World War 
II.61  As historians Lizabeth Cohen and Margot Canaday have shown, the G.I. Bill 
disproportionately benefited white, heterosexual men, as they were the constituency most 
likely to have served in the military, been honorably discharged, and have their 
applications for college admission or home and business loans accepted.62  The G.I. Bill 
and UMT legislation both assumed that men, as breadwinners, needed these benefits 
more than women, who would be supported by their husbands. Proponents used this 
expectation to argue that the vocational and leadership training men would receive in 
military camps would help them advance after their terms of service ended. Opponents 
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used the same assumption to claim that ripping men away from college and 
apprenticeship programs would harm their future vocational status and deprive the nation 
of qualified scientists and engineers. No one suggested that women could fill the extra 
admissions slots at colleges or universities as they had during World War II.63  Public 
discourse on UMT centered on the rights and responsibilities of men and the role they 
were expected to play in American society as both soldiers and civilians. 
* * * * * 
By early 1946, public opinion on military manpower policy was split. 
Dissatisfaction with the Selective Service system ran high.  Many men who had been 
serving overseas at the end of World War II remained stationed as occupying forces 
throughout Asia and Europe. With support from their families, they demanded immediate 
discharges, but the Army needed 1.5 million men to fulfill its commitments abroad. It 
would only be able to maintain this number and simultaneously rotate veterans home 
through continued conscription.64   
As Soviet intransigence delayed the reunification of Germany, communist forces 
continued to gain traction in China, and the “iron curtain” dropped over Eastern Europe, 
Truman and others determined that the United States would not be able to demobilize 
quickly. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which governed the draft 
during the war, was originally set to expire on May 15, 1945, but a series of extensions 
                                                
 63 See, for example, appendix 7, “Women and National Security” in A Program 
for National Security, 209-224. 
 64 George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence, Kans.,: University Press of 
Kansas, 1993), 91. 
 72 
allowed its operation to continue until March 31, 1947.65  These extensions were 
compromise measures, and though they passed Congress fairly easily, their provisions 
caused controversy. The new laws exempted eighteen-year-olds and fathers from the 
available pool, creating a dearth of manpower just as the Cold War was beginning to take 
shape. Demobilization rates slowed in early 1946 as the Selective Service struggled to 
meet its commitments. Americans with family members serving overseas and those 
whose loved ones faced induction lambasted the Selective Service in equal measure. 
Many Americans questioned the existence of a draft during peacetime, criticizing it as 
un-American.66  
At the same time, the public appeared to support universal military training. 
While the strategic details of how millions of American men with limited training would 
or could be deployed, the majority of Americans seemed willing to accept UMT as a 
military necessity. In a series of nine Gallup Polls conducted between December 1945 
and January 1956, support for UMT dropped below 65 percent only once.67  Approval in 
other, smaller surveys ranged as high as 83 percent.68  But such support was “soft.”69  
Most Americans may have approved of UMT in theory, but they prioritized other 
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economic, political, and social concerns and were not likely to agitate for its passage into 
law.70  They wanted to wait for American soldiers to return home, for the geopolitical 
shape of the post-war world to become clear, and to give the new United Nations the 
opportunity to foster international peace before they made any decisions about domestic 
military training or service. This left only a core group of lobbyists, led by the American 
Legion with support from civic organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Kiwanis International, and the Lions Club, to try to shape public opinion in favor of 
UMT. These enthusiasts faced a broader range of pacifist, educational, religious, labor, 
and civil rights organizations, all of which took their dissent to Capitol Hill and to the 
media.  
Opponents of UMT quickly capitalized on public antipathy toward the Selective 
Service by eliding the differences between military training and military service. They 
referred to UMT as “universal military conscription,” “peacetime conscription,” and 
“universal military service” in speeches, radio addresses, newspaper articles, and their 
organization names.71 Even though the Truman administration and Selective Service 
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repeatedly explained that the main point of the whole program was that men would train 
with the military as civilians rather than training in the military as soldiers subject to the 
same hierarchy, rules, and obligations as enlisted men, public confusion remained.72  
People’s comprehension was further muddled by contradictory media accounts and 
congressional debate. Several congressional bills did propose universal service in the 
military instead of just with it, although these did not receive backing from the president, 
War Department, or most civilian advocates of military training. 73   
As a result of this confusion, supporters struggled to control the terms of the 
debate. They tried to educate the public on the difference between plans for universal 
military training and the role of conscription under the supervision of the Selective 
Service System. Truman, for example, in his October 23, 1945, speech to Congress was 
very clear that he did not consider UMT to be “conscription,” as it had been characterized 
by its enemies. “Conscription is compulsory service in the Army or Navy in time of 
peace or war,” he argued. “Trainees under this proposed legislation…would be civilians 
                                                                                                                                            
Conscription; and the Greater Philadelphia Committee Against Wartime Enactment of 
Peacetime Conscription. 
72 By the second half of 1946, proposals for UMT had coalesced around the idea 
of one year of civilian training under military auspices for all eighteen-year-old, able-
bodied, male citizens, but the Trainees would remain civilians and be able to return to 
their peacetime pursuits at the conclusion of their year of training. The Selective Service, 
on the other hand, inducted men directly into the Army and Navy based on manpower 
needs as determined by the military branches themselves. The size of draft calls varied 
depending on a number of factors, including the nature of American military 
commitments, the number of men who volunteered for service, and attrition rates. 
Conscription, therefore, directly implied a multi-year service commitment under military 
direction. 
 73 See, for example, 78 H.R. 1806, 78 H.R. 3947, 79 S. 1473, and 79 S. 1749. 
 75 
in training.”74 But, as evidence of the muddled nature of the debate, even the president 
faced ridicule in trying to delineate the difference.75   
In response to criticism of the draft and in the face of continued public uncertainty 
over UMT, Truman and the War Department began exploring a return to voluntarism as 
the best way to meet America’s military manpower needs.76  Conscription and universal 
training could not exist side-by-side they reasoned; the democratic and egalitarian 
rationales for UMT would evaporate if the armed forces inducted some men for a period 
of several years while others merely trained as civilians for one. War Department 
officials, therefore, wanted to suspend the draft, both to prove that enough men would 
enlist voluntarily to maintain the vital nucleus of America’s military and to allow the 
political space for a UMT program to pass. In January 1947, the army officially 
abandoned its policy of advocating another draft extension. The expiration of 
Congressional authorization for the Selective Service System in March would further 
open the political doors to universal military training, or so military planners hoped. 
* * * * * 
Meanwhile, in late November 1946, Truman began assembling what was to 
become the President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training (PACUT). Both 
supporters and detractors of universal military training had long advocated an impartial 
study of UMT. Backers wanted proof that such a program was both feasible and 
necessary, while critics hoped to use the time such a study would take to delay passage of 
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a bill.77  Over the next seven months, members of PACUT, led by chair Karl T. Compton, 
the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, met with over 200 witnesses 
and traveled throughout the country to discuss the issue with concerned citizens. 
Ultimately, their report, A Program for National Security, confirmed universal military 
training as indispensable to the nation’s defense. Members grounded their 
recommendations in national security concerns, but they also used A Program for 
National Security categorically to refute opponents’ charges that UMT would destroy 
America’s democratic ideals and superior morality. In short, the commission’s findings 
brought the contested nature of citizenship and democracy to the fore in a way that no 
other document or forum had yet done. 
In highlighting the importance of UMT’s secondary benefits, PACUT members 
took their lead from President Truman, who appeared to have altered his rationale for the 
program since 1945. Where he had recommended UMT to Congress in October 1945 as a 
key element of the nation’s security program, calling all other benefits provided by the 
program “by products,” he had changed his emphasis by December 1946. In his opening 
statement to PACUT’s members, he explained that he had explicitly left the word 
“military” out of the commission’s title, calling the term “incidental” to what he had in 
mind. His words contradicted his statement from the year before, as he now claimed a 
universal military training program that taught men to be good citizens would make 
America stronger. As he saw it, the “great republics of the past” had crumbled “when 
their peoples became prosperous and fat and lazy, and were not willing to assume their 
responsibilities.”  A program of mandatory training, however, would ameliorate some of 
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the ills caused by modern living. It would inform the nation’s “young people…on what 
this government is,” teach them how to “get…along with one another, inform…them of 
their physical makeup,” and help them care for their bodies – the “Temple[s] which God 
gave [them].”  The end result, he concluded, would be to “have sold our Republic to the 
coming generations as Madison and Hamilton and Jefferson sold it in the first place.”78  
By late 1946, Truman clearly favored the civic republican justification for UMT, 
stressing young men’s responsibility to serve their nation and the rewards they would 
reap from their sacrifice. This charge set the tone for all future work the committee 
undertook. 
Members spent their first meeting debating the president’s stance and their own 
opinions on universal military training. Compton and Reverend Daniel A. Poling, the 
editor of the Christian Herald and a former Army Chaplain, had already testified in favor 
of the idea before the Woodrum and May Committee Hearings.79  In fact, PACUT’s 
composition was criticized fiercely in pacifist circles.80  Most of its members had close 
ties to the White House and the military establishment. Anna Rosenberg was an industrial 
relations consultant who had formerly served as the Regional Director of the War 
Manpower Commission and as Roosevelt’s personal observer in the European Theater of 
World War II. She would be appointed an Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1950. Joseph 
E. Davies was the former chairman of the War Relief Control Board and had served as an 
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ambassador to the Soviet Union, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Former New York State 
Supreme Court Judge Samuel I. Rosenman had been the Special Counsel to the White 
House until mid-1946. Attorney Truman K. Gibson, Jr., had served as a civilian aide to 
the Secretary of War during World War II. Vice President of Georgetown University, 
Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, had served as a consultant to the American Chief of 
Counsel at the Nuremberg Trials. Harold W. Dodds, the President of Princeton 
University, and Charles E. Wilson, the President of General Electric, rounded out the 
Commission. Gibson, an African American; Poling, a Protestant clergyman; Walsh, a 
Roman Catholic priest; and Compton and Dodds, both university presidents; had 
supposedly been appointed to the committee to lend it diversity and authority, but none 
represented the majority opinion on UMT of their broader constituencies. Although they 
paid lip service to remaining open-minded, most members, in fact, admitted their 
predisposition toward passage of a training program at their first meeting.81  
The basis for their support, however, was not grounded solely in the military 
needs of the country. Members took Truman’s charge to heart, acknowledging the 
importance of looking beyond the country’s immediate external defense requirements in 
order to investigate the possible moral, educational, and health benefits of UMT to 
national security. As Rosenman put it, “Insofar as this program promotes public health, 
literacy, intelligence, general citizenship and high standards, I think the program 
promotes national defense.”82  Specifically, Rosenberg expressed the hope that physical 
training would improve the well-being of American men in light of the high rejection 
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rates by Selective Service during World War II.83  Gibson saw UMT as the “only form of 
universal education” that the United States had “any chance of putting into effect.”  
While he acknowledged that military education might not be ideal, he felt “it [would be] 
better than none,” especially for young African American men, whose literacy rates were 
abysmal.84  Poling admitted that his “primary interest was in moral and religious 
values.”85  
These biases influenced the committee’s final report, A Program for National 
Security, which they submitted to Truman on May 29, 1947, after hearing testimony from 
witnesses with a wide variety of civilian and military backgrounds.86  In it, they 
unanimously and whole-heartedly recommended universal military training as a 
necessary and (relatively) economical element of the country’s national security program, 
but only “under circumstances that w[ould] strengthen the spirit of democracy and prove 
of lasting value from a physical, mental, and moral standpoint to the youths in training.” 
These “byproducts,” they concluded, would be appropriate goals within a military setting 
only if universal training offered a tangible benefit to national security, but no program of 
UMT could function without paying special attention to the citizenship training the men 
would receive. 87  The United States needed to cultivate its strengths – both moral and 
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military – in order to maintain its global “position of leadership” and prevent “the mantle 
of totalitarianism” from spreading “its darkness over still larger sections of the earth.”88 
According to the report, unpreparedness on the part of the United States led to 
World War II. Therefore, it behooved the United States to remain prepared for all future 
contingencies, including war. However, this would be a particularly difficult problem for 
the United States as a “peace-loving nation” left with “no choice except to prepare for 
every type of attack that might be launched against it…from any possible source.”89 The 
advent of air power and atomic weapons made this responsibility especially daunting. 
The commission foresaw sneak attacks against the United States, possibly with atomic 
weapons, and defensive wars in allied and non-aligned nations, especially in Latin 
America, as equally viable methods for drawing America into military action. In either 
case, the U.S. would have to mobilize quickly – perhaps within as little as sixty days – in 
order to meet the threat of mechanized warfare. Moreover, the report warned that the 
possibility of atomic warfare was both “lurid” and very real. 90 
The only viable way to protect the nation was through the combined effort of “an 
airborne striking force, composed of highly trained professional troops, equipped with the 
most advanced weapons and maintained in a constant state of alertness” and “trained men 
in every part of our country ready and able to meet disorder, sabotage, and even 
invasion.”91  This type of balanced approach would require either a force-in-being large 
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enough to meet threats overseas and maintain active-duty personnel in every major 
American city or a trained civilian populace. Both for economic reasons and to maintain 
the character of American democracy, PACUT concluded that a program of universal 
military training, as part of a larger, integrated national security program, was the best 
way for the U.S. to meet its defense obligations to the world and to its own populace. 
Most importantly, a “strong, healthy, educated population” that could “stand as a beacon 
of inspiration to those who believe that freedom and respect for the dignity of the 
individual are superior to security based on domination by the state” had to anchor any 
such program. A healthy and happy populace, assured the report, would provide the 
“bedrock” of American defense and prevent discontent from allowing American 
democracy to “degenerate into spineless ineffectuality.”92 
Operating on the assumption that “want, ill health, ignorance, race prejudice, and 
slothful citizenship” were as dangerous to American existence as Hitler, Mussolini, and 
Tojo, the members of PACUT made several recommendations for domestic reform.93  
They advocated a “healthy economy,” characterized by “full production, full 
employment, industrial peace, and the avoidance of recurring economic crises or 
inflation,” in order to alleviate fear at home and discourage aggression from abroad.94  
Improved healthcare would strengthen America’s manpower resources. Quality 
education, including the availability of advanced degrees for all who qualified for them, 
would create “a universal understating among our citizens of their duties as citizens,” 
including “their responsibility for the general welfare, of their country’s obligations in the 
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world community, and of the benefits of democracy.”95  Members especially prescribed 
educational opportunity based on merit, not race, pointing out that true democracy 
necessitated “the elimination of all forms of intolerance.”96  When these pieces came 
together, citizens would gain an “understanding of democracy and an increased sense of 
personal responsibility on the part of every individual for making democracy work.”97  
Universal Military Training was essential to meet this goal. 
The members of PACUT carefully constructed a plan for universal military 
training that they believed would meet America’s national security needs and deflect 
opponents’ arguments. They called for one year of continuous training for all men upon 
reaching the age of eighteen or graduation from high school, whichever came second. 
While their plan acknowledged that basic skills could be taught under other 
circumstances, “the continuous 6 months’ night and day experience in…camps with other 
men, and under strict discipline” followed by another six months of specialist training 
was essential to teaching the intangibles –  patriotism, responsibility, tolerance – to 
America’s men.98 Only those with severe physical or mental disabilities would receive 
exemptions, and anyone whose conscientious objection was deemed “sincere” would 
train in a non-military capacity. In order to combat accusations of militarism, the entire 
program would remain under civilian control within the executive branch.99   
PACUT’s report outlined the advantages of universal military training in positive 
terms. Military benefits would allow men to familiarize themselves with weapons before 
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their use might be necessary, teach trainees to “think like soldiers in military 
organizations,” and help the military identify men who possessed leadership potential. In 
addition, the program would shape America’s men both mentally and physically. 
Citizenship training would be central. A specially developed information and education 
program “would impart to each trainee the great psychological understanding that he… is 
performing, a duty to his country – a duty that [is] …part of his obligation as a 
citizen.”100  The screening would catch medical “defects” in the general population that 
might otherwise go undiagnosed and offer treatment for simple problems like hernias and 
bad teeth.101  Psychiatrists would help ensure that men adjusted to camp life and learned 
self-reliance, while tutors would be on hand to provide vocational guidance and literacy 
training, all of which would be “of inestimable value” to individuals and “of long-range 
benefit to the country.”102 
In other words, the plan understood UMT as a positive good for the nation. The 
entire country would gain protection in the event of an emergency, especially an atomic 
attack, because there would be civilian men in every town and city with tactical, 
organizational, first aid, and weapons training within a few years of the program’s start. 
But America would also gain a healthy, well-educated, male populace with a clear 
understanding of what it would be fighting for – and the knowledge that it should fight. It 
would “bring home” the idea that men “share[d] a common responsibility for their 
country’s destiny.”103  For men, citizenship would rest on the responsibility to fight. 
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The report, however, also made its case for training by directly refuting the 
arguments against UMT. It stated what universal military training was not. It was not 
conscription any more than compulsory taxes or education. It was neither “un-American” 
nor undemocratic so long as a democratically-elected government approved of it and so 
long as all men had equal obligation to participate. The report rejected the notions that 
military preparedness would lead to war or turn the US into a militaristic society.104  
Camp life would not necessarily be the moral cesspool certain detractors claimed. With 
carefully selected cadres, strict regulation of sexual behavior and alcohol consumption, 
good moral and religious training, and community involvement, universal military 
training could be a wholesome experience that developed the qualities of good citizens in 
American men even as it provided needed security to the nation. 
* * * * * 
PACUT received a fair amount of public attention, but it was the Experimental 
Training Unit at Fort Knox that became the centerpiece of a War Department public 
relations campaign for UMT.105  The Army designed the unit, which operated at the same 
time PACUT was meeting with witnesses, to test the basic training component of the War 
Department’s plan for universal military training.106  In order to publicize the virtues of 
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universal military training, the War Department brought reporters to Fort Knox to 
observe – and presumably write favorable articles about – the Experimental Unit. It also 
provided speakers to interested civic organizations and panel members to radio programs 
to highlight the various benefits a national UMT program could provide. 
Like A Program for National Security, the publicity materials produced for the 
Fort Knox unit focused on how UMT could mold responsible, upright, democratic male 
citizens.  The War Department noted the varied arguments against compulsory training, 
especially concerns about the religious and moral well-being of trainees, the disruption a 
year of training would cause to the educational and vocational lives of the men, and the 
fears over the destruction of democracy that training could signal, and it opted to take 
them on one by one. Although this strategy was generally not stated overtly, one War 
Department document, “Outline for Veterans Radio Panels,” clearly asserted, “opposition 
to universal military training is generally not based on fact but rather on such generalities 
as democracy, morals, aggression education, and pacifism.”  It identified “the chief 
opponents” to the plan as “parents, church groups, educators, subversive groups, and a 
large section of the public which does not think.”  Finally, it noted that “any attempt to 
sell a program of universal military training must be based on a thorough job of analysis 
and specialized thinking along the lines of objections of each of the opposing groups and 
it must establish refutation and motivation for each of the groups opposed.”107  But where 
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PACUT looked to bridge the gap between national security and civic virtue in its plan for 
UMT, the Army and War Department did not situate its experimental program within a 
larger defense program. Publicity concentrated on how UMT could save American values 
instead of how it would protect the security of the United States. 
The Experimental Training Unit officially opened on January 13, 1947, when the 
first of three training companies arrived on post. In all, 664 trainees took part in the first 
round of the experiment.108  The Army acknowledged that conditions could not fully 
mimic a national UMT program, since participants were regular enlisted men rather than 
conscripts, but it actively worked to approximate the conditions a national UMT law 
would create.109  All members of the initial cohort were under age twenty, and the men 
represented 46 states plus the District of Columbia.110  Only fourteen were married and 
none had children, a situation the Army expected of future “UMTees,” given their 
youth.111  The average trainee had attained 10.26 years of schooling, and only 31 had any 
education beyond high school.112  In an attempt to match the population at large, 31 men 
with Army General Classification Test (AGCT) scores of less than 70 who would 
otherwise have been rejected for military service were accepted into a special training 
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unit, known as the Pioneer Platoon. This unit was designed as a laboratory to test how 
these men would fare in a regimented environment.113  Nevertheless, all of the men in the 
Experimental Training Unit were literate, and none had any major physical ailments. As 
the Army remained segregated in 1947, all of the UMTees were white.114    
Although the men were regular Army recruits, the UMT experiment demanded 
that they be treated differently than the average G.I., and the Army was quick to highlight 
the unit’s different training focus, judicial system, and regulations. The War Department 
and the Army Ground Forces both worked to publicize the importance of UMT, 
publishing pamphlets, producing informational films, and providing speakers to 
interested civic, religious, and educational organizations.115  Naturally, the progress of the 
Fort Knox unit became part of this publicity campaign. The unit itself possessed a 
dedicated public relations office, which produced its own materials and hosted members 
of the public and the press who toured the installation. According to Unit Commander 
Brigadier General Devine, almost two thousand visitors toured the facility between 
January and July 1947 while the post’s Public Information Office assisted an additional 
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97 members of the media. Officers conducted press tours and helped reporters 
“compil[e]…information” for their stories.116  The printed materials produced by these 
offices clearly revealed a common desire to assuage the public’s fears of UMT by 
portraying the Experimental Unit at Fort Knox in the most positive, non-threatening light 
possible. 
One of the simplest tactics used by public information officers was to address 
informational statements directly to concerned parents. Devine personally wrote letters to 
the families of each of the trainees. The Public Relations Office at Fort Knox sent copies 
of the unit’s newspaper, the UMT Pioneer, home to parents of current volunteers each 
week.117  Publications invited parents to visit their sons in order to put their minds at ease. 
The 1947 pamphlet, Universal Military Training, offered the post’s guesthouses for 
parents to spend an evening. Letters describing “hot biscuits,” “curtains in the dayroom,” 
and “new-found friends” could only go so far. “Seeing is believing,” and, as a photograph 
of a mother dancing with her uniformed son assured parents, a visit was the best way for 
“mom” to gain satisfaction about “her boy[‘s]…welfare.”118  Such personalization was 
designed to make parents feel as though the Army understood their fears and would 
nurture and protect their sons. The homey atmosphere portrayed in these publications 
obscured the true purpose of universal military training. In fact, Universal Military 
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Training did not mention, picture, or even allude to any form of martial endeavor until 
page 27.  
 When publicity did highlight the military elements of the program, it extolled the 
secondary benefits of training. According to the publicists at Fort Knox, “the primary 
mission” of the unit was to turn out “hardy soldiers” who were “strong both in mind and 
body.”119 But, publications pointed out that drill, calisthenics, and aerobic exercise would 
all lead to stronger, more muscular bodies, while classes in personal hygiene would help 
remediate some of the problems faced by the country’s more disadvantaged youth. 
Planners hoped that all trainees would “acquire [the] personal health habits of bathing 
frequently [and] caring for the feet, skin, and teeth,” all of which would continue “to 
prevent disease even after their year at camp.”120  Moreover, UMTees would come in 
contact with people of differing backgrounds, a situation that would help individuals 
overcome their prejudices and solve some of the country’s class and ethnic tensions.  The 
hope was that “All [would] live and work together in the great democratic fraternity 
typical of America; bunking in the same barracks, eating the same food, wearing the 
same distinctive uniform, and sharing the same worth-while experiences.”121  The 
abundance of nutritious food, health care, and increased understanding of others was 
supposed to lull parents into a sense of well-being for their sons. 
Lobbying groups, however, posed a much greater obstacle to the passage of a 
UMT bill than individual parents, most of whom theoretically supported the measure, at 
least if public opinion polls were to be believed. Of these, religious organizations and 
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other associations concerned with UMTees’ religious and moral welfare were certainly 
among the most vocal and were therefore perceived as the greatest threat. The program at 
Fort Knox dealt with these concerns in a number of ways. The enhanced role of the base 
chaplains was perhaps the most novel. Within one week of arrival at Fort Knox, each 
trainee met with a Catholic or Protestant chaplain for an initial interview to ascertain his 
“denominational affiliations, status in the church…and willingness to support the unit’s 
religions program.”122  Chaplains provided a series of seventeen “Citizenship and 
Morality” lectures on topics such as “The Citizen and his Religion” and “The Citizen and 
his Worship,” which emphasized the importance of morality in civic life. Finally, 
attendance at worship services was compulsory during the first four weeks of training.123  
Devine and the Public Relations Office described the results of the chaplains’ program as 
“phenomenal.”124  They were happy to report that most men continued to attend worship 
services after they were no longer required to do so. Moreover, 102 Protestant trainees 
took steps to be baptized or confirmed, as did 35 of the 135 Catholics in the first group of 
volunteers.125 
Given the importance of morality, sex – or the promise thereof – was depicted 
carefully. The Army’s version of masculinity included an expectation of chaste, 
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heterosexual love with an eye toward future marriage and families. Thus, the trainees 
needed access to women, but only within controlled circumstances. Unit dances and visits 
to homes in the local community provided wholesome, chaperoned contact with the 
opposite sex. Universal Military Training, for example, showed one image of trainees 
gathered around a piano with young women from the local community for a singalong. 
Another photograph, of a young couple sitting under a tree was captioned, “Old buildings 
are not the least of the local attractions.”  These images left the reader to infer that a 
training post did not have to an all-male environment and that marriage, therefore, could 
be one of the benefits trainees would accrue through UMT.126   Twenty-eight compulsory 
chaplains’ lectures, including two on “Sex Morality,” stressed abstinence rather than 
prophylaxis. In fact, according to General Devine, “all references to mechanical 
preventives, or statements that penicillin is [a] cure-all were avoided….The basis for 
these lectures was the place of sex in the plan of God and the necessity for keeping one’s 
body and mind pure.”127  
 In case moral and religious instruction were not enough to keep trainees out of 
trouble, unit regulations prohibited pin-ups, gambling, profanity, and alcohol 
consumption. The Post Exchange contained a soda fountain rather than the usual bar 
because, according to the Public Relations Office, “the average 18 year old prefer[ed] a 
soda.”128  To prevent carousing on weekend passes, post regulations required trainees to 
register at the U.S.O. and to inform the unit headquarters of their intended whereabouts. 
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Devine measured the success of this endeavor by the low venereal disease rate exhibited 
by UMTees (10.2 per thousand) compared with that of the regular Army soldiers also 
stationed at Fort Knox (41.2 per thousand).129  Local statutes forbade bartenders 
throughout Louisville, the nearest city, from selling alcohol to trainees. In order to keep 
the UMTees visible, unit regulations required them to wear distinctive badges on their 
uniforms at all times while off post.  
Planners also instituted a plethora of after-hours activities to occupy (or possibly 
exhaust) the UMTees in a wholesome manner. As one UMT Pioneer columnist 
rhetorically asked, “How is a guy going to particularly good movie, attend glee club 
practice, see a company basketball game, and go to dance in one night [sic]?”130  
Volunteers could also take advantage of G.E.D., correspondence, or vocational classes; a 
hobbyshop; a music room; a sports center; a swimming pool; a radio station; and a theater 
in their off-duty hours. Publicity surrounding Fort Knox made sure to highlight all of 
these options in order to deemphasize the military nature of UMT, reassure Americans 
concerned about the moral lives of the young trainees, and underscore the ways military 
training would benefit men’s futures as civilians. 
Military publicity also aimed to quell fears of “Prussianism.”  Public relations 
officers stressed the democratic features of UMT rather than weapons training or drill. 
Pamphlets told their readers that trainees were not “taught to kill” because death was not 
“breathing down their backs.”  UMT, such publications claimed, could never foster the 
violence and terror that characterized militaristic societies because military training 
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avoided “regimentation” even as it taught “discipline and respect.”  The men at Fort 
Knox were never to be considered as mere numbers or cogs in a machine.  Each man was 
encouraged to “respond…as an individual, develop…as an individual, [and] think…as an 
individual.”131  Instructors were to present lectures and standardized curricula “in the 
democratic American way,” complete with “open discussions rather than formal 
lectures,” based on the assumption that “learning is motivated when each man is made to 
feel that his ideas are important and original.”132   
Even the Army’s system of discipline was modified to avoid the threat of military 
hierarchy. Unit regulations prohibited drill-sergeants and junior officers from haranguing 
and using profanity with the trainees, who were to be disciplined through a demerit 
system rather than with verbal threats, hazing, or other forms of abuse. Infractions too 
severe for the demerit system, such as going Absent Without Leave for less than 24 
hours, disorderly conduct, or drunkenness, were turned over to a Trainee Court. This 
disciplinary body consisted of a jury of seven trainees who decided cases argued by 
trainee Judge Advocates and Defense Counsels.133  Devine particularly lauded this 
system as a means to instill individual responsibility, stating, “Every court case is a 
lesson in justice and that is a lesson in citizenship.”134  In other words, planners believed 
that trainees would develop democratic values and learn active citizenship when they 
were encouraged to raise their voices and participate in discussion and self-government. 
Militarism simply could not flourish in such an environment. 
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In the process of producing publicity materials to allay fears about universal 
military training, the War Department and Army, therefore, constructed an idealized form 
of virtuous, moral, middle-class, male citizenship. The War Department promised boys 
poise and confidence, education and skills. They would learn discipline but maintain 
enough individuality to think for themselves. UMT would reinforce the values of church, 
home, and family. Thanks to the remediation any illiterate trainees would receive, all 
UMT graduates would meet at least minimum educational standards, and the available 
vocational training ensured that all would be prepared to be wage earners. Training would 
also harden soft bodies and correct the health defects of the nation. Universal Military 
Training promised, for example, that after a trainee had “given up a year to his country,” 
he would be able to “look forward to a prosperous future untroubled by war.”  In return 
for their time, trainees would gain confidence, new interests, and new knowledge. They 
would be “more tolerant and understanding,” “physically fit,” and “mentally alert.”  Each 
individual would “look…a man” upon completion of the program and be “ready to take 
on his new job or school work with satisfaction. Each would be a “responsible citizen, “ 
and military training would constitute that citizenship.135 
In June 1947 – the same month President Truman submitted PACUT’s report to 
Congress – a special subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the 
Executive Departments, chaired by Republican Forest A. Harness of Indiana, convened to 
investigate whether the military had acted inappropriately in its UMT publicity 
campaign.136  It found that the War Department had attempted to influence civilian 
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organizations in the hopes that these associations would lobby Congress to pass a UMT 
bill. Thus, it was guilty of engaging in propaganda. The hearings concluded that Alan 
Coutts and Helen Hamilton Woods, civilian employees of the War Department, and 
enlisted men from the Fort Knox unit had used federal funds to finance speaking 
engagements with civic, educational, women’s, parent’s and patriotic organizations. 
Further, the military had chartered planes at taxpayers’ expense to fly visitors, especially 
reporters, to Fort Knox, who subsequently received guided tours that stressed the virtues 
of universal military training. The Army also inappropriately used Citizen’s Advisory 
Committees, including the one in Louisville, and the UMT Pioneer to publicize UMT.137    
Although public support for UMT ran high in the summer of 1947 based on the 
positive recommendations of PACUT, the Harness hearings slowed the progress of a 
training bill that Republican Harry L. Towe of New York, the Chair of the House Armed 
Services Committee, had introduced.138  Towe’s committee and then a separate 
subcommittee of that body held hearings throughout June and July, but the issue had 
become a political hot potato. Opposition groups clamored to have their objections heard 
before the hearings, but the Armed Services Committee shut them down before they 
could all have their say. In its report, the committee defended itself, declaring that the 
issue had been “thoroughly debated” and a “singular uniformity of argument” presented. 
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Since “no new light would have been shed on the subject had hearings been extended,” 
they ended.139   
Further, as subcommittee members pointed out, the bill had “no hope of passage” 
since Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio had decided to throw his considerable 
political weight behind the opposition.140  Taft had always disdained compulsion in 
manpower policy, believing it an infringement on American liberty. He had voted against 
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and had advocated an all-volunteer 
military in the wake of World War II. By late 1947, he had turned his attention to UMT, 
bringing many Republican members of Congress with him.141  The House Armed 
Services Committee ultimately reported out the Towe bill favorably, but only because of 
the absence of eleven of its Republican members. It moved on to the Rules Committee, 
where it languished.142  Meanwhile, in the wake of the Harness hearings, Congress 
censured the War Department and, in early 1948, the Department of Justice initiated its 
own investigation. Publicity in favor of UMT from the War Department (later 
Department of Defense) all but stopped.143  It could no longer advertise UMT as a 
measure to strengthen America’s manhood or teach citizenship obligations. 
* * * * * 
After 1947, UMT did not vanish from the political scene, but the nature of the 
debate changed. When communists staged a successful coup in Czechoslovakia in 
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February 1948, alarm rippled through the defense establishment. Not only had the last 
remaining democracy in Eastern Europe “fallen” to communism, but the emergency 
highlighted the woeful manpower predicament faced by American ground forces. The 
Army’s available force was 117,000 men below its Congressional authorization, while 
the Marine Corps fell short by approximately 30,000 men.144  Moreover, soldiers were 
mustering out of the Army faster than new men could be recruited. Force strength was 
falling, leaving the Army, according to Secretary of State Marshall, “a hollow shell, over-
deployed.”145 
On March 17, in a speech addressed to a joint session of Congress and broadcast 
over most major radio stations, Truman outlined his emergency plan. He requested that 
Congress approve the European Recovery Program without delay, enact a plan for 
universal military training, and temporarily reinstate the draft.146  “We have found,” he 
declared, “that a sound military system is necessary in time of peace if we are to remain 
at peace.”147  The U.S., according to the president, was in a liminal state, neither war nor 
peace. The old objections to a peacetime draft had no place in a Cold War world. New 
exigencies called for a rethinking of national security policy.  
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Truman had performed another about face, this time by combining UMT with 
conscription. His administration’s previous position had been to separate the two 
measures, and the push for UMT had been part of the rationale for allowing the draft to 
expire in 1947.148  But now he tried to reconcile the two, reassuring the nation that 
Selective Service would be necessary only “until the solid foundation of universal 
training [could] be established.”  In the meantime, UMT would support the reserves, and 
conscription would fill the ranks of the active forces.149  Gone was any reference to 
UMT’s possible benefits for the nation’s moral, educational, or social welfare; discussion 
of the meaning of democracy; or consideration of the responsibilities of citizenship. From 
1948 on, the administration framed universal training solely as a defensive measure in an 
increasingly hostile world.  
As Cold War tensions escalated with the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, 
Congressional debate shifted away from whether the U.S. should arm itself and toward 
the best way to do it. Although some Republicans, like chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee Chan Gurney of South Dakota and chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, continued to support universal 
military training, most did not. Many followed Taft and lifted their objections to 
conscription, finding it “more important to be anti-Soviet than antimilitary.”150   
Instead, they chose to support the findings of the President’s Air Policy 
Commission, a fact-finding committee formed by Truman in July 1947 that advocated the 
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expansion of the newly independent Air Force as the most efficient and realistic way to 
defend the country. The committee’s conclusions clashed with the findings of PACUT. 
Its report, Survival in the Air Age, argued that an attack by the Soviet Union would most 
likely come from the air. The only way to meet such an aerial threat was through an Air 
Force of sufficient size and strength to both defend against Soviet air power and 
powerfully strike back. Where the Truman Administration advocated a 55-group Air 
Force supplemented by World War II era planes, this report posited a 70-group force 
consisting solely of modern aircraft as the nation’s best defense.151  A specially-created 
joint Congressional Aviation Policy Board under the leadership of Republicans Senator 
Owen Brewster of Maine and Representative John Carl Hinshaw of California, 
concurred.152 
The issue soon came to the fore in the debate over UMT as the Senate and then 
the House Armed Services Committees opened hearings to weigh the relative merits of 
Truman’s proposal. Over the course of the proceedings, it became clear that the service 
branches were not united in their vision for America’s national security. Where Secretary 
of Defense Forrestal advocated a “balanced” force, characterized by an expanded Air 
Force that would be supported by “a strong Navy, a sizable and well-equipped Army, and 
the many supporting services,” including UMT, Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart 
Symington demurred.153  Under direct questioning from Democratic Representative 
Lyndon Johnson, Symington admitted that he would rather have a 70-group air force than 
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UMT.154  Ranking Democrat Carl Vinson of Georgia seized on this admission and came 
out in favor of the expanded Air Force as well. With too many powerful members of 
Congress arrayed against it, UMT had no hope of passage in 1948. 
Opponents, meanwhile, had not substantially changed their line of attack since 
1944. They continued to object to UMT based on the assumption that the measure would 
infringe on the citizenship rights of individual men and destroy the moral fabric of 
American society. Over 100 witnesses either testified or submitted statements to this 
effect at the Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearings. Despite the publicity 
campaign of 1947, not one major organization or constituency that had opposed UMT in 
1944-45 supported it in 1948, though several, including the American Federation of 
Labor, the American Council on Education, and the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
lifted their opposition to selective conscription on a limited basis.155 
Labor and civil rights activists A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood 
of Sleeping Car Porters and founder of the March on Washington Movement, and Grant 
Reynolds, the New York State Commissioner of Corrections and former Republican 
candidate for Congress, added one new element to congressional deliberations. While 
African Americans had protested discrimination within UMT since it was first proposed 
in the early 1940s, Randolph and Reynolds pushed the sticky issue of segregation in the 
military into the limelight in a way civil rights leaders had been hesitant to earlier. In late 
1947, the two men founded the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and 
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Training to lobby for the desegregation of the military. Testifying under the auspices of 
that organization, they warned members of the committee that if integration was not 
made part of whatever training program Congress settled on, they would initiate a broad 
campaign of civil disobedience against any compulsory service or training “along the 
lines of the magnificent struggles of the people of India against British imperialism.”  
Randolph promised to “personally…advise Negroes to refuse to fight as slaves for a 
democracy they cannot possess and cannot enjoy.”  He pledged himself to “openly 
counsel, aid, and abet youth, both white and Negro, to quarantine any Jim Crow 
conscription system.”156  The two men, in cooperation with A.J. Muste and Bayard 
Rustin of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a pacifist organization, soon founded the 
League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience to back up their threats. They envisioned the 
League as a clearinghouse for information and a legal resource to defend young men who 
refused to register with the Selective Service or allow themselves to be inducted into a 
segregated system. 
The founders of the League framed their demands as the logical outgrowth of 
citizenship in a liberal democracy. If the government of the United States failed to carry 
out its responsibility to protect the rights of black men to train in or serve with the 
military on an equal basis as white men, then black men could not be obligated to 
perform that service. However, this liberal critique was paired with a specifically 
gendered, civic republican rationale for protest. Like many other civil rights activists, 
Reynolds and Randolph were not opposed to universal military training in the abstract; 
they merely rejected any plan that did not concretely outlaw segregation and 
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discrimination against black participants. They believed that military service could 
benefit black men, but only if it was on equal footing with their white counterparts. Until 
that could happen, the struggle for equality would serve the same purpose as military 
participation. It would be the fight that would teach black men to stand up for themselves 
as American citizens. If African American men did not serve in the military under 
segregated circumstances, then their refusal to associate with it would fulfill their 
responsibility to force the United States to live up to its democratic promise. Randolph 
characterized this demand for “full, unqualified, first-class citizenship” as a “positive, 
resolute out-reading for full manhood.”157 
Reynolds and Randolph’s call for civil disobedience among African American 
men initiated debate within the black community.  Other civil rights organizations, 
including the Congress of Racial Equality, an offshoot of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation; the NAACP; and the National Urban League; all agreed that the military 
should be desegregated, but they objected to Randolph’s tactics. They felt that supporting 
Randolph’s methods would be too damaging to their cause, especially after Oregon 
Republican and civil rights supporter Senator Wayne Morse suggested that Randolph be 
tried for treason. But, they were able to take advantage of the publicity garnered by 
Randolph’s demands to push their own anti-segregation agendas. The NAACP, for 
example, took the opportunity to create its own Council to Abolish Segregation in the 
Armed Forces. It is impossible to know how much influence this agitation had over 
Truman’s decision to order the desegregation of the armed forces in 1948, but it is clear 
that young black men were thinking about the issue. No polls were conducted in rural 
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southern or urban northern areas where the majority of black youth lived, but a survey 
conducted by the Youth Division of the NAACP found that seventy-one percent of black 
college students favored a boycott of segregated compulsory military training during 
peacetime, while fifty percent stated that they would not serve even during a war 
emergency.158  In July 1948, Truman issued Executive Order 9981, establishing the 
President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. 
Once Truman assured Reynolds and Randolph that segregation would be banned in the 
military and the draft as a result of this order, the two activists dissolved the League for 
Non-Violent Civil Disobedience before it could gain any traction.159   
It is clear, however, that the issue of racial equality hampered the passage of UMT 
legislation even further. The majority of congresspeople preferred to let the military 
decide its own racial policy, believing that the nation’s protection, not social 
experimentation, was the first priority of the Department of Defense. Walter Andrews, 
the Republican Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, for example, stated 
that he “would endorse limited segregation in keeping with Army policy.”160  Morse 
asserted, “Neither Congress nor the country is ready for a complete anti-segregation 
policy.”161  Most southern representatives would not support any program that mandated 
integration, and some attempted to have segregation specifically written into defense 
bills. Georgia Democrat, Senator Richard B. Russell, introduced an amendment to 
                                                
 158 Paula E. Pfeffer, A. Philip Randolph: Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement 
(Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), ch. 4. 
 159 For further discussion, see Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and 
the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 
3; Pfeffer, A. Philip Randolph, ch. 4. 
 160 Swomley, “A Study of the Universal Military Training Campaign,” 131, 
originally cited in the New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 20, 1947.  
 161 As quoted in Pfeffer, A. Philip Randolph, 141. 
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pending draft legislation that would have required the military to assign any man who 
filed a petition to a unit composed solely of men from his own race. Mississippi 
Democrat John Bell Williams offered a similar measure in the House.162  A few, 
however, including Taft and Senator William Langer, a Republican from North Dakota, 
actively fought to include integration amendments in UMT bills, most likely as a 
delaying tactic, since they opposed compulsory training in general.  
In the end, this political infighting and lack of public support killed UMT 
legislation. Truman signed the Selective Service Act of 1948 into law on June 24 without 
a training provision.163 Inductions were scheduled to start ninety days later, but in that 
time, international tensions calmed somewhat. Although the Berlin airlift continued, it 
appeared that Soviet Premiere Josef Stalin was unwilling to start another war. As a result, 
and because the threat of conscription spurred sufficient men to enlist on their own, draft 
calls stayed low and were suspended entirely by February 1949. Although the issue of 
UMT came up in the debates over the FY1950 budget, there was no impetus for its 
passage. Selective conscription barely seemed necessary, let alone training for all 
American men. Disparities between the House and Senate versions of the bill to renew 
conscription delayed extension in 1950, but debate centered on the mechanics of the law, 
not whether conscription should exist.164  Universal military training was not part of the 
discussion. 
                                                
 162 “Race Segregation Still a Live Issue in Draft Program,” New York Times, May 
13, 1948. 
 163 P.L. 80-759. 
 164 After the outbreak of the Korean crisis, Congress rushed to extend the draft. 81 
S.J. Res. 190 extended the draft to July 9, 1950, and then P.L. 81-599 extended it until 
July 9, 1951. 
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Truman, however, continued to lobby. With the opening of hostilities in Korea, he 
appointed staunch UMT supporter George Marshall as the Secretary of Defense, who, in 
turn, nominated Anna Rosenberg, a former member of PACUT, as the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel. They seized on the Korean 
emergency as an opportunity to renew their fight for UMT as part of a long-range plan to 
expand the country’s reserves. Their hope was to eliminate conscription after the war 
ended by authorizing the president to alter the terms of Selective Service legislation. 
They fought for a law that would allow Truman to shorten the period of training for 
inductees to six months and either reduce or eliminate the responsibility for active 
service. This would effectively create a training rather than service program. House and 
Senate deliberations added restriction on top of restriction to the proposal, however.165 
In 1951, Congress passed the Universal Military Training and Service Act.166  
Although  primarily designed to extend the draft, the act allowed for a UMT program, but 
only after Congress had established provisions for it in a separate law. The separate law 
never passed. Debates over its details and lack of political will sent the measure back to 
committee, where it died. Military planners continued to shift their focus to 
mechanization, air power, and a doctrine of limited engagement. By 1951, training a 
large reserve of infantrymen seemed obsolete. The Truman Administration had failed to 
convince opponents that UMT was an American, democratic, or necessary measure. The 
idea of universal military training was, in effect, politically dead.  
* * * * * 
                                                
 165 See Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 166-167. 
166 Truman signed the Universal Military Training and Service Act, P.L. 82-51, on 
June 19, 1951.  
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Scholar James M. Gerhardt argued that UMT consistently failed because no one 
could agree on its goals or how to accomplish them. Defense policy in the post-war years 
was constantly evolving as the geopolitical situation took shape and nations struggled to 
come to terms with the meaning of atomic weapons. The national security establishment 
was just starting to name the Soviet Union as America’s primary threat at the end of 
1947.167  The role of the infantry, the Air Force, and the reserves were all part of the 
public debate. But UMT also failed under the weight of its own history. In 1948, 
Congress was still fuming over the War Department’s failed publicity campaign 
surrounding Fort Knox; all of the same educational, religious, labor, pacifist, and civil 
rights organizations that had opposed the idea in 1944 continued to do so in 1948; and the 
Department of Defense had few new arguments to use in its own favor.168  Despite the 
various tactics used by the War Department and then the Department of Defense, the idea 
of UMT had trouble gaining new supporters. 
 Nevertheless, the failed campaign to pass a national UMT law is historically 
significant, especially for what it reveals about post-war Americans’ understanding of 
their own democratic principles. Proponents’ vision of citizenship did not include all 
Americans; despite the measure’s title, it was not universal. Although the Army 
advertised the diverse geographical, educational, and socio-economic backgrounds of 
future trainees, it virtually ignored the question of race. If and when UMT became law, 
African American men would be held liable for training, but only within a segregated 
                                                
 167 PACUT’s June 1947 report never mentioned a specific enemy, nor did 
witnesses at congressional hearings on UMT between 1945 and 1947. The reports from 
the President’s Air Policy Commission and the Joint Congressional Aviation Board, 
however, did, as did witnesses at the UMT hearings in 1948 on. 
 168 See Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, ch. 1-2, but especially pp. 104-105. 
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system. Civil Rights activists refused to support any vision of American citizenship that 
did not include black men on an equal basis with white men. Moreover, UMT was not 
designed to benefit women. It defined citizenship as a masculine prerogative. Only men 
would be obliged to undergo training and therefore only men would derive the secondary 
benefits of free health care, educational and vocational training, and the intangibles of 
leadership training, broad socialization, and moral and religious instruction.   
 Second, the picture the military created was simply too good to be true. Flesh and 
blood men did not always behave as the staged photographs and carefully worded text 
indicated. Journalist Alexander Stewart, for example, found that Fort Knox trainees, 
resentful of being called “the lace pantie brigade [sic],” frequently removed their 
distinctive badges while on pass in Louisville in order to find beer and women.169  
Clearly the men themselves, fearful that the prohibitions on alcohol and sex would 
damage their masculine self-image, did not universally buy in to the image of manhood 
so carefully cultivated by the Army. In fact, some of the independent press coverage took 
the Army’s carefully controlled message and pushed it farther than the publicity officers 
intended. A photo essay in Life magazine, for example, referred to the UMTees as “kid-
glove rookies.”  It derisively noted the trainees’ individually tailored uniforms, the unit’s 
“polite” and “solicitous” officers, and the rug on the club room floor.170 The end result 
was not so much an image of wholesome manhood, but an impression of soft, pampered 
teenagers. 
                                                
169 Alexander Stewart, “Is ‘UMTee’ the Answer?” Christian Century, reprinted in 
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Most importantly, the debate over universal military training illustrates the 
different ways that Americans defined citizenship and masculinity after World War II. 
Depending on the point of view, UMT could be seen as either democratic or totalitarian; 
as the best way to ensure an educated, healthy, involved citizenry or the worst; as vital to 
the growth of America’s manhood or the path to its destruction. It short, it was defined as 
both a means to shore up America’s core values and to tear them down.  
The plan gained the most traction in 1947, when the War Department chose to 
advertise it as a way to educate and improve American manhood, especially through 
citizenship training. But planners never made clear why the military should be the party 
responsible for instilling democratic virtues, moral values, and even manners into 
American men. Such paternalism struck a discordant note with many Americans, 
especially since it came from the military rather than private or even public civilian 
sources. Many Americans did not want the military to socialize their children. The 
absence of rationale was particularly obvious given the lack of stress on UMT as a 
military measure. The death of UMT was a significant blow to the civic-republican 
definition of the citizen-soldier. 
 Finally, the demise of UMT confirmed once and for all the army’s commitment to 
selective conscription rather than universal training or service. Reliance on a selective 
draft meant that military service did not extend to all men. As strategic needs changed 
and the likelihood of another global war declined, the armed services found they required 
fewer and fewer men. In all likelihood, the nation did not need a universal military 
training program in the years following World War II, but its defeat, by validating 
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military service as a selective male citizenship obligation, unintentionally paved the way 





“Necessary to the Maintenance of the National Health, Safety, or Interest:”  
Deferment Policy during the Early Cold War,  
1948-1953 
 
 When President Harry Truman stood before Congress in March 1948 to ask for a 
reinstatement of the draft, he fervently hoped selective conscription would be a 
temporary expedient, in place just long enough to bolster the armed forces until a 
program of universal military training could be implemented. But it was not to be. UMT 
never passed, and Selective Service continued to operate until 1973, officially through 
more years of peace than war. The Selective Service Act of 1948 instituted the United 
States’ first true peacetime draft.1  
Like America’s other twentieth-century draft laws, the Selective Service Act of 
1948 and its successor, the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, allowed 
men who met certain requirements to defer their military service, in some cases for long 
enough that they aged out of eligibility altogether. These deferments were designed to 
protect the nation’s economic stability by preventing the military from drawing men 
                                                
1 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 is widely considered the United 
States’ first peacetime draft by both scholars and the legislators who crafted it. It is clear, 
however, that the 1940 Act was passed with an eye toward America’s entrance into 
World War II. President Franklin Roosevelt signed it into law on September 16, 1940, 
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for land rights in the Caribbean and Canada and a year after easing the United States’ 
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Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 111 
willy-nilly out of the civilian sector. Unlike during World War I and World War II, 
however, conscription during the Cold War was not framed as an emergency expedient. 
Rather, after 1948, Selective Service was conceived as a semi-permanent institution 
necessary to support the large manpower requirements of the Cold War. The period of 
prolonged military preparedness engendered by this conflict forced manpower planners to 
rethink the purpose of conscription and the system used to sustain it. For the first time, 
deferments were used to support an indefinitely militarized peace instead of a temporary 
war effort. Within this context, meeting long-range defense goals and protecting national 
values were of greater consequence than during earlier periods of conscription. 
Sustaining a functional, vibrant, and distinctly American civilian society became as much 
a goal of military manpower policy as producing a strong military.   
 The onset of the Korean War brought these issues into sharp relief. The surprise 
with which the North Korean invasion of South Korea caught Pentagon officials 
underscored the need for preparedness in an uncertain world. As a result, the armed 
forces would not be demobilized after the cessation of combat as they had been following 
every previous American military engagement. Thus, the policy debates over deferments 
that occurred during the Korean War took on new meanings, as their results would last 
long into the militarized peace that followed. 
 This chapter focuses specifically on the debates about which groups of men to 
protect through deferments during the early Cold War, including the Korean War, as 
questions concerning men’s citizenship obligations moved from theory to actuality. In 
order to meet the emergency, the U.S. military decided to triple the size of its active 
forces, just as the nation’s population of military-aged young men fell to its lowest 
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number in decades. Fewer babies born during the Depression years meant fewer men 
available to be soldiers in the 1950s. Meanwhile, the Selective Service Act of 1948 
deferred or exempted veterans; ministers; conscientious objectors; husbands without 
children; fathers; men considered physically, mentally, or morally unfit; and those in 
occupations considered in the national interest, including agriculture.2 Moreover, the law 
prevented the induction of men younger than nineteen years old. All of this meant that 
available manpower was spread thin in both the military and civilian sectors. Yet, in 
1951, with congressional and presidential approval, the Selective Service added a 
deferment category for college students. Moreover, Congress and certain segments of the 
public proved reluctant to draft eighteen-year-olds or revoke the dependency deferment 
for fathers even at a moment of heightened concern over the depth of the available 
manpower pool.  
Despite downward population trends and vastly increased induction calls, 
pressure from professional organizations, federal agencies, and the American public 
indicated these groups’ desire to look beyond the immediate emergency.  They 
considered certain men more valuable to the nation as civilians than as soldiers. Science, 
engineering, and educational organizations argued that American technological 
superiority depended on maintaining an uninterrupted supply of bright, young college 
graduates. Civic organizations, including many that lobbied for universal military 
                                                
2 Occupational deferments were offered to men whose jobs were considered vital 
to the functioning of the nation.  As will be shown, the law was vague as to which jobs 
qualified, and, often, local boards were left to their own devices to determine whether a 
man should receive such a deferment.  In general, however, men in the fields of science, 
medicine, education, agriculture, public health and public safety and those who worked in 
factories producing goods to fulfill defense contracts could gain them if their employers 
could demonstrate that workers with similar skills could not easily be found.   
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training, hoped to lower the age of induction to eighteen, but the same pacifist and 
religious groups that fought against UMT also maintained that military service at such a 
young age would destroy America’s youth. Finally, individual citizens and lawmakers 
alike fretted over what would happen to the institution of the family if fathers were 
regularly drafted away from their homes. To these groups, national defense included 
training future generations of scientists, engineers, and doctors; nurturing boys into men; 
and protecting the nuclear family. The decision of who to draft and who to leave at home 
would have lasting repercussions. Conditions established during the war would not be 
temporary; they would be the new “normal” for an indeterminate length of time into the 
future peace. Therefore, it was imperative that new regulations protect American values. 
Policies that protected students and fathers from military service during an active 
military emergency set an ambivalent precedent. First, they further committed the United 
States to a system of selective military service. Even though the law ostensibly held all 
qualified men liable for induction, student and dependency deferments created a situation 
in which the military establishment purposely kept particular categories of men out of the 
armed services in the name of national security. More importantly, newly written 
regulations deferred these men because of their potential to contribute to the nation’s 
defense in the future, not because of what they actively contributed at the moment. These 
policies helped to militarize the civilian sector, especially the scientific and engineering 
fields, as they defined certain occupations and domestic arrangements as service to the 
state. Simultaneously, these deferments limited the role of the military by restricting the 
reach of conscription and the number of men who actually served in the armed forces. 
Moreover, deferments were justified because they protected the nation’s economic and 
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familial structures.  Therefore, these policies unwittingly privileged economic and 
domestic forms of citizenship over martial citizenship in the civic-republican tradition. 
Their unintended result was to further the process of separating military service from 
masculine citizenship. 
* * * * * 
 In many ways, the Selective Service Act of 1948 was an ambivalent measure. On 
one hand, the very existence of conscription during peacetime indicated the intensified 
militarization of post-war American society. Traditionally, the United States had 
depended on involuntary inductions only during wartime because the American people 
historically harbored a deep, suspicion of peacetime conscription. In the late 1940s, 
however, fear of a third world war trumped such misgivings. In the emerging Cold War 
environment, national security was seen by many as a more critical issue than the threat 
of compulsion, which was why former isolationists, like Republican Senator Robert Taft 
of Ohio, dropped their opposition to conscription in 1948. On the other hand, Congress 
responded to Truman’s request with a limited bill.  
Even though the president had spent the previous three years fighting for a 
program of universal military training, the Selective Service Act of 1948 baldly stated 
that all men did not have an equal responsibility for military service. According to the 
legislation, “the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces … should be 
shared generally,” but only “in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and 
just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective national economy.”3 In 
other words, while universal military service theoretically should be an obligation of 
                                                
3 Selective Service Act of 1948, Public Law 80-759, United States Statutes at 
Large 62, part 1, (1948): 605. 
 115 
citizenship, such a program was not a practical reality. The nascent Cold War demanded 
partial mobilization. Men should expect to serve if called, but the Act would not call all 
men equally. It authorized the president to defer any individual engaged in work “found 
to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest;” whose 
status as the sole supporter of dependents rendered his “deferment advisable;” whose 
belief in a ‘Supreme Being’ caused his opposition to all wars;” or who was “found to be 
physically, mentally, or morally deficient or defective .”4 Except for those incapable of or 
religiously opposed to military service, the law offered deferments to those who could 
perform service to the country in some other manner, either through their jobs or through 
their family role as breadwinner.5  
These broad categories of deferments made sense. They assured equity of national 
service, if not equality; left enough skilled workers to continue scientific research and 
maintain a strong economy; and protected the interests of society’s most vulnerable. The 
armed forces could not expect to draw their personnel haphazardly from the young male 
populace without ramifications in the civilian sector. Factories and hospitals could only 
operate when fully-staffed with skilled employees; the nation needed farmers and 
agricultural workers to maintain its food supplies; schools required teachers to educate 
children; and many families could not afford to lose their primary breadwinners and 
caregivers to the low pay of the Army.  
Targeted short-term deferments and permanent exemptions from military service 
had been used during each of the twentieth-century’s previous wars to protect the 
                                                
4 Ibid., 612-13. 
5 No alternate service was required of conscientious objectors under the 1948 law. 
The Universal Military Service and Training Act of 1951 added a clause that required 
alternate service from conscientious objectors as well. 
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economy as a whole by ensuring enough potential employees remained available to keep 
it vibrant and healthy.6 The Selective Draft Act of 1917, for example, authorized the 
president to exempt federal, state, and local officials and men working in vital industries, 
including, “artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards … 
pilots; mariners … [and] persons engaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be 
necessary to the maintenance of … national interest during the emergency.”7 The 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 simplified the language, but similarly offered 
deferments to “those men whose employment in industry, agriculture, or other 
occupations … is found … to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, 
safety, or interest.”8 Occupational and agricultural deferments were of immense 
importance in keeping the nation on war footing during World War II. 
But deferments and exemptions were used to defend social values deemed of 
national importance as well. For example, the 1948 Act, like other twentieth-century 
American draft laws, protected the beliefs of those men who could prove they were 
religious conscientious objectors. Although it was a contested issue, the majority of 
Americans agreed that compelling a man to compromise his sincerely-held religious 
ideals, even in the name of national defense, undermined the nation’s foundational 
                                                
6 Technically, a deferment is a short-term postponement of draft eligibility so that 
a man may fulfill another, more pressing obligation to the state, while an exemption is a 
permanent release from the responsibilities of military service. Twentieth-century 
policies and practices have obscured the differences between the two, however. For 
example, as this dissertation shows, men after 1948 pyramided their deferments, turning 
short-term postponements from military eligibility into permanent exemptions. 
7 Selective Draft Act of 1917, Public Law 65-12, United States Statutes at Large 
40, part I, (1919), 79. 
 8 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Public Law 76-783, United States 
Statutes at Large 54, part 1 (1941): 888. 
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principle of religious freedom.9 Ministers and divinity students were exempted from 
military obligations for similar reasons.  
One deferment based heavily on national values was that granted to men with 
dependents. In part, this deferment indicated the assumption that the father (or 
occasionally other male family member) was the main source of income within the 
family. Since the base pay of the enlisted grades was particularly low until reforms in the 
mid-1950s and military allowances for dependents of soldiers and sailors were not 
automatic until the Korean War, many families did, in fact, face hardship when the male 
head-of-household was conscripted.10 But the application of the dependency deferment 
historically went far beyond cases of individual hardship.  
                                                
9 The 1917 law allowed members of historic peace churches – Quakers, 
Mennonites, and Brethren – to apply for conscientious objector (CO) status, but such 
status did not provide a deferment. At first, non-combatant military service was the only 
option offered to a drafted CO, but by the end of 1917, alternate civilian service in 
hospitals became available to a limited number of those who refused to enter the military. 
Absolutists, who refused to register, and COs who refused their assigned service faced 
prison sentences. During World War II, the law was broadened to include those outside 
of the historic peace churches whose religious beliefs led them to oppose all wars under 
any circumstances. Congress authorized the establishment of 151 Civilian Public Service 
(CPS) camps to provide alternate service for those COs who refused non-combatant 
service within the military. 12,000 men worked in these camps over the course of the 
war, approximately 25,000 served in the military in non-combatant positions, and another 
5,000 went to prison for refusing to register or for protest in the CPS camps, where 
conditions were often subpar. The 1948 law offered religious objectors deferments from 
service without any obligation for alternate service. See John Whiteclay Chambers II, 
“Conscientious Objectors and the American State from Colonial Times to the Present,” 
23-46, in The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance, ed. 
Charles C. Moskos and Chambers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
10 Regulations instituting allotments and allowances for families were established 
concurrently with each twentieth-century draft, but they were separate and time-limited 
measures. For example, during World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the 
Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act on June 23, 1942, to provide extra support to 
the dependents of enlisted men, over a year and a half after conscription had been 
instituted in September 1940. 
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How and when the federal government, local boards, and particular men chose to 
use the deferment illustrates the complex interplay between military service, economic 
need, competing value systems, and the obligations of masculine citizenship. The 1917 
law, for example, allowed the President to “exclude or discharge… those in a status with 
respect to persons dependent upon them for support which renders their exclusion or 
discharge advisable.”11 This vague language granted local draft boards wide latitude in 
classifying individual men, but despite some abuse of the provision, most inductees did 
not choose to apply for the exemptions to which they may have been entitled.12 As 
historian Christopher Capozzola argued, the popular political culture of the day “defined 
citizenship through its obligations.” Therefore, men who did not serve, perjoratively 
labeled as “slackers” by the public, “were not just bad citizens,” they were “inadequate 
men.”13 In such an environment, more men preferred to volunteer for service or allow 
themselves to be conscripted than apply for an exemption.14 Either they felt that their 
obligations to the State trumped their responsibilities to their families or they believed 
                                                
11 Selective Service Act of 1917, United States Statutes at Large: 79. 
12 The mere having of dependents was not enough to rate an exemption.  Men had 
to prove that their wives and children were financially dependent on them.  A memo from 
the Provost Marshal General’s office, for example, stated, “The rule does not ask, ‘Is the 
husband, as a matter of law, liable to support the wife?’  It asks, ‘Is the wife, as a matter 
of fact, mainly dependent on the daily labor of her husband for support?’”  Quoted in 
Dorit Geva, “Different and Unequal: Breadwinning, Dependency Deferments, and the 
Gendered Origins of the U.S. Selective Service System,” Armed Forces and Society 37 
(fall 2011): 605.  
13 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of 
the Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 30-31.  See 
also Susan Zieger, “She Didn’t Raise Her Boy to be a Slacker: Motherhood, 
Conscription, and the Culture of World War I,” Feminist Studies 22 (1996): 7-39. 
14 Despite national trends, there was abuse of the system.  In mid-1917, some 
districts reported that up to 80 percent of men filed for dependency exemptions, 
prompting further clarification of the regulations.  See Geva, “Different and Unequal,” 
606-609. 
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that they were meeting their familial obligations through their service to the State.15 In 
response, wives, elderly parents, and children who depended on these would-be soldiers 
frequently appeared before local draft boards to request the exemptions their loved ones 
would not. This brought “the state into…personal relationships in unprecedented ways,” 
and allowed draft board members to evaluate the relative importance of military service 
vis a vis family relationships.16 That draft board members applied their personal value 
systems to each individual case in the absence of centralized guidance made this a 
particularly fraught process. 
Congress, the Selective Service System’s national office, and especially local 
board members again tried to protect fathers from the draft during World War II. The 
1940 draft law repeated the language of the 1917 act with respect to dependency. Local 
boards interpreted this throughout 1940 and 1941 to mean that all married men should 
receive a deferment, including those whose wives worked. Eleanor Roosevelt, in a 
January 1941 press conference, explained that “more than ‘dollars and cents dependency’ 
must be considered.” She supported her point of view with the words of Major Gordon 
Shaw of the Selective Service’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., who stated, “to say 
that a man is to be called because his wife and children would not starve is to deny that 
the wife and children depend upon him for more than his pocketbook. It is to deny his 
moral leadership and protection.”17 Roosevelt and Shaw’s assumption was that a husband 
and father provided a moral compass for his family. The Selective Service agreed that to 
                                                
15 Or, as Capozzola points out, for many, the promise of a regular pay check, three 
square meals a day, and a roof over their heads, may have outweighed the negative 
aspects of military service. See Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 37. 
16 Ibid., 37-38. 
17 “Quotes Backing on Draft View,” New York Times, Jan. 22, 1941. 
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draft him away from his home would leave his dependents directionless and do more 
harm that good.  
Even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the American declaration of 
war in December 1941, fatherhood remained a protected social role. In April 1942, the 
Selective Service reclassified men with dependents to indicate who had children and who 
did not, as well as who worked in war-related jobs and who did not. Although the agency 
was not yet ready to draft men with dependents, the reclassification effort was designed 
to encourage men with dependents to bolster their deferred status by taking a job in the 
national interest as insurance against the time when Selective Service would have to 
rescind the III-A (dependency) deferment. In the meantime, President Roosevelt 
recommended lowering the age of induction from twenty-one to eighteen rather than draft 
fathers.18  
As the war deepened, deferments had to be tightened. Nevertheless, Historian 
George Q. Flynn argued that regardless of manpower needs, local values, especially the 
importance of fatherhood, were substantially more influential than national directives. 
“Local control did lead to unscientific classification,” he wrote, “but the results had 
public approval. An unscientific father seemed more valuable to the public than a 
bachelor chemist.”19 Repeatedly, and despite memos from state directors and the 
Selective Service’s national headquarters, local boards inducted single farmers, industrial 
workers, or men with special skills rather than break up families. Even during total war, 
the so-called “Good War,” the civic-republican impulse to serve the nation through 
                                                
18 See George Q Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, (Lawrence, Kans.: University 
Press of Kansas, 1993), 68-75, for more information. 
19 Ibid., 61. 
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military service came into conflict with the tradition of selective military service designed 
to protect particular social values.   
This trend continued in the post-war years. The language of the 1948 Selective 
Service Act echoed that of the previous laws in its ambiguity. It authorized the president, 
and thus the Selective Service, to defer men whose “status with respect to persons 
dependent upon them … renders their deferment advisable.”20 As during the century’s 
previous conflicts, the issue of dependency was complicated, but it was loaded with the 
era’s unique cultural baggage. The end of almost two decades of Depression and World 
War led to a new emphasis on the home and family. Renewed economic prosperity, the 
availability of a broad range of consumer goods, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
restoration of close to 10 million men to civilian life placed a new emphasis on a “return 
to normalcy.” Marriage and birthrates skyrocketed.21 Prescriptive literature and other 
forms of media extolled the virtues of the nuclear family. In the first three months of 
1951 alone, for example, readers of Look magazine learned that married men and women 
lived longer than those who were single and that couples with children were less likely to 
divorce than those without.  The message to subscribers was that larger families equaled 
a longer, happier life.22 
While it is unlikely that Truman or Major General Lewis B. Hershey, the Director 
of Selective Service since 1941, considered parenting advice books when formulating 
military manpower policy, popular messages about fatherhood filtered into those policies 
                                                
20 Selective Service Act of 1948, United States Statutes at Large: 612. 
21 By 1950, women, on average, married at the age of 20, and the birthrate peaked 
in 1957 at 25.3 per thousand.  See Nancy Woloch, Women and the American Experience: 
A Concise History, 2nd Edition (Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 2002), 343.   
22 “More Children Equal Less Divorce,” Look, Feb. 13, 1951, 80; “Married 
Women Live Longer,” Look, March 13, 1951, 21. 
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nonetheless. According to contemporary prescriptive literature, social stability depended 
on happy families, which in turn required involved male figures, a phenomenon historian 
Jessica Weiss, borrowing from McCall’s magazine has termed “togetherness.”23 Fathers 
were of the utmost importance.  According to Look, it was their “responsibility” to make 
“the family successful as a unit,” and not just by “concentrating on making money.”24 
The June 1950 issue of Parents Magazine warned that children would fail to “find 
emotional fulfillment” or “be good parents…to their children” unless “Dad” offered them 
the opportunity to develop “a warm regard for some of the best qualities of masculinity – 
tenderness, protection, strength.”25 Fathers could counterbalance the negative effects of 
overbearing mothers and prevent sons from becoming “sissies.” According to advice 
manuals, the very future of American society depended on the firm hand and tender heart 
of a loving, engaged Dad.26 A man in uniform, stationed half-way around the world 
simply could not fulfill the role. 
                                                
23 See Jessica Weiss, To Have and To Hold: Marriage, the Baby Boom, and 
Social Change (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), especially ch. 4. An 
editorial in the May 1954 issue of McCall’s touted the achievability of the new American 
Dream – home-ownership, large family, better education, more wealth – and explained, 
“But the most impressive and most heartening feature of this change is that men, women 
and children are achieving it together. They are creating this new and warmer way of life 
not as women alone or men alone, isolated from one another, but as a family sharing a 
common experience.” The magazine pledged, “from this day forward,” to appeal to those 
looking to share in this new life of togetherness. Otis Lee Weise, “Live the Life of 
McCall’s,” McCall’s, May 1954, 27 [emphasis in original]. 
24 “The Conspiracy against Chastity,” Look, Jan. 16, 1951, 73. 
25 O. Spurgeon English and Constance J. Foster, “How to Be a Good Father,” 
Parents Magazine, June 1950, 84 [emphasis in original]. 
26 For more, see Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the 
Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 146-149; Jessica Weiss, To Have and To 
Hold, esp. ch. 3; James Gilbert, Men in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in the 
1950s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), esp. ch. 7; Ralph LaRossa, Of War 
and Men: World War II in the Lives of Fathers and their Families (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2011), esp. Parts III and IV. 
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Student deferments, meanwhile, had a much shorter history. Although educational 
groups lobbied for student deferments during World War I, Secretary of War Newton D. 
Baker repeatedly denied any blanket exemptions, explaining to President Woodrow 
Wilson, “it…seemed necessary…to let the draft fall where it will and make exceptions 
after the men are drawn, [rather] than to create classes, and the consequent class feeling, 
by exemptions in advance.”27 Since the Selective Draft Act only conscripted men aged 
twenty-one or over until August 1918, three months before the end of the war, when the 
minimum age was dropped to eighteen, most college students who chose not to volunteer 
for the armed services did not have to worry about induction.28  
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 allowed students to postpone 
their inductions until the end of their academic year or until July 1, 1941, whichever 
came first, but as during World War I, it was not until Congress considered dropping the 
age of draft liability to eighteen in the fall of 1942 that the issue of student deferment 
gained much political momentum. College administrators, whose enrollments had already 
declined by close to 25 percent between 1940 and 1941, vigorously protested the 
proposed change.29  As a result, the Selective Service piloted a limited student deferment 
program in 1943. Students who majored in one of twenty science, engineering, and 
related fields; whose university would certify that they were in good standing; and who 
would graduate before July 1, 1945 could receive a deferment.30 As manpower needs 
                                                
27 Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson, May 26, 1917, box 4, Newton D. Baker 
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., as quoted in John Whiteclay Chambers, 
III, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free Press, 
1987), 190. 
28 Chambers, To Raise an Army, 233. 
29 Flynn, The Draft, 75. 
30 “Widens Deferment for Men in College,” New York Times, March 5, 1943. 
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increased, however, these deferments were limited to a total of 10,000 students 
nationwide in the fields of chemistry, engineering, geology, geophysics, and physics.31  
World War II, however, jumpstarted the militarization of civilian science and 
highlighted its importance to military strategy and tactics. The advent and military 
application of such technologies as radar, synthetic rubber, proximity fuses, penicillin, 
and especially the atomic bomb brought scientists firmly into the realm of national 
defense, frequently under the auspices of the federal government. The War and Navy 
Departments both undertook limited research agendas and awarded contracts to private 
laboratories to work on specific problems. Defense-related research was conducted in 
other major agencies, as well, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and 
Interior.32 In 1941, the White House created the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD) to coordinate research and development efforts between federal 
and military agencies; liaise with foreign governments and civilian institutions, including 
universities, the National Academy of Science, and the National Research Council; and 
develop some of its own programs. Its Section on Uranium (S-1) worked under the Army 
Corps of Engineers to develop the atomic bomb in what became known as the Manhattan 
Project. It even stationed civilian geologists, physicists, architects, biologists, and civil 
and electrical engineers in overseas theaters of operation, through its Office of Field 
Service.33 But Vannevar Bush, OSRD’s director, envisioned a much stronger connection 
between science and national defense as the country moved toward peace. 
                                                
31 Flynn, The Draft, 79. 
32 President’s Scientific Research Board, Science and Public Policy, vol. 3, 
Administration for Research (Washington, DC: GPO, 1947), 2-3. 
33 The Office of Scientific Research and Development was created by Executive 
Order 8807 on June 28, 1941. It subsumed the short-lived National Defense Research 
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In Science: The Endless Frontier, a 1945 report commissioned by President 
Franklin Roosevelt, Bush encouraged the federal government to “accept new 
responsibilities for promoting the flow of new scientific knowledge and the development 
of scientific talent in our youth.” This was “the proper concern of the Government,” he 
argued, since science “vitally affect[ed the nation’s] health… jobs, and…national 
security.” Science, he claimed, had won the war. While he acknowledged that “science, 
by itself, provide[d] no panacea for individual, social, and economic ills,” he asserted, 
“without scientific progress we could not have maintained our liberties against tyranny.” 
Basic scientific research, or work exploring how the natural world functioned rather than 
that attempting to solve a particular problem, was key to America’s continued to safety, 
since no one could predict what applications new knowledge would yield.34 In order to 
further such inquiry, he advocated the creation of a permanent Science Advisory Board to 
help guide the president and Congress as they shaped future scientific policy for the 
country and a congressionally-funded civilian organization to “supplement and 
                                                                                                                                            
Committee (NDRC), which awarded contracts for scientific research, and was designed 
to follow up on development as well as research; coordinate the efforts of the military 
services, the NDRC, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; and motivate 
research in military medicine. For more information, see Alan I. Marcus and Amy Sue 
Bix, The Future is Now: Science and Technology Policy since 1950 (Amherst, NY: 
Humanity Books, 2007), 14-23, and Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for 
War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
Science in World War II, Office of Scientific Research and Development (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Co., 1948), especially 35-51, 143. Available online at 
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL6026526M/Organizing_scientific_research_for_war 
34 At the time of the report, the existence of the atomic bomb had not yet been 
made public, but as the director of the OSRD, Bush was instrumental in getting the 
Manhattan Project off the ground. He was well aware of its development, and therefore, 
of its importance as an example of basic research.  He understood the importance of 
theoretical physics to national defense in a way that most Americans did not yet grasp. 
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strengthen” military research. Government funding would ensure that the work got done, 
while civilian control would guarantee intellectual freedom.35 
Adequate numbers of trained personnel were essential to Bush’s vision. “The 
limiting factor is a human one,” he wrote. “We shall have rapid or slow advance in this 
direction or in that depending on the number of really first-class men who are engaged in 
the work in question.” And Bush stressed the importance of numbers. He worried that 
“too many such men ha[d] gone into uniform” during World War II.  The widespread 
enlistment and conscription of scientifically talented and trained men had created a deficit 
of approximately 150,000 science and technology students who would have received 
bachelors degrees and another 17,000 men who would have earned advanced degrees in 
chemistry, engineering, geology, mathematics, physics, psychology, and the biological 
sciences by 1955. Therefore, he argued, it was incumbent upon the government to 
compensate for this imbalance by “remov[ing] the barriers” to scientific education. 
Federal programs should encourage improvement in science education and offer 
scholarships and fellowships to talented students looking to pursue advanced degrees. 
The security of the nation depended on scientifically trained manpower, be it military or 
civilian.36 
Scientific manpower was therefore a subject of great concern to the federal 
government as it demobilized after World War II and then reorganized its many agencies 
as the Cold War began to take shape. In October 1946, Truman appointed his Assistant 
and former Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, John R. 
                                                
35 Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1945) 
http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm#summary [accessed Feb. 29, 2012]. His 
proposals eventually led to the establishment of the National Science Foundation in 1950. 
36 Bush, Science http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm#summary. 
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Steelman, as the chairman of the President’s Scientific Research Board.37  The Board was 
to “investigate and report upon the entire scientific program of the Federal Government,” 
including the availability and allocation of resources and the training of scientific 
personnel.38 Its membership consisted of the heads of those federal agencies most 
involved in scientific research, including Robert Patterson, the Secretary of War; James 
Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy; Clinton P. Anderson, the Secretary of Agriculture; 
Vannevar Bush, as the Director of the OSRD; and David Lilienthal, the Chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission. These men took it for granted that science was vital to 
national security. Their five-volume report, Science and Public Policy, issued between 
August and October 1947, opened with the claim that “the rapid extension of scientific 
knowledge…may reasonably be said to be a major factor in national survival,” as proven 
during World War II, when “the laboratory became the first line of defense and the 
scientist, the indispensable warrior.”39 
The members of the President’s Scientific Research Board did not find the 
shortage of trained scientists quite as dire as Bush had in 1945. Their report found that 
the war had directly cost the United States approximately 90,000 bachelors degrees and 
5,000 doctoral degrees in scientific subjects, but it expected these numbers to rise to 
100,000 and 8,400, respectively, “before the effects of war-reduced enrollments [were] 
overcome.” Steelman, however, estimated that only one-third of science majors entered 
research or teaching careers, reducing the deficit to a mere 40,000 scientists and 
                                                
37 The Scientific Research Board was created by Executive Order 9791, which 
was signed on October 17, 1946. 
38 President’s Scientific Research Board, Science and Public Policy, vol. 1. A 
Program for the Nation, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1947), III. 
39 Ibid., 3. 
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engineers on the bachelors level. Ninety percent of Ph.D.s tended to enter similar 
professions, leading to a loss of approximately 7,600.40 Nevertheless, the report warned, 
the nation could not afford to sit idly by and wait for the manpower shortfall to correct 
itself. To do so would be “dangerous not only to…national welfare but to national 
security.” As examples, it pointed out that neither the Atomic Energy Commission nor 
the Army could fully staff their research and development programs.41 Therefore, it was 
“of the utmost urgency that steps be taken to increase and improve [America’s] scientific 
manpower pool.”42 
The report concluded that the nation’s universities were the key to solving the 
scientific manpower crisis. They were sites of both training and basic research. Financial 
support through grants to improve facilities and equipment, fellowships to augment 
professors’ salaries, and scholarships to assist the brightest students would all help ease 
the deficit.43 But it would be a long process. Scientists, according to Steelman, could not 
be “mass-produced.”44 America’s colleges and universities would need 15,000 additional 
science instructors, including 4,500 with Ph.D.s, a process that would take at least ten 
years, to reach the pre-war student-teacher ratio. Yet given the huge post-war increase in 
demand for scientists, that number, according to the report, was not guaranteed to be 
sufficient.45 In short, policies to encourage students to enter scientific fields were vital to 
national security. 
                                                
40 Ibid., vol. 4. Manpower for Research, 13. 
41 Ibid., 3. 
42 Ibid., 27. 
43 Ibid., 27. 
44 Ibid., 6-7. 
45 Ibid., 3. 
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Science and Public Policy never specifically mentioned Selective Service or 
conscription as a current or future policy. At the time the report was submitted, the draft 
had been deactivated, with the hope that it would no longer be necessary. The Army was 
trying to fill its ranks with voluntary enlistments, and Truman was lobbying hard for 
UMT. Volume 4 of the report, however, viewed the decision to draft science students 
during World War II with skepticism. It acknowledged that the pressures confronting 
policy makers at the time had been “complex,” but the report also pointed out that in 
“stripping” the nation’s colleges and universities of scientists and students, the U.S. had 
followed a vastly different policy than its allies, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, 
which had “sharply increase[ed] their training programs for scientists.”46 “In light of the 
effect of the policy in contributing to the present shortage,” it concluded, “the wisdom of 
the decision [not to defer science students] seems dubious.”47 The message was clear. In 
the event of another war, at least some student deferments would be necessary to protect 
America’s scientific development and, by extension, its national security. 
 Congress listened to these warnings and included broad provisions for deferments 
in the Selective Service Act of 1948, but granted the President the authority to establish 
the appropriate regulations. With presidential approval, therefore, the Selective Service 
designed the subsequent draft to create as little disruption to a student’s academic year as 
possible. High school students over the age of eighteen who met the physical 
requirements for induction were classified as I-S and automatically deferred until they 
graduated from high school or turned 20, whichever occurred first. College students who 
received draft notices were granted administrative deferments in the II-A category, the 
                                                
46 Ibid., 12, 5. 
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same as that used for men deferred for non-agricultural occupations, and allowed to 
postpone their inductions through the end of the current academic year. 48 Although the 
use of the II-A classification prevented the loss of a semester’s tuition or academic credit 
and essentially granted deferments to all college freshmen, it left post-secondary students 
vulnerable to the draft before they earned their degrees.49 Director of Selective Service 
Hershey realized that further regulations needed to be developed. 
* * * * * 
 In November 1948, the Selective Service and the National Security Resources 
Board jointly convened the first meeting of six Scientific Advisory Committees and 
asked them to develop a workable plan for classifying and deferring students in the 
national interest. Members represented professional organizations and public and private 
universities in six fields – agricultural and biological sciences, engineering sciences, the 
healing arts, humanities, physical sciences, and the social sciences – but representatives 
very quickly realized that they shared common goals and opted to work as a committee of 
the whole. They elected M.H. Trytten, the Director of the Office of Scientific Personnel 
of the National Research Council, as their Chair.50  None of the men present at the two-
day November meeting or its December successor questioned the need to defer college 
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students or the urgency of protecting scientific fields in the name of national security. 
That these goals were of paramount importance was considered obvious; how to achieve 
them was not.51 
 How deferred students should be utilized ultimately became one of the 
committees’ major points of contention. Was the purpose of this program to allow 
students time to gain special skills for use within the military or to further civilian 
research? How did committee members, as a group, define service to the nation? Even as 
members hammered out the details of their proposal, the rationale for such a proposal 
remained unspoken until late in the second day of the December meeting, when Harvard 
professor and economist John Kenneth Galbraith proposed an embargo on occupational 
and dependency deferments after graduation for men who already had received a student 
deferment. He feared a public relations disaster if the American people believed college 
students could go on to become an “elite group” singled out “for protection from the 
Draft.”52 George O. Curme, Jr., a vice president of Carbide and Carbon Chemical 
Corporation, took issue with Galbraith’s assumption “that the only way in which a man 
can serve his country is by being in uniform,” a statement that led Hershey’s assistant, 
Colonel Louis F. Kosch, to ask, “Where is the man most valuable to the national 
defense?”53 
                                                
51 See Meeting of Scientific Committees, November 4 and 5, 1948, box 71, 
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 Answers to Kosch’s question varied, as committee members tried to weigh 
multiple factors, including public perception. If only certain men could afford college, 
and these men received repeated deferments, the student program would create a 
privileged class that, by virtue of its wealth, would never have to face down an enemy 
gun. Charles W. Cole, the President of Amherst College colorfully, and perhaps 
presciently, explained, “while it won’t be nearly as acute in peacetime as in wartime, I do 
think we will separate the sheep from the goats in college, and all through life and make a 
very bad situation publicwise.”54 On the other hand, other representatives firmly believed 
that American security depended on the research of talented civilian scientists. Men could 
contribute just as much to national defense in civilian laboratories, if not more, than they 
could if they served in the military. As Charles E. Odegaard, Executive Director of the 
American Council of Learned Societies, put it, the idea that “the only real way to defend 
your country is in a uniform…is an old idea and is a medievalist one.” Unless the men 
present at a conference of scientific advisory committees could jettison the “old tradition 
that when there is a war Johnny gets his gun and goes off to defend the country,” there 
was no point in continuing to meet. Committee members would never convince the 
public at large. “We have got to face the facts of an altered technological situation in our 
society,” he expounded. “If we don’t believe that it is essential to have this trained 
personnel, then this whole training program doesn’t make sense and there is no point in 
our sitting here talking about utilization outside the Army….I think we have to work 
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against a popular conception that war is fought only by the man in uniform.” Service was 
service, whether military or civilian.55 
 Ultimately, committee members came to agree with Odegaard. They proposed a 
plan that they believed carefully balanced the democratic values of equality and open 
access to education with the selectivity necessary to a program defined by its need for 
special skills. Since no one could determine which skills would be important in the 
future, they called for a liberal system of deferments, for which students from all fields, 
not just those related to science and engineering could qualify. To be eligible for the 
program, students would have to rank in the upper percentile of their college class and 
score a 110 or higher on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT), an exam 
designed by the Army to test basic intelligence and given to all prospective soldiers at 
induction and enlistment centers. Committee members wanted to make sure that only the 
best and brightest would earn the privilege of a deferment. But in order to prevent the 
perception of elitism, they strongly recommended the creation of a widespread, 
government-funded scholarship program for qualified students. Moreover, they endorsed 
the possibility of further deferments for graduating students. The plan proposed a four-
month grace period for graduates in order that they might be able to start graduate school 
or find a job that qualified for an occupational deferment. If they failed to do so, then 
they would be reclassified as I-A (available for service), and treated as any other draft-
eligible male citizen.56 The plan created, in Odegaard’s words, “a genuine selective 
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service system in a much wider sense” that took “into account…other kinds of service 
that [were] essential to the national interest.”57 
 The Scientific Advisory Committees submitted their report to Hershey on 
December 21, 1948, but the Selective Service shelved it and dissolved the committees in 
early 1949 when inductions were suspended. Without a monthly conscription quota to 
meet, the issue of student deferments lacked urgency. It was not until Cold War tensions 
erupted into war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950 that the issue of the draft moved 
back into the public eye and onto the Congressional floor. The Selective Service restarted 
inductions as the military mobilized to meet the emergency, and Congress quickly 
extended the Selective Service Act of 1948, which had been due to expire at the end of 
the month. Lawmakers began working on the legislation that would become the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951.58 In doing so, they were forced to 
prioritize those values that they believed deserved special protection.  
* * * * * 
Planners in the State and Defense Departments did not envision the Korean War 
as an isolated emergency of limited duration. Instead, they contextualized it within an 
environment of Cold War militarization and based American foreign and military policy 
on their belief in the existence of a continuing global struggle between American 
democracy and Soviet communism. As the recently-issued, top-secret National Security 
Council report, NSC-68, made clear, the consequence of losing the war in South Korea 
would be an ideological victory for the Soviet Union. The U.S. would have to mobilize 
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accordingly to defend its ally, but it would not be able to demobilize after the war. 
America’s only viable response to the Soviet threat, whether in war or peace, was a 
massive buildup of conventional and thermonuclear arms in order to create a “military 
shield” under which allies could develop political and economic systems friendly to the 
U.S. America needed the strength “to deter…Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if 
necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character.” 59 
Any peace of the 1950s would therefore be a militarized peace.60 To maintain a flexible 
force ready to meet any contingency, the Army, it was believed, would have to rely on 
conscription to meet its manpower needs. Thus, when the Selective Service sprang into 
action to meet its quotas in June 1950 after having suspended all inductions the year 
before, the question of which men to safeguard through deferments quickly became a 
political issue.  
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The vast majority of American men between the ages of eighteen and 26 could 
not be conscripted because they had not yet reached the legal age of induction, already 
held deferments, were already in the military or reserves, or were veterans.61 Moreover, 
low birth rates during the Depression years had their greatest impact on the draft-age 
population during the late 1940s and early 1950s, when just over one million men turned 
eighteen annually.62 Hershey feared that if the war continued, too few would qualify for 
induction to replenish active-duty soldiers who rotated out of service.63 His anxieties 
increased when the Truman Administration asked for a total military force of 3.5 million 
men by early 1951. Hershey and the Defense Department worried that the available pool 
of manpower would not be deep enough to meet the need, especially as mounting 
casualties in Korea created a need for ever-greater numbers of men.64 Nevertheless, under 
pressure from a variety of sources, the Director of the Selective Service returned to the 
Scientific Advisory Committees’ plan for deferring college students, primarily in order to 
protect scientific and engineering fields. 
                                                
61 Deferred or exempted men outnumbered available registrants by a margin of 
4:1. On June 30, 1952, there were 8,563,000 classified registrants between the ages of 
18.5 and 25. 4,570,000 were deferred, 2,935,000 were either in the military or reserves or 
veterans, and 1,118,000 were immediately available.  Annual Report, 1952, 63.  
62 Ibid., 1951, 11. 
63 See Meeting of Advisory Committee on Specialized Personnel, Washington 
D.C., December 3, 1951, box 71, Papers of the Planning Office, 1947-1963, Entry UD 
24, RG 147, NARA, 25-31.  
64 Testimony of Anna Rosenberg, Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Jan. 
10, 1951, 37-66; Senate Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military and Service 
Act: Report of the Committee on Armed Services to Accompany S. 1, Report No. 117, 82d 
Cong., 1st sess., February 1951, 8-9 [Hereafter Senate Report 117]; James M. Gerhardt, 
The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970 
(Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 148. 
 137 
Hershey hastily recalled the members of Trytten’s advisory group in July 1950, 
asking them to review their recommendations and issue a new report, which they did in 
December.65 Their new report confirmed the Scientific Advisory Committees’ 
commitment to a liberal deferment program, citing the mercurial nature of scientific 
advancement. “It is quite possible,” it noted, “that fifteen years ago nuclear physicists 
would have been dismissed as a scientific luxury – as a group of theoreticians not 
essential to the national defense.”66 Now, the report implied, theoretical physicists were 
indispensible to national security. Trytten went on to claim victory in World War II as 
“primarily the triumph of a virile technology based on the skills and knowledge of 
scientists, engineers, and other specialists.”67 Deferments for scientific training, therefore, 
were not only an acceptable masculine alternative to military service, they were crucial if 
the United States was to maintain its military and technological superiority. Equally 
important, he believed, college students contributed to “national preparedness just as 
certainly as…men in training in the armed services.”68 Odegaard confirmed this notion at 
a conference to present the committees’ findings to the public. He explained, “National 
defense is now more than a military affair. It requires as a correlative a concept of 
civilian defense that involves far more than putting out fires or directing traffic to bomb 
                                                
65 The Scientific Advisory Committees met in Washington, D.C. on July 31, 1950 
and again on October 4 and 5, 1950. See Report of the Meeting of the Combined 
Scientific Committees with the Healing Arts Educational Advisory Committee, July 31, 
1950, and Walter R. Krill to Colonel Eanes, September 26, 1950, both in 105 Advisory 
Committee (Gen), 1950-48, box 34, Central Files, 1948-69, RG 147, NARA. 
66 “Reports of the Scientific Advisory Committees,” in Trytten, Student 
Deferment in Selective Service, 92. 
67 Ibid., 20. 
68 Ibid., 43. 
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shelters.”69 Civilian work was not throwaway work. It was imperative to national 
security. Men did not need to don a military uniform in order to defend the nation. 
Hershey did not entirely agree. While he supported the group’s recommendations 
regarding the importance of student deferments, he adamantly believed that a deferment 
should be a postponement of military service, not an exemption. Not all national service 
was created equal, at least in his view. He warned members of the Preparedness 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee evaluating the new Selective 
Service bill that Congress must carefully frame the legislation, “otherwise a deferment 
becomes simply a means of evading service by staying out until the program ends or the 
law expires.”70 Lawmakers had to balance Odegaard and Hershey’s competing points of 
view as they worked to overhaul the 1948 law. 
Legislators worked to untangle a welter of competing interests, contradictory 
scenarios, and contingent statistics in order to hammer out a workable bill that would 
increase the size of America’s eligible manpower pool. Length of service, age of 
eligibility, mental and physical standards, and deferment criteria, all faced Congressional 
scrutiny in 1951, as lawmakers desired a plan flexible enough to meet both the Korean 
emergency and any future contingencies. Moreover, Congress and the Department of 
Defense wanted to put the issue of Universal Military Training to rest. “The time has 
come when we must look beyond the end of our nose,” declared Democratic Senator 
                                                
69 Scientific Advisory Committees Minutes of Public Meeting, December 18, 
1950, box 71 Papers of the Planning Office, 1947-1963, Entry UD 24, RG 147, NARA, 
14. 
70 Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 508.  
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Lyndon Johnson, as he opened the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings that January.71 
At issue was the delicate balance between military preparedness, the country’s economic 
welfare, and its social values. That the armed forces needed to pull millions of men out of 
civilian society was not up for debate. Who to pull certainly was. 
Representatives from the Pentagon quickly dismissed groups they viewed as 
unlikely to be able to fill manpower needs. Assistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg 
eliminated the possibility of drafting veterans with less than twelve months of service, 
pointing out that most of those within the eligible age range would be disqualified for 
reasons of dependency, occupation, or poor physical condition.72 Moreover, the public 
outcry had crescendoed when reservists, most of whom were veterans of World War II 
and many of whom had wives and children, had been called up for service during the 
early months of the Korean War. A renewed draft of veterans was not expected to gain 
public support. Further, the Department of Defense adamantly rejected lowering its 
physical and mental standards for induction amidst fears of increased rates of disciplinary 
problems and high projections for pension expenditures into the future.73 General Omar 
N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, worried that men who could not meet 
high mental qualifications would be a “liability,” while Chief of Naval Operations, 
                                                
71 Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 23. 
72 House Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training: Hearings 
before the Committee on Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 1951, 62.  Although 
Congress wished to tighten deferment criteria, it never seriously considered entirely 
eliminating dependency or occupational deferments. 
73 As of early 1951, approximately ten percent of the available manpower pool 
was classified as IV-F, although the Selective Service expected this proportion to rise as 
more men were examined and classified. This compared favorably to the 21.8 percent 
rejection rate from World War II, even though physical standards were concurrent with 
World War II minimums and mental standards were slightly higher. See Senate Report 
117, 7. 
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Admiral Forrest Sherman, called lowered standards, “a pain in the neck all along the 
line.”74 Neither veterans nor IV-Fs (those rejected for physical, mental, or moral reasons) 
could be expected to resolve the military’s dire manpower predicament. 
The major point of contention, therefore, became whether to draft eighteen-year-
olds or married men, either with or without children. Defense officials preferred the 
younger men. First, they were cheaper. Witnesses estimated that the military could save 
between $456 million and $513 million annually on dependency allotments by inducting 
eighteen-year-olds instead of older men with family obligations.75 Second, they believed, 
inducting younger men would cause less social damage. As Rosenberg argued, “a draft of 
husbands and fathers would be much more destructive in its family and community 
consequences than the calling of eighteen-year-olds.” The “older family man” was more 
likely to be heavily enmeshed in local businesses, education, and the “life of the 
community generally,” which meant that drafting men with dependents would cause “a 
great loss…to the purchasing power of families” and be “more costly in social values.”76 
At the hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, she also speculated that 
men with dependents might be less efficient soldiers than those without. She explained 
that the government could never lose sight of “the morale factor of calling a man in who 
has dependents and who therefore is at heart and mind somewhat at home while he is in 
the military.”77 She cited experts who had assured the Department of Defense that 
                                                
74 Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 627, 667. 
75 Senate Report 117, 6; Testimony of Anna Rosenberg, Senate Preparedness 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training and 
Service Act of 1951, 69. 
76 Ibid., 68, 69, 70. 
77 House Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 143. 
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younger men had less difficulty adjusting to military life than slightly older men because 
many had “not married or developed permanent roots in their careers.”78 Of especial 
social benefit was the fact that inducting eighteen-year-olds was less likely to break up 
families, and therefore less likely to contribute to divorce rates. Finally, multiple 
witnesses insisted that eighteen-year-olds made excellent soldiers.79 General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, then Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
insisted that young men “deserved” the privilege of military training so that they could 
defend themselves and their country in the event of war.80 Eighteen-year-olds, therefore, 
from the Defense Department’s procurement perspective, were the most reliable source 
of additional manpower. 
Civilians outside of the defense establishment, however, were less certain of the 
wisdom of drafting men just out of high school. They tapped into several of the 
arguments that had been made by opponents of universal military training. Witnesses 
from a variety of backgrounds argued that drafting eighteen-year-olds, who could not 
vote, would militarize American society and regiment boys’ minds. Boys’ immaturity, 
testified John M. Swomley, Jr., the Director of the National Council Against Conscription 
and an anti-UMT activist, was one of the major reasons for the “higher prevalence of 
neurosis among younger persons in the Army,” a situation that could be avoided by 
keeping this age group out of the military.81 Mrs. William L. Slagle of Dayton, Ohio, 
                                                
78 Ibid., 172. 
79 Ibid., 9, 345. 
80 Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 1203. 
81 See, for example, the testimony of Rev. Ezra Ellis, Chairman, Public Affairs 
Committee of the Minneapolis Church Federation and Minister of Wesley Methodist 
Church, Minneapolis, Minn.; Robert W. Lyon, Young People’s General Assembly for 
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lamented, “Our country is not in such dire straits that we need to conscript our babies for 
a global crusade comparable to the Children’s Crusade of the Middle Ages.”82 Other 
opponents agonized about young conscripts’ moral well-being. Reverend Ezra Ellis, the 
Chairman of the Public Affairs Committee of the Minneapolis Church Federation, fretted 
that the boys would “be allowed the freedom to seek their own recreation in strange 
places under no discipline, with gambling, prostitution, and drinking sources of unusual 
temptation.”83 Charles W. Elliott of Chicago, Illinois, worried that “the fact that lectures 
and movies on venereal disease [and] the issuance of preventatives and the location of 
prophylactic stations is part of GI indoctrination” would both “corrupt” and “debase” 
draftees.84 Finally, some educators warned that conscripting eighteen-year-olds would 
“liquidate a substantial portion of the higher education” system in the United States.85 
They feared that if men were taken into the military before they completed one or two 
years of college, veterans would never return to complete their degrees.86 Others believed 
the measure would demoralize high school seniors.87 In all, these arguments capitalized 
on the notion that eighteen-year-olds were boys who required nurturing rather than men 
                                                                                                                                            
Peace, Metropolitan Community Church, Chicago, Ill.; J. Raymond Schmidt, the 
International Order of Good Templars; William H. Neblett, USAF(R), Los Angeles, 
Calif.; Dr. Ruth Bleier, Chairman, Maryland Committee for Peace; Sidney Aberman, 
Executive Secretary, War Resisters League; John M. Swomley, Jr., Director, National 
Council Against Conscription, all excerpted in Senate Report 117, 29-31. Quote, p. 31. 
82 Ibid., 30. 
83 Ibid., 29. 
84 Ibid., 30. 
85 Testimony of Ralph W. McDonald, National Education Association of the 
United States, as quoted in Senate Report 117, 27. 
86 See also Paul E. Elicker, Executive Secretary, National Association of 
Secondary School Principles, ibid., 28. 
87 See the testimony of Elicker and Edgar Fuller, Executive Secretary, National 
Council of Chief State School Officers, excerpted in ibid., 28. 
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who would thrive under military training. Conscription at such a malleable age could 
irrevocably harm their educational, vocational, and moral futures. 
Legislators had no choice but to take these concerns seriously, especially since 
constituents espoused them just as strongly as witnesses before congressional hearings. 
Letters from average American citizens flooded the White House, the vast majority of 
which opposed drafting eighteen-year-olds.88 In one random sample of 300 letters taken 
by White House officials in January 1951, only seventeen writers favored the idea. In an 
April sample, only one did. Analysis of the selection showed that the authors hailed from 
across the country, in what the report referred to a “bona fide citizen response.” Writers 
based their opposition on several points, but in the aggregate, they believed eighteen-
year-olds were too young and immature for compulsory military service, especially when 
the men in question were not enfranchised and therefore had no input into the policy; the 
proposal would militarize the nation; jeopardize liberty; and interrupt men’s educational 
goals. Letters suggested drafting prisoners, aliens, refugees, and older men instead.89 
Lawmakers, therefore, were left with a conundrum. The nation needed military 
manpower. One group or another had to be tapped to fill the armed forces’ need for 3.5 
million men, leaving legislators with questions about who the nation valued and how. 
Which men were most needed on the homefront and which on the battlefront? Who had 
done their duty, and, for that matter, how was duty to the nation to be defined in the 
fraught environment of the Cold War? How was manhood to be defined? Were eighteen-
                                                
88 For examples, see Official File 245 Misc. – Drafting of 18 Year Old Boys, 
boxes 988-991, White House Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman 
Library, Independence, Missouri [hereafter HST]. Of these, three folders contain letters 
in favor of drafting eighteen-year-olds and 25 contain letters against. 
89 Eighteen Year Old Draft, n.d. and Random Sample, n.d., both in 245 Misc. 18-
yr-old-boys, box 988, White House Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman. 
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year-olds sufficiently men to be considered eligible for compulsory military service? Was 
fatherhood – a man’s responsibility to his family – enough justification to exempt a man 
from military service – his responsibility to his nation? Most of these questions were 
never explicitly asked, either on the congressional floor or in citizens’ letters, but their 
themes appeared repeatedly. 
While opponents of the eighteen-year-old draft defined teenagers as boys, other 
Americans, especially women, used their missives to plead with the president to exempt 
fathers and married men without children from military service.90 They argued that 
“married people [were] the nucleus for the future families of America,” the foundation on 
which the country was built.91 Wives needed their husbands’ financial contributions and 
emotional support. Without these, writers assured Truman, “newly established homes” 
would “break up,” wives would have “to go out and find work or live off [their] parents,” 
and “heartbreak and sorrows” would follow.92 Mrs. Joseph Pepe of New Britain, 
Connecticut, complained that she would not be able to maintain payments on her home or 
furniture if her husband were drafted. “This may not seem important to you,” she wrote 
the president, “but it is to us and to many of my friends who are in the same position.” 
The loss of her husband would mean the disintegration of this young wife’s entire world. 
Meanwhile, she explained, boys of eighteen in her hometown could not find work since 
employers were “afraid to take a chance,” so teens sat “in confection parlors all 
                                                
90 See, for example, letters contained in Official File 245-Misc. (1950-June 1951), 
box 845, White House Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman. 
91 Mrs. Bennett Mr. Groisser to My dear Mr. President, Feb. 5, 1951, OF 245 
Miscellaneous (1950-June 1951), box 845, White House Official File, Papers of Harry S. 
Truman, HST. 
92 Mrs. Martin Rabinowitz to the President of the United States, Feb. 5, 1951 and 
Warren Rinda to Mr. President, February 15, 1951, both in OF 245 Miscellaneous (1950-
June 1951), box 845, White House Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, HST. 
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afternoon, or in pool rooms,” unable to take on the responsibilities of men. Moreover, she 
complained, “a married man would be dragged away from home and work,” unable to 
fulfill his masculine obligations. “How can you raise children and serve your country at 
once?” she concluded. Mrs. Pepe’s implied answer seemed to be that child-rearing was 
an important form of service, which is how she could justify drafting younger, single men 
before older, married ones. In a later passage, she directly asked President Truman how 
he, as an individual and the head of State, could draft the married men who were “raising 
your families and working in your factories.”93 Her casual use of the personal pronoun 
conflated male domestic and occupational responsibilities with vital service to the State. 
Pepe’s letter was exceptional, but lawmakers largely sided with those who 
favored the conscription of eighteen-year-olds, believing the alternatives were worse.  
Witnesses at congressional hearings offered enough justification to overcome legislative 
reluctance. High-ranking Army and Navy officers argued that there was no material 
difference between an eighteen-year-old and a nineteen-year-old; Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Rosenberg, Secretary of Labor Maurice J. Tobin, and Assistant to the Secretary 
of Agriculture Edward J. Overby all testified that taking men immediately after they 
graduated high school would cause the least amount of disruption to their lives, as did 
several prominent educators. Veterans organizations unanimously came out in favor of 
the measure.94  
                                                
93 Mrs. Joseph Pepe to Dear President, February 6, 1951, OF 245 Miscellaneous 
(1950-June 1951), box 845, White House Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, HST 
[emphasis mine]. 
94 General Omar Bradley and Admiral Forrest Sherman spoke in favor of drafting 
eighteen-year-olds, as did Dr. James P. Baxter, III, the president of Williams College and 
Chairman of the Committee on Manpower, Association of American Colleges; Dr. Karl 
B. Compton, the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former Chair 
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The final version of the bill, which Truman signed into law as the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act on June 19, 1951, was a compromise that tried to 
balance all of the competing interests.95 Men would be required to register with the 
Selective Service at age eighteen and would become liable for the draft at eighteen-and-a-
half, but only under certain circumstances. A particular draft board would not be able to 
conscript any eighteen-year-olds until it had exhausted its entire pool of eligible men 
aged nineteen and over. To ensure a larger supply of older men, married men without 
children lost their deferments except in cases of extreme hardship. Moreover, conscripts 
would be responsible for 24 months of active service followed by an eight-year reserve 
commitment. The Department of Defense reasoned that a longer term of service would 
offset its need for more men.96  Finally, minimum physical and mental standards were 
lowered so that more men would qualify as acceptable for service.97 Taken together, 
these elements both qualified more men for the draft and held them in active duty for 
longer, thus lessening the number the Selective Service needed to induct each month.  
                                                                                                                                            
of the President’s Advisory Committee on Universal Training; Dr. Detley W. Bronk, 
President of Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Harold W. Dodds, the president of Princeton 
University; and representatives of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of 
the United States, the Disabled American Veterans, AMVETS, the American Veteran’s 
Committee, and the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America. See Senate 
Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military 
Training and Service Act of 1951. 
95 P.L. 82-51. 
96 The law allowed the term of service to be shortened by executive order in order 
to make way for universal military training, which is how the law received its name.  
Separate legislation, which never passed, would have been necessary to fully implement 
universal military training. See Chapter 1 for a more complete discussion of UMT. 
97 Additionally, quotas were established so that each of the branches of service 
would have to take an equivalent number of men from the lowest mental category. This 
was deemed equitable since only the Army was drawing personnel through the Selective 
Service. 
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The law settled, at least temporarily, many of the outstanding questions about the 
relationship between military service, American manhood, and citizenship. Congress 
safeguarded fathers, deeming them more important as civilians than married men without 
children. Protecting children, therefore, was of paramount importance. Young children 
needed their fathers. Older children, according to the law, also needed certain protections. 
The law defined eighteen-year-olds as men rather than boys, but only within certain 
boundaries. They were to be soldiers of last resort. Conscripted eighteen-and-a-half-year-
olds could only be deployed overseas after four months of basic training, all but 
guaranteeing that they would not reach enemy shores before their nineteenth birthdays. 
Finally, the law itself contained language designed to ensure their moral well-being. The 
Senate version of the bill had included a clause declaring it to be the duty of every 
commanding officer to “protect the health, morals, and spiritual welfare of the personnel 
of his command” in order to protect the values “which are fundamental in the 
preservation and strengthening of the fiber of American citizenship.”  This was weakened 
in the final version, but the law gave the Secretary of Defense the power to regulate “the 
sale, consumption, possession of or traffic in beer, wine, or any other intoxicating liquors 
to or by members of the Armed Forces or the National Security Training Corps at or near 
any camp, station, post, or other place primarily occupied by members of the Armed 
Forces or the National Security Training Corps.”98 Alcohol was deemed dangerous, and 
eighteen-year-olds were to be protected wherever possible. 
* * * * * 
                                                
98 Senate Report 117, 72; Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 
Public Law 82-51, United States Statutes at Large 65, part 1 (1951), 88-89. 
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Interestingly, as badly as the nation’s armed services needed manpower, 
legislators proved unwilling to touch college students. In fact, the implementation of a 
student deferment – rather than the administrative postponement until the end of the 
academic year that already existed – proved the least controversial proposal of the new 
conscription bill. Not one single witness testified against the idea at the Senate 
Preparedness Subcommittee Hearings.99 Even the Secretary of Labor, who estimated that 
only two percent of men between the ages of nineteen and 26 possessed critical skills, 
preferred to see occupational deferments eliminated before the student deferment.100 
Instead, Congress only debated the mechanism for administering the student deferment.  
Hershey, assuming he would receive congressional approval, started designing a 
new program for student deferments, based on the recommendations of Trytten’s six 
Scientific Advisory Committees, in late 1950.  Hershey wanted local boards to have 
access to students’ scores on aptitude tests before students’ initial classifications, which 
meant the Selective Service needed to administer an exam before students received their 
induction notices.101  Hershey, therefore, contracted the Educational Testing Service 
(ETS) of Princeton, New Jersey, to develop a standardized test of verbal and quantitative 
                                                
99 Senate Report 117, 48. It should be noted, however, that the plan debated by the 
Senate called for 75,000 students per year to be enrolled in a special program whereby 
they would participate in basic training and then pursue their university studies before 
fulfilling their active duty obligation. Many witnesses supported the program precisely 
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100 He did, however, wish to protect apprentices, equating accredited 
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of Maurice J. Tobin, Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 328-333, 336-339. 
101 Lewis B. Hershey to the President, March 3, 1949, 105 Advisory Committee 
(Gen), 1950-48, box 34, Central Files, 1948-69, RG 147, NARA. 
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reasoning for the Selective Service.102 Additionally, instead of insisting that a man be 
eligible for the deferment by passing the qualifying test with a minimum score and 
ranking in an upper percentage of his college class, Hershey proposed that an individual 
should be able to receive the deferment if he achieved one or the other. As Trytten later 
wrote, this would allow “highly selective institutions…to hold more of their students, 
since a higher percentage of these could be expected to qualify on a scholastic aptitude 
examination. And the less selective institutions would be able to retain at least a fixed 
percentage of students determined by the specified criterion of academic 
accomplishment.”103 Using “or” rather than “and” provided the program greater 
flexibility when dealing with the nation’s range of students and academic institutions.104  
Truman approved Hershey’s plan and issued Executive Order 10230 on March 
31.  In order to prevent a deferment from becoming an exemption, the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act, which passed subsequently, added a clause that extended to 
age 35 the draft liability of any man who accepted a deferment before the age of 26 and 
an amendment confirming the autonomy of local draft boards, which would not be 
                                                
102 Henry Chauncy, “The Use of the Selective Service College Qualification Test 
in the Deferment of College Students,” Science, July 25, 1952, 73. The idea of using ETS 
had been reported to the December 1948 meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committees 
after it had been suggested at a meeting of the American Council on Education in late 
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and had been administering tests for the Navy ROTC ever since. Apparently, nothing 
came of the suggestion. See Meeting of Scientific Committees, December 9 and 10, 
1948, 9, 26. 
103 Trytten, Student Deferment in Selective Service, 35-36. 
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standing. See Trytten, Student Deferment in Selective Service, 65. 
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required to defer anyone. In other words, the law affirmed that all deferments, including 
those granted to students, were to be considered guidelines for local boards rather than 
hard and fast rules. Local board members would have to take local conditions into 
consideration when classifying individuals. This provision would lead to much 
controversy in the future, but it was added to stave off any claims from the public that the 
law created a protected class. Congress wanted to make it clear that the student deferment 
was not a statutory exemption. Students needed to qualify for the deferment, and even 
then, it was up to the local board whether or not to grant it. 
Meanwhile, the Selective Service plunged ahead with the establishment of new 
regulations. In the summer of 1951, it added the II-S category for deferred students to its 
classification system and started offering the ETS-administered Selective Service College 
Qualification Test (SSCQT). Approximately 80 percent of the estimated 450,000 draft-
eligible men on American college campuses took the new standardized exam during its 
first four administrations in 1951. 105 These numbers were significant enough to catch 
scholars’ attention.  
In May 1952, three Cornell University sociologists initiated a study of male 
college students’ attitudes towards military service, the draft, and deferments. Close to 
3,000 students from eleven college campuses across the nation responded to their 
questionnaire, and of these, 83 percent expressed negative opinions toward service in the 
                                                
105 There were an estimated 1,569,000 male college students in the US in the fall 
of 1950, the majority of whom were not eligible for the draft, being either veterans, 
members of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), under age eighteen or over age 
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only 450,000 eligible for the draft. A total of 413,392 students took the test between May 
1951 and May 1952. 63 percent scored the requisite 70 or higher to obtain a deferment . 
See Trytten, Student Deferment in Selective Service, 68. 
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military. College men did not want to be drafted, especially to fight in Korea, a conflict 
that only 46 percent of respondents supported. Moreover, they embraced their newly won 
deferments. Only one in ten of the students surveyed believed the law granted special 
privileges, while a full 96 percent claimed they rarely or never felt guilty about not being 
in uniform, even with their country at war. Nevertheless, as much as they did not wish to 
be called up, students, by a margin of four to one, acknowledged that military service was 
a responsibility of citizenship and viewed their deferments as a temporary reprieve. 
Ninety-one percent believed they would be inducted within three years of graduation, but 
they hoped the war, at least, would be over by then.106 They may have understood 
military service as their duty, but they did not extend their obligation to fighting in an 
unpopular war. 
The instatement of the student deferment did not immediately soothe the panic the 
war had caused within the scientific community. Leaders in science and engineering 
fields agonized over what they saw as an impending shortage of trained personnel, 
regardless of the government’s careful planning and new initiatives. Community 
members held a series of publicly- and privately-sponsored policy conferences between 
1950 and 1953 to discuss the problem and issue recommendations.107 An industrial 
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employers’ report cited by Scientific American, which devoted its entire September 1951 
issue to the problem of manpower, stated that an additional 60,000 engineers alone would 
be needed in the public and private sectors by 1954.108  
Otherwise, however, the student deferment program proved a great success. In 
fiscal 1952, 204,446 men were classified as II-S.109 Although some labor unions, most 
notably the United Auto Workers, and a few educators, such as Harvard University 
President James Conant and Princeton University President Harold Dodds, publicly 
labeled the program “undemocratic” because it granted special privileges to an elite 
group, the majority of Americans supported it.110 In one 1952 Gallup opinion poll, 69 
percent of respondents favored inducting students only after they had completed their 
studies.111 Hershey reluctantly accepted the program as a necessary element of modern 
manpower planning, even as he lamented his own agency’s liberal deferment policies.112 
Although the expectation from both within the Selective Service and among the 
students themselves was that students would serve in the military eventually, the addition 
of the II-S deferment set an ambivalent precedent. It created a situation in which the 
military establishment purposely kept a particular category of men out of the armed 
services in the name of national security, not because of what those men actively 
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contributed to the defense of the nation but because of their potential to contribute in the 
future. The Selective Service, with the support of the President, Congress, the 
Department of Defense, and professional and educational organizations, found them more 
valuable as civilians than as soldiers. Additionally, because the student deferment 
program hoped to encourage science education in particular, it helped militarize the 
scientific fields by tying them to the nation’s defense efforts. It privileged civilian forms 
of masculine citizenship at the same time that it militarized them. 
* * * * * 
 Dependency deferments similarly offered advantages to men who took up 
domestic responsibilities as husbands and fathers by allowing them to avoid the 
uncertainty of conscription.  In wartime, however, rising manpower needs directly 
conflicted with the national desire to keep families intact. The loss of the deferment for 
married men without children in 1951 had been a blow to many families, especially as the 
number of applications for marriage licenses took a marked upswing in June 1950, just as 
the war began.113 While it is impossible to know if these couples married to avoid 
conscription, it is more than likely that at least some did, marking a possible trend.  
By mid-1951, the Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency certainly 
noticed a trend related to new marriages – a significant increase in first births to new 
parents. A press release in August noted that the birth rate for the first five months of the 
year was 8.4 percent higher than that for the same time period in 1950, putting 1951 on 
track to break 1947’s record-high birth rate. The rate for May 1951 was a full 14.3 
percent higher than May 1950, a phenomenon the Public Health Service directly related 
                                                
113 Press Release, August 3, 1951, 002.40, 1963-48, box 26, Central Files, 1948-
69, RG 147, NARA. 
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to the increase in marriages caused by the start of the Korean War the previous summer. 
Moreover, the increase in births in 1951 was almost exclusively caused by first births, as 
opposed to any increases seen in 1948 or 1949, which were caused by second, third, or 
fourth children.114 Again, we cannot know why these couples decided to procreate, but it 
is known that most of the men in these families were of the proper age to face 
conscription, they chose to marry and have children immediately upon the outbreak of 
war, and Americans continued to resist drafting fathers. A June 1952 Gallup poll found 
that only 43 percent of Americans favored keeping the armed forces at their current 
fighting strength through the induction of men with children. By way of contrast, 60 
percent supported conscripting men working in vital defense industries. Only the student 
deferment received more support than that for fatherhood.115 
Even so, both classifications faced criticism, especially from those who felt 
unfairly targeted by the Selective Service system. Foreshadowing the Vietnam War, the 
Korean War acquired a reputation for being a poor man’s fight. 116 Those who could 
afford higher education soon learned to pyramid their deferments, moving seamlessly 
from II-S (student) to III-A (dependency) or II-A (occupational) deferments. A student 
who graduated from college and went on to graduate school, had a child, or found a job 
in the national interest could transform a temporary deferment into a de facto exemption. 
                                                
114 Ibid. 
115 59 percent of respondents favored allowing college students to graduate. 
George Gallup, “Draft Deferments for College Men, Fathers Favored,” Daily Boston 
Globe, June 1, 1952. 
116 See, for example, “Wealthy Men Dodging Draft, Senators Told,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune, Feb. 5, 1953; “Why Korea is Called ‘Poor Man’s War,’” U.S. News and 
World Report, Feb. 20, 1953: 18-20; “Board Quits; Claims Draft Favors Rich,” 
Washington Post, July 10, 1953; “Lawmaker’s Son Deferred; Draft Board Resigns,” Los 
Angeles Times, July 15, 1953. 
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A few members of Trytten’s Scientific Advisory Committees had foreseen this possibility 
in 1948, but the other members of the committees had largely dismissed their worry with 
a wink.117 Hershey also downplayed the phenomenon, claiming that no more than three 
percent of II-S registrants took this path, but negative publicity caused the Selective 
Service embarrassment.118 Magazines worried about privileged young men shirking their 
patriotic duty as they “babied out” of military service.119 In mid-1953, local draft boards 
complained that 13,000 men per month were applying to change from student to 
dependency categories. This was especially egregious as the nation’s manpower woes 
continued to escalate, despite the 1951 reforms. The military needed men, badly. 
In response, various agencies that handled the nation’s manpower policy began 
studying the issue, including the Selective Service’s Scientific Advisory Committee on 
Specialized Personnel. Hershey had constituted the committee in 1951 based on the six 
Scientific Advisory Committees to help make policy recommendations on issues relating 
to students and scientists. The group’s primary goal was to protect the student deferment. 
Members, in one set of recommendations, wrote, “Probably nothing would wreck our 
intricate technological civilization so surely as to divert from their training and 
development in their specialties for more than three years all those on whose special 
skills our society will later depend.” Moreover, they explained, since the program 
deferred no more than five percent of any particular cohort, it did not “markedly make 
                                                
117 Psychology Professor Everett L. Kelly of the University of Michigan brought 
up the possibility at the November 1948 meeting as did economics professor John 
Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard at the December meeting. Trytten dismissed both of their 
concerns by making a joke. See Meeting of Scientific Committees, November 4 and 5, 
1948, 65, and Meeting of Scientific Committees, December 9 and 10, 1948, 36-37. 
118 Annual Report, 1954, 20. 
119 Harold H. Martin, “Why Ike Had to Draft Fathers,” Saturday Evening Post, 
Aug. 29, 1953, 27.  
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inroads upon the total manpower pool.” However, they recognized that the program had a 
serious public relations problem. They acknowledged, “Certain changes may result in 
insignificant additional yields but may be of great importance otherwise.”120 In other 
words, revoking the possibility of the dependency deferment from any man who had 
availed himself of a student deferment would not solve the nation’s manpower crisis, but 
it would make the public feel better about the student deferment program as a whole. The 
National Manpower Council and the Department of Defense agreed. They both 
recommended ending dependency deferments for anyone who had used a student 
deferment.121  
The Selective Service, as an agency, however, was divided. Something needed to 
be done, but if students were the only men denied further deferments, it could cause an 
administrative nightmare and public backlash. The issue went around and around. A first 
draft of a proposed Executive Order for President Dwight Eisenhower suggested ending 
III-A deferments for any man who previously had held a deferment, but ultimately, the 
agency’s Manpower Policy Committee suggested fatherhood should no longer be 
grounds for deferment for any man.122 Eisenhower agreed and, in July 1953, ended the 
                                                
120 Scientific Advisory Committee on specialized Personnel Statement and 
Recommendations, August 18, 1952, 105 Advisory Committee (Gen.), 1952-51, box 34, 
Central Files, 1948-69, RG 147, NARA. 
121 National Manpower Council, Student Deferment and National Manpower 
Policy, 3. 
122 Daniel O. Omer to Roger W. Jones, June 1, 1953, attached to Daniel O. Omer to 
Roger W. Jones, June 5, 1953, 110 General, 1954-1950, box 35, Central Files, 1948-69, 
RG 147, NARA; Daniel O. Omer to Roger W. Jones, June 5, 1953, ibid. 
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III-A deferment for all men except those for whom military service would cause extreme 
hardship and privation.123  
Eisenhower’s revocation of the fatherhood deferment was significant for several 
reasons. First, it took effect several weeks after the Korean armistice was signed. Even 
though fighting had ended, defense planners did not foresee American demobilization. 
Arthur Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, claimed that the 
military buildup would not reach its peak until 1954 and that the United States would be 
“involved in some kind of defense-mobilization program for the next 10, 15, or 20 
years.”124 High manpower requirements would be part of the militarized peace outlined 
by NSC-68. The United States could no longer afford to protect fatherhood in the name 
of national security, or so planners believed. Rather, the country needed fathers to protect 
their families by defending their nation as soldiers. Second, the change in regulation 
occurred amongst a flurry of bad publicity. It seemed to be the only way the public could 
relinquish its desire to keep fathers on the homefront. Fatherhood ceased being a 
protected category only amidst explanations that the change corrected an injustice. As 
Hershey put it, he had to “trade students for fathers.”125 Under the new regulation, 
students would no longer be able to shirk their duty as citizens by pyramiding 
                                                
123 Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10469, which he signed on July 11, 1953, 
allowed men already deferred for fatherhood to retain their III-A classification, but any 
additional men seeking a dependency deferment after August 25, 1953 would have to 
prove either that his wife’s pregnancy occurred prior to the cut-off date or that his 
military service would cause undue hardship or privation for his family. See Flynn, The 
Draft, 138; National Manpower Council, Student Deferment and National Manpower 
Policy. 
124 “Planning Nation’s Man Power for 10 Years Ahead,” U.S. News and World 
Report, Jan. 4, 1952: 32. 
125 Bulletin to the Advisory Committee on Specialized Personnel, No. 10, 
November 15, 1952, 105, Advisory Committee (Gen.), 1952-51, box 34, Central Files, 
1948-69, RG 147, NARA. 
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deferments. Rescinding the privilege was a way to avoid elitism, solve the manpower 
crisis, and continue training the next generation of defense professionals. But the need for 
such justification turned out to be short-lived. Fatherhood in 1950s America was simply 
too important an institution to go without special protections. 
* * * * * 
 As during any modern war, manpower policy during the Korean War was 
complex. It involved coordinating the preferences and needs of multiple government 
agencies and civilian special interest groups. The military had to be staffed, war 
production stepped up, the civilian economy maintained, food produced, and daily life 
continued, all while allocating a finite number of men and women to military, 
agricultural, essential, and non-essential occupations in a democratic fashion. Workers, 
therefore, had to be encouraged rather than coerced to enter particular fields, stay on the 
job, and increase production, or the United States would risk becoming no better than its 
communist enemy. But, as during the two world wars, the armed forces could not depend 
on voluntary enlistment. The federal government and the public deemed the military 
threat imminent enough to justify conscription. Once again, the United States had to 
figure out how to balance the ideal of democratic participation with the practice of 
selective service. 
 The Korean War was different from earlier wars, however, in that was not 
considered the main event. Even though it was a hot war with devastating consequences 
for the people who lived it, it had limited strategic aims. American policy makers 
believed it a mere distraction from the real threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Cold 
War would not end when the shooting in Asia stopped, especially with the threat of 
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atomic war persistently looming. Thus, demobilization after the armistice was not an 
option. Viewed through a longer lens then, the Korean War signaled the beginning of the 
heavily militarized peace called for by NSC-68 rather than its own discrete conflagration. 
 Debates over deferments during the Korean conflict, therefore, took on a special 
significance. Policy makers were aware that the decisions they made would have 
consequences that lasted longer than the war itself. Conscription would become the new 
normal in American society, at least for the immediately foreseeable future. One of the 
Selective Service’s basic premises was that any policy “adopted with a short range 
perspective” that could impact “the American way of life and its cultural and social 
values,” could “freeze into a pattern” that could “take centuries to eradicate.” 
Consequently, warned the agency, “never before has it been so extraordinarily important 
to deal sensitively with these intangible values which in the long run form a very large 
part of the essentials of the way of life we are trying to defend.”126 The choice of who to 
defer and who to draft mattered. The U.S. needed the right men in the right place to 
engage the enemy, maintain the economy, assure the nation’s technological supremacy, 
and preserve its families, but also to ensure that America stayed “America.” 
 In fact, the nature of the discourse over deferments between 1948 and 1953 did 
not so much indicate a change in the country’s social values as a shift in how policy 
makers understood its defense needs. This is why the addition of the student deferment 
was so important. The Selective Service had piloted a student deferment program during 
World War II, but quickly contracted it when manpower pressures grew too great. 
                                                
126 Premises Underlying Manpower Policies, November 30, 1951, attached to 
Meeting of Advisory Committee on Specialized Personnel, Washington D.C., December 
3, 1951, box 71, Papers of the Planning Office, 1947-1963, Entry UD 24, RG 147, 
NARA. 
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Although the military desperately needed men during the Korean War as well, Congress, 
the Selective Service, and the general public were much more willing to protect a plan 
designed to produce scientists in the name of national defense in the post-atomic bomb 
era. By 1951, science was seen as a key component to national security, and the only way 
to obtain scientists was to train them. The introduction of the II-S classification, 
therefore, helped broaden the definition of service to the nation. College students, like 
men with vital war jobs and farmers, were defined as performing service that maintained 
the national health, safety, or interest. The Selective Service accepted their potential 
contributions as equally valuable as those of the infantry soldier. This would have 
significant consequences into the future as masculine citizenship obligations continued to 
separate from military service. 
 Similarly, the debates over the importance of men’s domestic roles in the 1950s 
did not illustrate a significant shift in the country’s social values. Fathers and husbands, 
for example, did not receive more consideration during the Korean War than they had 
during World War II, when Congress had also turned to eighteen-year-olds before 
revoking dependency deferments and local draft boards had gone out of their way to 
protect family men. But the arguments used by those who wanted to protect fathers in the 
early 1950s are important to understand, for, as the next chapter will show, the context 
began to change in the late 1950s. Men’s domesticity, like science and engineering, came 
to be considered a key element of national defense as the Selective Service began to 
explicitly encourage marriage and fatherhood through a new policy called manpower 
channeling. All in all, military service became less important for many American men, 
even as militarization suffused their lives
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Chapter Three 
“The Keystone…of the Structure”:  
Manpower Channeling and the Meaning of National Defense,  
1955-1965  
 
 In January 1958, Director of Selective Service Lewis B. Hershey was called 
before the Subcommittee on Independent Offices of the House Appropriations 
Committee to justify his agency’s expenditures.  Questioning was friendly, but 
apparently, the general’s responses to questions about negative press coverage were not 
sufficient to quell Congressional concerns about waste in Hershey’s agency.  By early 
February, several members of Congress had written to Hershey asking him to answer 
charges that Selective Service was “wasteful, expensive,” and “inefficient.”1  In reply, 
Hershey penned a pointed letter to Congress explaining the purposes of his agency.   
 In his letter, which he published in the March issue of Selective Service, the 
agency’s news organ, Hershey acknowledged the current low level of draft calls, then 
only about 13,000 men per month, but emphasized that the procurement of military 
manpower constituted only about twelve percent of the Selective Service System’s 
operations and six percent of its expenditures.2  The rest of its time and resources went 
                                                
1 At the very least, Kansas Republican William Avery and Texas Democrats 
Lyndon Johnson and Joe Kilgore queried Hershey in response to an article by syndicated 
columnist Paul Harvey.  See Lewis B. Hershey to Honorable William H. Avery, February 
4, 1958, and attachments, Bala thru Bald, FRC 82, Central Files, 1948-69, RG 147, 
Records of the Selective Service, National Archives and Records Administration, College 
Park, Maryland. [Hereafter Central Files, RG 147, NARA].  Harvey’s article, “Recruiting 
Declared Cheaper than Expensive Selective Service,” ran in the Topeka State Journal on 
Jan. 3, 1958. 
2 Copies of the letter, addressed to Avery and Johnson, are also located in Bala 
thru Bald, FRC 82, Central Files, RG 147, NARA, but the choice of Selective Service as 
its main venue is important.  The newspaper went to all 42,000 plus members of the 
Selective Service System, and, according to doctoral candidate Gary Lee Wamsley, was 
an informal way of disseminating new policies without formulating official dicta that 
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into the process of classifying the nation’s men, screening those members of the Reserves 
who were on Standby status, planning for future emergencies, and channeling men into 
the reserves and civilian occupations the federal government defined as critical to 
national survival.3  “Selective Service has gone so far beyond the simple job of inducting 
13,000 men a month into the Armed Forces,” he wrote, that the argument that it had 
become obsolete was “practically pointless.” Far from being its main function, induction 
had “become only a collateral, almost…a byproduct of its operations.”4  Global and 
domestic conditions had caused the system to evolve past its original function. 
Hershey’s testimony and the follow-up letter were significant because they 
marked one of the first times that the Director explicitly named the Selective Service’s 
policy of manpower channeling, a form of social engineering designed to coax men into 
designated fields by offering them deferments from conscription. He used the term, 
however, as a label for a procedure he viewed as already in practice.  He argued that the 
                                                                                                                                            
could come back to haunt Hershey or the Selective Service.  In an interview about 
Selective Service, one official at the national headquarters in Washington, D.C., 
explained, “You have to look for what isn’t there with the old man.  That’s the way it is 
in this outfit.  You get so you’re pretty good at reading between the lines.  Once you get 
to know the ‘Old Man’ [Hershey] its no trick.  But I’ll tell you this, when he says ‘It 
would be my guess that local boards will,’ you can bet that about 4,000 boards are going 
to do it.”  See Gary Lee Wamsley, “Selective Service and American Political Culture: 
The Maintenance of Equilibrium between Demands of Function and Political Culture by 
an Institution of Civil-Military Justice,” (Ph.D. Diss.: University of Pittsburgh, 1968): 
167-168, 183-184.  Quote p. 168. 
3 As will be explained later in this chapter, there are seven reserve components in 
the American military – the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, 
Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.  All 
together, they are known as the reserves and all of their personnel are known as 
reservists.  The latter five, which are administered by their respective Pentagon 
departments rather than the state governments, are known as the Reserves and their 
personnel as Reservists. 
4 Lewis B. Hershey, “Altered Role, Continuing Need for Draft Stressed,” 
Selective Service 8 (March 1958): 1-2.  Quote, p. 2. 
 163 
agricultural, occupational, and student deferments the agency used during World War II 
and the Korean War had become “a part of the channeling of people in the direction that 
they had to go” without “compulsions.”  During these wars, in fact, the Selective Service 
went “to all extremes of alleged volunteering, to make people think they volunteered 
when they [were] actually being channeled through a process.”5  The results of the 
practice were stark.  “The only reason the Nation is not short 40,000 or 50,000 engineers 
today,” he claimed, “is because they were deferred in 1951, 1952, and 1953.”6   
Hershey explained that the needs of the military’s reserve programs, America’s 
technological rivalry with the Soviet Union, and the ever-present threat of nuclear war 
meant channeling would take on an even greater importance in the future.  America 
needed more scientists, more engineers, more doctors, and more teachers, and offering 
deferments from military service was one of the most efficient means to ensure that men 
chose to enter those professions.  It was a matter of “national survival.”7  And he proved 
true to his word.  By the first half of the 1960s, informational literature produced by the 
Selective Service System referred to channeling as one of the agency’s main functions 
and justified its guidance of civilian choices by calling the policy “a counterpart and 
amplification of the System’s responsibility to deliver manpower to the armed forces.”8   
                                                
5 Subcommittee on Independent Offices, House Appropriations Committee, 
Independent Offices Appropriations for 1959: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 1958, 
200. 
6 Hershey, “Altered Role, Continuing Need for Draft Stressed,” Selective Service 
8 (March 1958): 2.   
7 Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Independent Offices Appropriations for 
1959, 197-211. Quote, p. 202. 
8 Selective Service System, “Channeling,” Orientation Kit, 1965, 1. 
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This chapter examines the growth and consequences of the policy of manpower 
channeling.  It argues that the idea solved two distinct problems that arose from the 
inherent contradictions within a system that claimed military service as a responsibility of 
all able-bodied male citizens but did not demand universal military service.  The first was 
pragmatic.  As children of the baby-boom generation started to come of age and the 
population of young men began to grow in the years after 1955, the number of those 
eligible for the draft far outpaced the number of men needed by the military.  Channeling 
increased the number of deferments offered to otherwise available men and pushed them 
into new reserve programs that would allow them to fulfill their obligation of military 
service without disrupting their civilian lives.  The policy reduced the size of the 
burgeoning manpower pool, making it more manageable, and increased the probability 
that a man classified as I-A (available) would, in fact, be drafted. This reduction allowed 
the Selective Service to show that it functioned as a viable system of military manpower 
procurement. 
Second, the policy provided the Selective Service with an ideological justification 
for its increasingly liberal use of deferments.  Through manpower channeling, Hershey 
and the Selective Service explicitly defined certain civilian occupations and implicitly 
acknowledged marriage and fatherhood as essential service to the nation.  The program’s 
development, therefore, signaled full acceptance of a definition of national service that 
included civilian activities as well as soldiering. This position stood in contrast to the 
grudging tolerance the agency had proffered during the Korean War.  By 1958, the 
Selective Service defined men who held occupational and dependency deferments as 
fulfilling their citizenship obligations.  According to the Selective Service System’s own 
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publications, military service was not strictly necessary from American men so long as 
they performed some measure of national service that was sanctioned through the 
granting of a deferment. The responsibilities of masculine citizenship, therefore, did not 
have to be fulfilled through uniformed service. 
Consequently, the policy of manpower channeling further militarized the civilian 
sector, as a broader swath of men’s activities outside of the military were defined as vital 
to national defense.  Men of draft age were not always conscious of this redefinition.  
Even though Hershey made no secret of his agency’s rationale for deferments, there 
appears to have been little popular awareness of it.  Media outlets found Hershey’s 
pronouncements about channeling unremarkable and rarely reported on them.  
Nevertheless, the policy provided a mechanism through which men could avoid active-
duty military service and devalued military service by identifying civilian pursuits as 
equally important to national security.  Channeling materially limited the number of men 
who actively served in the armed forces.  In so doing, it further separated military service 
from masculine citizenship. 
* * * * * 
 By the time of his 1958 congressional testimony, Lewis B. Hershey and the 
Selective Service had become virtually synonymous.  Hershey had been helping to shape 
the agency since he had been assigned to the Joint Army-Navy Selective Service 
Committee in 1936, and he had been the system’s director for eighteen years. He was its 
public face.  He wrote extensively, testified before Congress frequently, and appeared in 
newspaper articles almost daily. Perhaps more importantly, Hershey’s views about the 
proper role of the Selective Service heavily influenced the agency’s policies and 
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practices.  The laws regulating the draft were purposely vague and granted the president 
the authority to determine the details of its operation.  Because the presidents under 
whom Hershey served usually deferred to the Director’s expertise, Hershey shaped the 
regulations that governed the Selective Service, 9  
 Moreover, Hershey’s agency was relatively small, especially considering the 
number of lives it affected.  The Selective Service System’s national headquarters was in 
Washington, D.C., but the staff there was kept to a minimum.  In fiscal 1958, its staff of 
61 commissioned officers and 150 civilians was responsible for studying manpower 
problems, analyzing demographic trends, conducting research, liaising with state offices 
and other federal agencies, and devising new policies.10 Each state and territory possessed 
its own state director and related staff, but in 1958, these state offices ranged in size from 
only five to thirty people, for a total of 1,019 employees.11  The responsibility for 
classification, sending out induction calls, and handling most appeals went to the 
system’s 4,079 local boards and appeal boards, which were scattered in communities 
across the country.  Close to 42,000 people worked on these boards, but the vast majority 
were unpaid volunteers, appointed by the states’ governors and approved by the 
                                                
9 See, for example, the correspondence between Hershey and President Kennedy 
regarding 1963 change in the order of call for married men without children, discussed 
below. 
10 United States Selective Service System, Annual Report of the Director of 
Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1958 to the Congress of the United States pursuant 
to the Universal Military Training and Service Act as Amended (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1958), 5 [hereafter Annual Report, (year)]. 
11 Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Independent Offices Appropriations for 
1959, 221.  New York was the only exception, as it possessed two State Headquarters, 
one that administered to New York City and one that handled the rest of the state. 
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President.12 In 1958, the total budget for the entire system was a mere $27 million, 
leading Hershey to complain that he needed to cut off phone service in many of the local 
board offices due to lack of funds.13  In comparison, the National Science Foundation, 
another independent agency linked to national defense, operated on $40 million dollars in 
fiscal 1958 and, as a result of the Soviet launch of Sputnik in late 1957, received close to 
$100 million more in fiscal 1959.14  So although over 43,000 people worked with the 
Selective Service, the system was relatively small and highly decentralized.  Policies, 
regulations, and guidelines were developed by a small group of people working in 
Washington and carried out by a large number of volunteers throughout the nation who 
were free to interpret them with additional guidance from state directors.   
Hershey sat on top of the organizational pyramid. Scholars James W. Davis, Jr., 
and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, working in the late 1960s, suggested that the entire diffuse 
system was held together by the force of Hershey’s personality.15  Because the Selective 
Service did not pay most of its members, it could not coerce them into conformity.  
Rather, it had to “rely on normative appeals and the manipulation of symbols to obtain 
                                                
12 In fiscal 1958, only 14.3 percent of the System’s total employees were paid.  
Annual Report, 1958, 4. 
13 Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Independent Offices Appropriations for 
1959, 197, 209-210. 
14 Ibid., 265; National Science Foundation, Ninth Annual Report for the Fiscal 
Year Ended June 30, 1959 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960), 134.  Available online at 
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1959/annualreports/start.htm. 
15 Wamsley made the same argument in his 1968 dissertation. Through 
interviews, he documented the admiration and respect members of the Selective Service 
held for Hershey.  Local board members and national officials alike affectionately 
referred to Hershey as the “Old Man.” One State Director, when asked how Selective 
Service had managed to gain national acceptance, answered, “Well, it all can traced back 
to one man – one man with wisdom and foresight.”  He then proceeded with “a fifteen 
minute eulogy and life history of General Hershey.”  See Wamsley, “Selective Service 
and American Political Culture,” 164-167, 364-381. Quote, p. 365. 
 168 
the behavior it require[d].”  Hershey, who cultivated a “homey-folksy air,” was that 
symbol.  Davis and Dolbeare pointed out that in 24 issues of Selective Service between 
January 1965 and December 1966, 22 articles in addition to Hershey’s regular, monthly, 
signed column focused on the Director.  Further, close to half of the pictures printed in 
the newspaper featured Hershey.16  He appeared just as prominently in earlier issues as 
well.  
Hershey brought a strong sense of civic republicanism to the Selective Service.  
He grew up on a small Indiana farm, worked his way through college, and entered the 
military through the National Guard. 17  His world-view was based on a Jeffersonian 
understanding of virtue and responsibility.  He believed that the nation’s greatest asset 
was the strength of its local communities, and throughout his tenure as Director of 
Selective Service, he fought to keep the system decentralized.18  He argued that small, 
“little groups of neighbors” would know the needs of their own communities better than 
any bureaucrat in Washington or elsewhere.  They would understand who could be 
spared for military service, the requirements of the local economy, and for whom military 
service would be a true hardship.  Local board members who were connected to the 
neighborhood would also put a human face on the system and, by virtue of their presence, 
encourage men to register and serve.  Shame and a sense of duty would prevent 
prospective inductees from doing otherwise, since everyone, especially local board 
                                                
16 James W. Davis, Jr., and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little Groups of Neighbors: 
The Selective Service System (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), 42-46.  
Quotes, pp. 43, 45. 
17 For more on Hershey’s childhood influences, see George Q. Flynn, Lewis B. 
Hershey: Mr. Selective Service (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
1985), ch. 1-2.  
18 The idea of decentralization came from the Oakes report, but it was Hershey 
who molded the system. See Davis and Dolbeare, Little Groups of Neighbors, 20. 
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members, would know if a particular man was medically disqualified, performing an 
essential job, or a slacker.  
 And to Hershey, men who did not serve the country when it needed them, were, 
indeed, shirking their responsibility as American citizens.  He developed his civic-
republican outlook early in life.  As a young National Guard officer, working and often 
failing to recruit men into his unit, he became frustrated at his peers’ lack of loyalty to 
their country.  When few students joined a drill unit he organized at the University of 
Indiana in 1917, just before American entrance into World War I, he complained, “I fear 
for my land when this represents their flower of manhood.”  Easy living made men soft, 
irresolute, and selfish.  It made them unmanly. Ultimately, he welcomed American 
entrance into World War I, for, as he wrote in his diary, “When the spirit of responsibility 
dodging is abroad to so large an extent, it certainly seems that only a war with all its 
horrors can awake us to our obligations.”19  Men had a duty to perform military service, 
especially in times of emergency. Without a spirit of commitment, the spirit of the nation 
itself would begin to decay. Hershey designed the Selective Service, therefore, as “an 
educational tool” that could be used to inculcate and “preserve… traditional values – 
patriotism, individual responsibility, decentralization of government,” as well as a 
manpower procurement agency.20    
Hershey’s civic-republican ideas about citizenship did not change substantially 
throughout his time in the Selective Service, but in the years following the Korean War, 
his notions about what constituted service to the nation did.  This change was primarily 
                                                
19 Diary of Lewis B. Hershey, March 12, 1917 and June 7, 1917, personal papers 
of Gilbert Hershey, Jacksonville, North Carolina, cited in Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 22, 
23. 
20 Ibid., 188. 
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due to demographic realities.  When the population of draft-eligible men began to climb, 
it became clear that not all of them would be needed to serve in uniform.  Yet Hershey 
saw America as imperiled.  The threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union and 
conventional war with its proxies threatened the United States domestically and its 
interests abroad.  The populace could not afford to become complacent, he believed, even 
if induction calls were low.  By 1958, the practical and the ideological had combined to 
produce the new policy of manpower channeling. 
* * * * * 
Several factors contributed to a reversal of the critical manpower shortage faced 
by the armed forces during the Korean War. The first was a shift in national security 
policy. When Eisenhower took office in 1953, his discomfort with an $85 billion defense 
budget constituting 60 percent of federal expenditures and 13.8 percent of the gross 
national product led him to reassess military strategy.21 What became known as his New 
Look threatened the use of strategic – and eventually tactical – nuclear weapons as the 
best deterrent of communism, in the belief that any nuclear engagement would lead to 
destruction on such a mass scale that it would be in both the American and Soviet best 
interest to avoid such conflict.  The United States would continue to support its allies in 
local disputes, especially against communist foes believed to be Soviet proxies, as it had 
in Korea, but it would do so with economic, air, and naval support, rather than with 
                                                
21 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 
1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 653; Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. 
Immerman,  Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 178. 
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ground forces.22  Under this policy, the military enhanced its nuclear stockpiles, its 
support and delivery systems, and its transportation and communication capabilities but, 
with the exception of the Air Force, the armed services scaled back. Emphasis on air 
power and irregular methods of warfare, including covert operations and psychological 
warfare, grew while the strategic prominence of the infantry decreased.23 Between 1953 
and 1961, the overall size of the military’s active forces dropped from over 3.5 million 
men to under 2.4 million. The Army contracted the most, losing 675,000 soldiers during 
Eisenhower’s presidency.24  
Second, in an effort to boost the military’s dismal retention rate, Congress passed 
the Career Incentive Act in 1955, offering, on average, an eleven percent pay increase to 
men who remained in uniform after their initial term of service.25  It also offered extra 
hazard pay for airmen and submariners and a dislocation allowance to permit families to 
move with servicemen to new permanent duty stations.  By all measures, the law was a 
success.  The reenlistment rate across the branches of service rose from 14.9 percent in 
fiscal 1954 to 44 percent in fiscal 1956.26  
                                                
22 For a detailed description of the New Look Policy, see Bowie and Immerman, 
Waging Peace, esp. ch. 12. 
23 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 660. 
24 James M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower 
Procurement, 1945-1970 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 192. 
25 Terms of service varied depending on how a man entered the services.  Draftees 
were inducted for two years.  Men could enlist in the Army and Marine Corps for three or 
four years and the Navy and Air Force for four years. President Eisenhower signed P.L. 
84-20 on March 31, 1955.  Pay increases ranged from between six and 25 percent for 
officers, six and 22 percent for warrant officers, and seven and seventeen percent for 
enlisted men.  See Senate Committee on Armed Services, Career Incentive Act of 1955, 
S. Rept. No. 125, March 29, 1955, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, 5. 
26 Ibid., 3; Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 214.  
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Perhaps most importantly from a procurement perspective, the demographic 
trends that had been such a problem during the Korean War reversed themselves. 
Throughout the second half of the 1950s and 1960s, more and more men turned 18 each 
year, vastly expanding the available pool of manpower.  Barely more than 1 million men 
turned 18 in 1951, but close to 1.5 million reached the age of eligibility in 1961.27  By 
1965, the number of 18-year-men had increased by 50 percent over the number from a 
decade earlier.28  Where there were 9.1 million men between the ages of eighteen and 26 
registered with the Selective Service in 1953, there were 10.9 million in 1957, and 13.9 
million in 1961.29  
Together, these circumstances meant that the armed forces needed fewer men 
even as more men were accessible to them. Because the size of the active forces was 
lower, the services were more successful at filling their quotas with voluntary 
enlistments.30  Between the end of the Korean War and the beginning of the Vietnam 
War, the Navy and Marine Corps utilized the Selective Service only occasionally, and the 
Air Force did not use the draft at all.  Thus, only the Army was left to regularly augment 
its numbers with draftees. Consequently, an increasingly small proportion of the available 
                                                
27 Annual Report, 1951, 11. 
28 In 1955, 1.15 million men turned 18.  In 1965, 1.72 million men reached this 
milestone, an increase of 50%.  House Armed Services Committee, Review of the 
Administration and Operation of the Selective Service System: Hearings before the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 2d. sess., 1966, 
10003. 
29 Annual Report, 1953, 67; ibid., 1957, 74; ibid., 1961, 58. 
30 As will be pointed out later in this chapter, however, one of the main 
justifications for continuing the draft was that it motivated enlistments.  With the 
potential for conscription hanging over their heads, many men voluntarily chose to enlist 
in the service branch of their choice in order to maintain some control over the terms of 
their military service. 
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manpower pool faced conscription each year.  Inductions dropped from 33 percent of 
total military procurement in fiscal 1954 to 22 percent in 1957 to just 9 percent in 1961.31   
* * * * * 
Small draft calls presented problems for the Selective Service System.  Hershey 
had always insisted that deferments were merely postponements of military service, not 
exemptions from it.  But by the mid-1950s, the numbers were working against him.  
Where close to 472,000 men had been inducted in 1953, the Selective Service drafted less 
than 153,000 in 1955.32  Only two years after the manpower crisis of the Korean War had 
prompted the end of deferments for fathers and three after the draft age had been lowered 
to eighteen-and-a-half, State Directors of Selective Service started writing Hershey, 
wondering what was to be done with their excess men.  R.T. Finks of Missouri reported 
in August 1955 that his state yielded approximately 2,000 new registrants each month but 
received induction calls for only 230 men.33 Illinois and Massachusetts faced similar 
situations.34  
Members of the Defense Establishment, including Hershey, continued to insist 
that conscription was necessary to the security of the nation.35  When the Universal 
                                                
31 Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 217. 
32 Selective Service, Induction Statistics, http://www.selectiveservice.us/military-
draft/8-induction.shtml. 
33 Memo: Commencement of Classification, August 1, 1955, attached to R.T. 
Finks to Major General Lewis B. Hershey, August 8, 1955, 300 Classification – Gen. & 
Ala-Nev. 1963-1948, box 61, Central Files, RG 147, NARA. 
34 See Chester A. Furbish to General Hershey, March 29, 1955, attached to 
Bernard T. Franck, III, to Colonel Furbish, April 26, 1955, 127 General Mass. 1963-
1955, box 47 and Lewis B. Hershey to Colonel Armstrong, January 5, 1956, and 
attachments, 127 General Ill. 1963-1953, box 46, both in Central Files, RG 147, NARA. 
35 See, for example, the statements of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Arthur Bradford, Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, 1955 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 
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Military Training and Service Act of 1951 came up for renewal in 1955, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Carter L. Burgess told the Senate Armed Services Committee that 
the military would only be able to meet about half of its manpower requirements through 
voluntarism.  Moreover, he explained, “The very existence of induction authority 
stimulates individuals to enlist.”36  Hershey agreed.37  When faced with the threat of 
conscription, defense planners believed, many men voluntarily enlisted in order to choose 
their branch of service and the terms of their enlistment.38  Further, the Director insisted 
that only five to ten percent of qualified men, who he defined as those in the I-A 
category, managed to escape military service.  “When we deal with masses,” he assured 
members of the committee, “we are going to have a loss in spite of all that we can do,” 
just as “no matter how well you turn out…lumber” at a sawmill, there will be “a lot of 
sawdust.” 39  The problem was inescapable, regardless of demographic conditions or the 
size of induction calls. 
Despite Hershey’s confidence, the press soon noticed the effects of the decreasing 
number of calls.  Newspaper and magazine articles reported that a young man’s chances 
                                                                                                                                            
Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate on H.R. 3005, 
H.R. 6057, and S. 1467, 84th Cong., 1st sess., June 1955, 182-185. 
36 Ibid., 199. 
37 See the testimony of Lewis B. Hershey, ibid., 225.   
38 Three years later, in 1958, Secretary of the Army William M. Brucker pointed 
out that 95 percent of enlistees with no prior history of military service enlisted for only 
three years, “the minimum period of enlistment under which the volunteer is afforded an 
enlistment option.”  Brucker believed the short nature of their voluntarism was evidence 
that “a large proportion of those enlistees” volunteered “under direct pressure of the 
draft.”  See William M. Brucker to Everett R. Hopper, Jan. 9. 1959, Interoffice Memos 
(Admin. Corres.) 1958, box 109, Selective Service System, Training and Conference 
Files, Inter Office Memos to Conference Three, Entry UD 20, Training and Conference 
Files, RG 147, NARA. 
39 Testimony of Lewis B. Hershey, Senate Committee on Armed Service, 1955 
Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 229. 
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of seeing military service ranged anywhere from between one in four to one in fifteen.40  
A late-1955 Washington Post piece that placed the odds at one in twelve revealed, “many 
youngsters talk about ’12 to 1’ being ‘pretty good odds’….With no war on, few 
apparently think much of their obligation to serve, and talk of ‘waiting it out.’”41  In an 
early 1956 Gallup Poll, 26 percent of male teenaged respondents believed that they would 
never serve in the military, a significant change from the nine percent of male college 
men who felt they would not serve in 1952.42  Of the 74 percent of teens in the Gallup 
survey who did think they would eventually serve, one third planned to wait for the draft.  
With no guarantee that the Selective Service would come calling, these men felt no 
responsibility to preemptively join up.  Most likely, they hoped to avoid military service 
altogether.43 
The seeming capriciousness of the system, which had been exacerbated by 
decreased calls, added to negative public opinion. By early 1955, the news magazine U.S. 
News & World Report began reporting on the fickle nature of the draft.  Because the 
Selective Service conscripted the oldest eligible men first, the magazine reported, “many 
                                                
40 See “Legion Head Says Draft is Unfair,” Baltimore Sun, March 28, 1955; 
David Lawrence, “Young Men Can Relax Again,” U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 6, 
1956, 52-53. 
41 John G. Norris, “Answer to Lagging Reserve Program is 3-Fold,” Washington 
Post, Dec. 5, 1955. 
42 Edward A. Suchman, Robin M. Williams, and Rose K. Goldsen, “Student 
Reaction to Impending Military Service,” American Sociological Review 18, no. 3 (June 
1953): 293-304.  
43 A study conducted by an Ed.D. doctoral candidate for his dissertation supported 
this assumption.  He analyzed 3,045 answers to a questionnaire administered to high 
school juniors and seniors from 56 schools in 30 states.  He found that students’ 
overriding concern was maintaining control over their lives.  They wished to stay out of 
the military for as long as possible and to be able to choose their own branch of service if 
military service was required.  See Oliver LaVerne Rapp, “Military Problems Facing 
High School Boys,” (Ed.D. Diss.: University of Illinois, Urbana, 1956): 46, 90. 
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a young man apparently is to find that the draft will pass him by in his early years, only to 
catch him and force him into service after he has a job, a wife, perhaps children.” 
Moreover, logistical strains on the system caused “an increasing number of youths” to 
“never get so far as to be physically examined for the draft.” They remained unclassified 
for years.  The shrinking proportion of classified men, combined with the fact that one in 
three men who were examined failed the pre-induction physical and mental exams, meant 
that a large number of young men were left in their home communities.  Most of them, 
according to the magazine, possessed “no obvious defects,” and therefore did nothing but 
“heighten the public’s impression that the draft [was] full of loopholes.”  Articles also 
pointed out that “at least several hundred thousand men, now in the draft age bracket, 
apparently will not be needed” for military service and that “the number of men who 
escape service could be larger, if voluntary enlistments exceed expectations.”44  The 
overall message was that men who chose to gamble with their futures could lose big, but 
the odds ran in their favor.   
Reports such as these worried members of the Selective Service System and 
Congress, who were concerned about public apathy toward military service.  One 
particular article, also from U.S. News and World Report, sparked controversy.45 When, 
in January 1956, the journal reported on the “remote” prospect of conscription, placing 
the odds of being drafted at just one in fifteen, John H. Greenaway, the New Hampshire 
State Director, complained that such reports were “detrimental to the orderly working of 
the Selective Service.” He specifically linked his state’s drop in registrations to “such 
                                                
44 “The Chance of Being Drafted Now,” U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 21, 
1955, 32; “Draft to Go On – Who’ll Be Called,” U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 18, 
1955, 32. 
45 Lawrence, “Young Men Can Relax Again,” U.S. News, 52. 
 177 
news items,” complaining that negative news coverage led to “callous disrespect” among 
those who were required to register. 46  The article also caught the attention of the House 
Armed Services Committee, the members of which grilled Assistant Secretary of the 
Army Hugh M. Milton and Hershey about whether the one in fifteen statistic was true.  
Hershey demurred, claiming that statistics could be used to prove almost anything, 
depending on how they were used, although he used his column in the February issue of 
Selective Service to fire back.47  “A Nation intensely interested in transportation and with 
innerspring and foam-rubber seats,” he wrote, “will not only be looking for the shortest 
and easiest method of performing service, but will be impressed by those who continually 
play up the hope that there is a…great chance of avoiding any service.”  But, he warned, 
such an attitude, “encourages young men to put off military training when they can best 
undergo it and risks service at a time when there are far more [familial and occupational] 
complications.”  Where news coverage indicated the odds of avoiding service were high, 
Hershey cautioned that the stakes were even higher.  If too many men decided to wait out 
the draft, then that “gamble” would “probably be the greatest factor in compelling 
Congress” to start conscripting men into new reserve programs, in which everyone would 
lose.48  
                                                
46 John H. Greenaway to General Hershey, January 6, 1955 [sic], attached to 
Bernard T. Franck, III, to Mr. Greenaway, January 30, 1956, 127 General N.H. 1963-
1948, box 48, Central Files, RG 147, NARA. 
47 Subcommittee No. 1, House Armed Services Committee, Review of Reserve 
Program by Subcommittee No. 1, Serial No. 41, Jan. 5, 1956, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 4914-
15.  See also Bernard T. Franck, III, to Mr. Greenaway, January 30, 1956, 127 General 
N.H. 1963-1948, box 48, Central Files, RG 147, NARA. 
48 Hershey, “Public Reaction to Settle Fate of Reserve Program,” Selective 
Service, Feb. 1956, 2. 
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By the mid-1950s, therefore, the military’s manpower procurement system was 
under significant pressure. Although the law that authorized the draft was renewed easily 
in 1955, the growing draft-age cohort combined with diminishing needs for manpower 
exacerbated the contradictions inherent in a system that held all men responsible for 
military service but did not, in fact, require or even want universal participation.49  
Hershey realized the Selective Service’s need to reassess “how the System c[ould] adjust 
universality as a principle to high selectivity as a reality.”50  Since virtually no one in 
power was willing to end the draft, the most obvious solution to the over-supply of 
eligible men was to reduce the number of men considered eligible for induction.51 
 Reducing the size of the available manpower pool would accomplish several 
things.  First, lowering the number of men considered eligible for conscription would 
increase the odds that the men who remained I-A (eligible) would be conscripted.  
Second, the threat of coercion would spur enlistments. Finally, the change would lower 
the national age of induction, or the average age at which men were called by the 
Selective Service.  During the Korean War, when manpower was at a premium, many 
local boards had exhausted all of the men between the ages of twenty and 26 available to 
them. When they started conscripting younger men, the national age of induction fell to 
nineteen-and-a-half.  But as manpower needs had eased, the age of induction had crept 
                                                
49 69 Stat. 223 was passed on June 30, 1955. 
50 Annual Report, 1956, 65. 
51 1956 Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson ran on a platform that 
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back up.  By 1955, it had reached 23, with most men receiving induction notices between 
the ages of 23 and 25. This situation created difficulties both for men living under the 
uncertainty of the draft and for the armed forces. The military preferred younger men 
because they had fewer family responsibilities, were in better physical condition, and 
were believed to be more malleable than older men.  Men without deferments lived under 
the threat of the draft until age 26 and men with deferments until age 35.  By then, they 
usually were married, had children, and were deeply enmeshed in their careers, making a 
two-year term of service a true psychological – and frequently material – hardship.52  
Hershey began discussing options for shrinking the pool of eligible men in 1955, 
devoting at least one national conference of officers in the Selective Service System to 
the subject.53  A poll from national headquarters solicited state directors’ opinions on the 
best way to “reduce and control” the growing number of available men.  Despite the 
assurances of Idaho State Director John E. Walsh to the national director that his state 
would “be ready to accept any steps that [Hershey] decide[d] to take in order to reduce 
the manpower pool in Class I-A,” the survey’s results indicated that the state directors 
constituted a fairly conservative body.54  Of the options provided, which included 
postponing the inductions of fathers under the age of 26 and men in scientific and related 
fields, the state directors preferred delaying the initial classification of registrants until at 
                                                
52 “Proposal to Ease Draft is Offered,” New York Times, Sept. 23, 1955.  See also 
Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 228-229. 
53 John E. Walsh to Major General Lewis B. Hershey, July 13, 1955, attached to 
Dee Ingold to General Walsh, July 26, 1955, 127 General Idaho, 1955-1948, box 46, 
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least the age of twenty and postponing the induction of all men over the age of 25.55 
These choices would eliminate the oldest and youngest men from the eligible supply, 
allowing the Selective Service to focus specifically on men between the ages of twenty 
and 25.  Further, the System could continue to avoid blanket administrative deferments, 
granting dependency and occupational deferments only on an individual basis to men 
who requested them. Unanimously, however, the state directors voted to delay any action 
until after the Universal Military Training and Service Act had been successfully 
renewed.56   
Hershey followed the state directors’ advice on this last point, but moved beyond 
their recommendations when he took “unwritten” action to liberalize induction policies in 
July 1955, only weeks after Congress reauthorized the law.57 He chose to postpone 
induction in all cases brought to his attention where the men were over the age of 26, 
fathers, or employed in the scientific fields and urged state directors to issue similar 
directives to all local boards. 58  Classification procedures, including pre-induction exams 
to determine if a registrant should be categorized as provisionally capable of military 
                                                
55 Postponement of induction and deferment were similar in effect but not 
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service, were also delayed until well past the age of eighteen. Missouri, for example, 
suspended classification until men reached age 21.59   
Although these were radical – and frequently unilateral – administrative changes, 
Hershey knew they were unlikely to be controversial.  As argued in chapter two, 
Americans were generally willing to protect fathers and scientists from military service, 
based on the belief that their civilian roles were more important than any job they could 
perform in uniform.  Similarly, measures to limit eighteen-year-old men’s contact with 
the Selective Service System were unlikely to be questioned.  Finally, Hershey and the 
states viewed these measures as temporary, in place only until Congress could pass 
pending legislation on the state of the country’s reserve forces and until Eisenhower 
could approve an executive order determining the proper order of induction calls, given 
the present needs of the military and civilian sectors.60 
* * * * * 
 It is unclear exactly who named the policy of manpower channeling, but it is clear 
that it grew out of practices already performed by the Selective Service System.  The key 
to its development was an expansion of the definition of “service” that took place in the 
wake of the Korean War.  Between 1956 and 1959, the system began to accept certain 
civilian activities as the equivalent of military service, a significant shift from the 
rationale it offered for deferments during the conflict.   
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Partially as a result of the growing population of service-aged men who would not 
see active duty, Hershey instructed his staff to study the best ways to select men “for the 
task where they might give the greatest service to the Nation.”61  Concurrently, he 
amended his own public attitude toward the agency’s role.  For example, he altered the 
basis on which he defended the regulations that extended the age of draft liability from 26 
to 35 for men who received deferments. Where he had argued during the Korean War that 
the extended age limit would ensure men’s military service, he now claimed that the 
threat of loss of deferment would detain them in essential occupations until an age when 
other family pressures would probably keep them there.62 Where once he had prophesied 
disaster if Congress allowed too many deferments, writing in 1949, “If we make [a man] 
too secure [in his job], it will take about three Selective Service Systems to bomb him 
loose when we finally want him to go out and use [a] weapon,” he now started to 
advocate a “freer deferment trend” so that men could be released to “make contributions 
to civil life.”63  The Selective Service’s congressional mandate was to secure military 
personnel, but by the late 1950s Hershey had expanded its purpose to guide the choices of 
civilian men, thus eliding military and civilian procurement in the name of national 
security. 
 Such a redefinition of service grew out of the agency’s commitment to civil 
defense. Hershey and his staff believed that if a nuclear attack were to occur, the 
Selective Service would be invaluable to the country’s rebuilding and civil defense 
efforts.  Its decentralized structure would allow it to continue to procure soldiers even if 
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national or state headquarters were destroyed.  He complained that few Americans 
“recognize[d] the importance of having in existence an organization capable…of 
contributing…to the identification, location and utilization of the manpower which 
[would] be needed without delay when survival [was] the first and primary necessity.”64 
As he told the officers present at a reunion for those who had served with the Virginia 
State Headquarters, “Defense must come not from the top down, but from the bottom up.  
It must be based on the cellular structure which originated at Jamestown and Plymouth 
Rock, and which built this Nation into the greatest in the world.”65  Each local board, 
therefore, was “expected to function by itself if isolated.”66   
The Selective Service liaised with the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the 
Departments of Defense; Labor; Commerce; Agriculture; and Health, Education, and 
Welfare; and the Federal Civil Defense Administration in developing plans for a nuclear 
emergency. National and State headquarters participated in regular relocation exercises, 
in which essential staff and records were moved to secondary locations, away from major 
cities and other possible targets of nuclear attack.  Personnel also took part in Operation 
Alert, a federally-organized, national civil defense drill held annually between 1954 and 
1961. Designed to test Americans’ readiness at all levels of society, it involved everyone 
from ordinary citizens in target cities, who were required to take cover within fifteen 
minutes of the alarm, to the President of the United States, who evacuated the White 
House with his staff.67  
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By 1956, Hershey realized that the role of the Selective Service could be far 
greater than merely raising an army.  A nuclear strike was expected to disrupt American 
transportation and communications networks, potentially destroy the nucleus of the 
federal government, and reduce major cities to rubble.  Hunger, thirst, illness, and death 
would follow.  Some form of community organizing would be required to stave off panic 
and chaos, and all hands would be necessary to rebuild.  Since the Selective Service 
maintained records on all men, not just those found acceptable for military service, in 
Hershey’s view, it was the logical choice to step into the breach that a nuclear catastrophe 
would create. It was “the only agency with a complete inventory of the Nation’s 
manpower between the ages of 18 and 35,” and thus it had “become…the storekeeper for 
the manpower supply that can be conceivably needed for survival.”68  Its mission, 
therefore, needed to evolve.69 
In the July 1956 issue of Selective Service, Hershey outlined the place of Selective 
Service in the past and his vision for the future.  He wrote, “As the needs of warfare 
changed the concept of selecting men for the task where they gave the greatest service to 
the Nation grew.”  As illustrated by the addition of student deferments during the Korean 
                                                
68 Ibid., 1957, 61. 
69 New York State took the possible role of Selective Service in civil defense 
quite seriously.  In 1959 the State Director ordered local boards to begin coding all 
registrants and reservists in the state system by occupation.  It also added an Annex to its 
Catastrophe Plan that would allow the state to “call registrants, by occupation, for 
utilization by Civil Defense.”  By March 1960, local board members had coded over 
61,000 registrants and they expected to have coded over 162,050 by the end of 1961.  
National Headquarters conducted a study on the feasibility of registering all Americans 
between the ages of 16 and 70 for civil defense purposes, but found that it would cost 
$878 million.  File cabinets alone would cost $15 million, so the plan was abandoned.  
See LBH to Colonel Boughton, March 28, 1960 and attachments, 127 General N.Y. 
State, 1963-1958, box 48, Central Files, RG 147, NARA, and Memo: Oregon Plan, April 
18, 1958 and Memo: Oregon Plan, April 9, 1958, both 321 Deferments 1963-1954, box 
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War, men outside of uniform could be just as important as those in the armed forces.  
“From the deferment of men to do, came the transition to defer to train to do,” he 
explained.  But student deferments were not enough.  Hershey derided the methods 
currently used to “account for…manpower,” denying that they would “insure a rapid and 
effective mobilization” and ultimately survival.  He particularly decried a system in 
which a man who had been rejected for military service, especially for reasons of 
disability or dependency, was given a “basis for believing that he [could] hope to escape 
his obligations because of his unacceptability.”  “We must…cease to encourage large 
numbers of our young men to believe that they are useless for the primary duty of 
citizenship,” he exhorted readers.70  Participation in the nation’s defense efforts could 
occur in a civilian capacity as well.   
While masculine citizenship should continue to be based on a man’s contribution 
to the country’s security, eligibility for military service could not and should not be the 
only measure of that contribution.  Rather than conscript all men into military service, 
Hershey now advocated modifying the meaning of deferments. Instead of signaling that a 
man had no role to play in the defense of the country, deferments should signify the vital 
nature of civilian work.  “We are now recognizing service in defense and out of 
uniform,” he wrote. “Warfare, cold or hot, grows more complex as society grows more 
complex and as technology advances…Skills and abilities we discount today in 
measuring our strength may be critical tomorrow.”  “The men who serve[d] without a 
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gun or a uniform” were crucial for the nation’s survival and should be recognized as 
such.71 
According to Hershey, encouraging men to pursue particular occupations was the 
job of the Selective Service, even if the law governing the draft did not specifically grant 
the agency such powers.  The Universal Military and Training Act stated that national 
security required “the fullest possible utilization of the Nation’s technological, scientific, 
and other critical manpower resources,” but as Hershey understood it, Congress, also had 
“repeatedly indicated its confidence in the Selective Service System to administer broad 
delegations of authority to aid…the general objective of survival.” Therefore, he 
reasoned, it had sanctioned the redefinition of service.  “The law enumerates the principle 
of universality of service, which is sound,” wrote the Director, but “great latitude was 
given in the application of this principle.”  Thus, the Selective Service was now “in a 
position where it [could] exercise leadership in the establishment of the ever-changing 
concepts of what constitutes essential service for survival.” 72  Men had the responsibility 
to serve the nation, but in the environment of militarized peace engendered by the Cold 
War, when the push of a button could take the world from peace to war and plunge the 
United States into darkness, the form of that service had to be flexible.  Congress had 
deemed it so.  Where in 1950 Hershey had disagreed vehemently that a male citizens’ 
obligation to defend his nation could be fulfilled in any way other than through the 
military, by the end of the decade he had changed his stance, stating, “the concept that 
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‘duty’ is best exemplified by service in the Armed Forces” should “be interpreted…more 
broadly.”73 
By 1958, this shift in reasoning had coalesced into the policy of manpower 
channeling, which Hershey referred to as “the counterpart of procuring manpower for 
civilian activities.”74  Channeling encouraged men to enter civilian fields deemed by the 
Selective Service to be in the national health, safety, or interest by offering them 
deferments. Such deferments were not seen by the system as “an exemption 
from…military obligations,” but rather as a sign that the man’s “civilian activities” were 
“of greater value to the national security than his services in the Armed Forces.”75  The 
policy, therefore, was an admission on the part of the Selective Service, an agency 
directly tied to the military, that the responsibilities of masculine citizenship in the United 
States did not have to include military service.  
By 1959, in the wake of the panic surrounding the 1957 Soviet launches of two 
Sputnik satellites, the Selective Service had defined channeling as one of its major 
functions, on par with military manpower procurement.  According to Hershey, it was the 
Selective Service System’s responsibility as the only federal agency capable of 
cataloguing of the country’s “human resources” to “inventory or reappraise critically” the 
nation’s “educational, scientific, and technological activities.”76  Such classification was 
vital, he felt, because it would allow the System to “select and deliver…persons of any 
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class, type, skill, aptitude, or profession, degree of physical fitness, or other category,” 
regardless of the nature of the national emergency.77   
The agency shared its newly self-defined mission with other members of the 
Defense Establishment and civilian agencies.  In 1959, the Selective Service received 
permission from the Assistant Secretary of Defense to pilot an Orientation Course in 
Washington, D.C. for any government employee who had a professional interest in the 
workings of the Selective Service.78  The course, which was attended by approximately 
150 military officers and civilian workers from the Departments of the Army, Air Force, 
Treasury, Commerce, and Labor and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, was 
designed around the supposition that channeling was an indispensible function of the 
agency.79 Along with sessions on “The Process of Registration,” and “The Various 
Classifications Used by the Selective Service System,” the proposed curriculum for the 
course included classes on “The Channeling of Registrants into Essential Civilian 
Activities” and “The Channeling of Registrants into the Reserve Forces.”80 
As part of the planning process for the Orientation Course, Colonel Joel D. 
Griffing, the Selective Service’s Chief Planning Officer sent a memo to Hershey’s 
assistant, Colonel Charles H. Grahl, explaining that the Selective Service System 
possessed “the capability to select” as well as the “power to compel.”  It could “place 
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men” in supporting civilian roles, for the process of classification actually “indicate[d] 
the area civilian or military in which the individual [would] serve.”81  Grahl, whom 
Hershey had charged with planning the session on “The Emergency Role of Selective 
Service,” responded with an outline for his presentation.82 In it, he confirmed that the 
agency considered the placement of individuals, “whether it be in uniform or whether it 
be in the civilian area of the war effort, to be the overriding aim and purpose of its 
actions.”  In fact, he claimed that it took “no great amount of insight into the philosophy 
and principles of manpower utilization to realize that attention to the proper placement of 
men in the civilian area is quite as important as the proper placement of men in the 
Armed Forces.”83  What is striking about these words is that they were shared, not only 
with the 150 attendees of the pilot Orientation Course, but with participants in all of the 
follow-up sessions, which continued through and probably beyond 1965. 
George Q. Flynn, Hershey’s biographer, suggests that the General developed the 
practice of manpower channeling as a rationalization to keep his agency alive during a 
period of reduced need, but this is an incomplete – and rather cynical – explanation.  As 
policy historian James M. Gerhardt makes clear, virtually no one in Congress, the 
Department of Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff seriously considered eliminating the 
draft during the Eisenhower or Kennedy years.84 Defense planners believed that the threat 
                                                
81 Joel D. Griffing to Col. Grahl, Dec. 16, 1959, Orientation Course box 71, 
Papers of the Planning Office, RG 147, NARA. 
82 Lt. Colonel Rankin to Colonel Griffing, 11 December 1959, Orientation 
Course, box 71, Papers of the Planning Office, RG 147, NARA. 
83 The Emergency Role of Selective Service, n.d. attached to Joel D. Griffing to 
Col. Grahl, Dec. 16, 1959, Orientation Course, box 71, Papers of the Planning Office, RG 
147, NARA. [emphasis in original] 
84 Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 
1993), 209; Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 229. 
 190 
of conscription motivated men to volunteer, and they pointed to the low enlistment rates 
of 1947, when the draft had been suspended, as their proof. Moreover, since the public 
appeared comfortable with the Selective Service, there was no impetus to overhaul or 
terminate the system through the 1950s and early 1960s.  
Instead, channeling grew out of two sources.  The first was pragmatic.  The 
Selective Service expanded its existing deferment structure to accommodate the growing 
draft-age population and the nation’s declining military manpower needs.  By defining 
civilian activities as service to the nation and therefore as essential to national security, 
the Selective Service solved the problem created by the growing population of draft-
eligible young men.  Offering deferments to more men checked the expansion of the I-A 
(eligible) manpower pool, which in turn allowed the agency to apply more pressure to 
those who remained susceptible to the draft.  The increased risk of induction among those 
men left as I-A spurred draft-motivated enlistments and ensured that a higher proportion 
of men designated as available would be conscripted.  Secondly, the policy stemmed 
from Hershey’s genuine commitment to a civic-republican definition of citizenship.  He 
professed the idea that “freedom is a heady wine and can be drunk only when watered 
with a high percentage of acceptance of responsibility.”85 The Director of Selective 
Service was unwavering in his belief that all men had a “fundamental obligation” to serve 
their nation, especially in times of emergency.  The Cold War, “the gravest threat to its 
existence” that the United States had “ever faced,” certainly filled the bill in Hershey’s 
estimation.86  Since universal military service had been deemed unnecessary by Congress 
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in 1951, Hershey was free to expand the definition of service. The effect of that 
expansion was not to strengthen men’s commitment to national service in the name of 
defense, as Hershey might have hoped.  Instead manpower channeling provided men with 
multiple ways to avoid military service, further separating military service from ideals of 
masculine citizenship.  
* * * * *  
The first target of channeling was the Reserve and National Guard.  In mid-1955, 
at the same moment Hershey and the states halted the inductions of fathers, men older 
than 26, and scientists, Congress was deliberating the best way to procure manpower for 
the nation’s military reserve programs, which ultimately increased the responsibilities of 
the Selective Service.  New laws mandated additional deferments for men who entered 
Reserve programs designed especially for those with designated critical skills and those 
between the ages of seventeen and eighteen-and-a-half.  Moreover, the agency was asked 
to classify certain Reservists so they could be properly mobilized in the event of war or 
national emergency.   
Mobilization of the Reserves and National Guard for the Korean War exposed 
deficiencies in the structure and organization of the programs as they were then 
constituted.  When North Korean soldiers invaded South Korea in June 1950, President 
Truman called up the National Guard and Reserves in order quickly to augment the 
Regular forces that were stationed in Japan and elsewhere around the world.  Because 
individuals could be activated faster than organized units, however, the Reservists who 
were deployed first were frequently World War II veterans who had not chosen to fulfill 
their reserve obligations in organized training programs. They did not train regularly, did 
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not draw drill pay from the military, and frequently were married, had children, worked 
in essential occupations, or were past the age of eligibility for conscription, conditions 
that would have earned them deferments had the terms of their World War II service not 
left them vulnerable to call up.  Second, the Army found that many of its personnel 
records had not been updated since 1945 and were therefore woefully unreliable.  Men 
had moved, become physically disabled, died, and found new jobs since the end of World 
War II.  Many reservists requested exemptions from service for hardship, dependency, or 
occupational reasons, but the Reserves and Guard could not grant the exemptions until 
the men reported for duty.  Other men simply could not be found.  The whole situation 
created a logistical nightmare.  By the end of August 1950, 96,400 reservists and 
guardsmen had been recalled successfully, but their units were understrength by 50 to 75 
percent.  One signal battalion reported with only 23 of its 1,035 authorized personnel.87  
Finally, once Reservists and members of the National Guard arrived in Korea, their 
service record was mixed.  National Guard members, who were not required to 
participate in any form of basic training, proved especially inexperienced. The 
inefficiencies and inequities of this system caused a firestorm of bad publicity.88     
In 1952, Congress and the Pentagon sought to correct these myriad problems 
through a complete overhaul of the Reserve and National Guard system.  The resulting 
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Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 did several things.89  First, it explicitly identified the 
seven components of the reserve forces.  Two of them, the Army National Guard and the 
Air National Guard, were the equivalent of state militias and remained under the control 
of state governors unless federalized by an act of Congress or by the President, in which 
case they organized as the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air 
National Guard of the United States.  The remaining five components – The Army 
Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard 
Reserve – were directly administered through the Pentagon.  Under the 1952 law, all 
seven components would each contain three separate categories of service: the Ready 
Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.  Members of the Ready Reserve 
could be recalled to active duty immediately in a time of war.  They could either be 
organized into units that trained regularly on weekends and in the summer and that would 
be deployed as a whole, or they could serve as individuals who did not train regularly and 
who could be assigned where needed.  Members of the Standby Reserve were usually, 
though not always, inactive.  They constituted a backup pool of manpower that did not 
train but that could be mobilized in an extreme emergency.  Men with rare, specialized 
skills could also be mobilized from this Reserve, if needed.  Finally, all career military 
men who drew retirement pay were placed in the Retired Reserve.   
Second, the law established provisions outlining service obligations for those men 
who completed their active duty responsibilities.  In short, it created an eight-year term of 
service for all service men, regardless of the method by which they entered the military.  
Those who enlisted for four years – the only option available in the Navy and Air Force – 
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would accrue an additional four-years of duty in the reserves.  Those who enlisted in the 
Army or Marine Corps for three- or four-year terms of service could complete their eight 
years in the Reserves or National Guard, and two-year draftees would have a six-year 
reserve obligation.  Men would begin their reserve commitment in the Ready Reserve, 
but could transfer to the Standby Reserve after a combined total of five years of military 
service. In almost all cases, should mobilization be necessary, Ready Reservists were to 
be called before Standby or Retired Reservists.90  To avoid the negative experiences of 
the Korean War, however, the law included provisions to protect veterans of previous 
wars.91 
Such restructuring was designed to allow for a more orderly mobilization and 
deployment, should one be necessary, but it left open a number of questions.  The 1952 
law required the armed forces to keep their records up to date and physically examine 
every Reservist and Guardsman every four years to ensure that every man could be 
mobilized if necessary, but it did not prescribe a mechanism for classifying the men.92  
Second, part of the purpose of the Act was to increase the flexibility of the military in an 
emergency by providing trained units as reinforcements, but the law did not contain 
enough incentive for men to join the organized components of the Reserves.  Therefore, 
most Reservists did not drill regularly or receive extra training.   Further, the vast 
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majority were veterans, who were older, and as a result of the legislation, protected from 
mobilization if they had served during wartime. By 1955, therefore, it had become clear 
to defense planners that further legislation was needed in order to fix these problems and 
to find a way to entice or compel younger men, who were more likely to be deployable 
for a longer period of time, to join the reserves.93 
The Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which Eisenhower signed into law on August 9, 
addressed many of these issues and granted the Selective Service System new 
responsibilities.94 For example, the legislation charged the president with the 
establishment of regulations that would allow the armed services to “provide a system of 
continuous screening of units and members.”95 The job of classifying Standby reservists 
was soon assigned to the Selective Service.  As the agency responsible for sorting and 
classifying those civilians eligible for the draft, it seemed natural that it could also 
catalogue the nation’s reservists.96  Annual vetting and re-classification of Reservists 
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undeniably served a military function. It helped the Pentagon keep its rosters current.  A 
situation like that which had occurred in 1950, when the reserve had existed largely on 
paper alone would not happen again.  But the measure fulfilled other functions as well.  It 
protected the families of Reservists in the same way that dependency deferments 
preserved particular domestic arrangements for civilian men.  The military wanted to 
avoid creating “extreme personal or community hardship” by deploying individual men 
who could not afford to leave their families.  Reservists who acquired significant debt to 
start new businesses or whose family arrangements changed as the result of illness or 
additional children could be moved from the Ready Reserve to the Standby Reserve and 
kept there at the discretion of local Selective Service boards.  Standby Reservists, 
moreover, could not be recalled to service without being declared available by the 
Selective Service.  Finally, the law also recognized the need to maintain a “proper 
balance of military skills” and “critical civilian skills” both in and out of the reserves.97  
If Reservists acquired skills deemed as in the national interest, especially in the fields of 
science or engineering, the law allowed these men to be transferred to the Standby 
Reserve.  The Department of Defense believed that certain men could be of greater use as 
civilians, even in the event of a national emergency.   
The Reserve Forces Act also authorized the creation of several new programs.98  
The first allowed men to enlist directly into the Reserves.  Men who chose this option 
would still be responsible for the same total number of years of service – reduced from 
eight to six under different provisions of the law – as Regular soldiers in the Active 
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Forces, but they would be able to postpone their two years of required active duty for up 
to two years.  This option required exactly the same service obligation as was asked of 
conscripts, but provided a measure of flexibility not offered to draftees.  A second 
program offered men between the ages of seventeen and eighteen-and-one-half the ability 
to enlist for three to six months of active duty for training and then serve an additional 
seven-and-a-half years in the Ready Reserve of any reserve component other than the 
National Guard.99  If volunteers satisfactorily fulfilled the terms of their contract, their 
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draft liability would be lifted at the completion of those eight years.  If not, they would be 
removed from the program and face the possibility of conscription until age 28.  The 
National Guard, which had always allowed men to enlist at age seventeen, was 
authorized to grant similar deferment benefits if recruits younger than 18.5 volunteered 
for three to six months of basic training.  Finally, the law sanctioned the creation of a 
Critical Skills Reserve, designed to harness the expertise of scientists and engineers.100  
Any man whose job qualified as a critical occupation or essential activity based on the 
lists published by the Departments of Labor and Commerce in 1955 could apply for six 
months of basic training followed by eight years in the Standby Reserve, with no further 
drilling requirement.  All of these options were designed to benefit the Reserves by 
lowering the average age of members, which, in theory, would increase force readiness.  
But the enticements these programs offered to potential recruits took the form of draft 
deferments and reduced expectations for active duty.  Such lures minimized the 
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importance of participation in the armed forces, even as literature from the Selective 
Service and armed forces emphasized military service as an obligation. 
 The six-month program aimed at seventeen- and eighteen-year olds started 
slowly.  The services encountered difficulties filling their quotas.  In late 1955, the Army 
had enrolled only 4,500 recruits for its 8,000 slots.  All of the services fell well short of 
their goal, a combined total of 100,000 men per year, despite a media blitz that included 
close to 66,000 radio spots, 5,500 special radio programs, over 20,000 television 
advertisements, 800 special television shows, and more than 7,000 recruitment talks to 
over 709,000 people from the Army alone.  Print ads and articles also ran in Boy’s Life, 
Scholastic Roto, Parade, Life, U.S. News and World Report and the Boy Scout’s Explorer 
Quarterly.101  Recruiters blamed the poor showing on a lagging information campaign.  
Graduating high school students simply were not yet aware of the new program, officials 
assured the public.  In Washington, D.C. for example, some high schools had refused to 
allow recruiters access to students, and in others, principals granted Army, Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Air Force personnel a mere fifteen minutes to make a combined pitch for all 
of their programs.  Many teenagers, however, when asked, recognized that the age of 
induction hovered around age 22 and still preferred to take their chances with the draft.102  
Still others joined the National Guard, which did not require any active-duty training 
time.  They recognized military service as a legal obligation of their citizenship, but did 
not feel it necessary to voluntarily seek a means of fulfilling that responsibility. 
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Hershey complained bitterly about the Reserve program’s detractors, including 
the teens who ignored their obligations.  He hoped the situation could be turned around 
once men realized the import of their decisions. “It can be predicted with certainty,” he 
explained, “that equity will tend to reduce the length of the service requirement in the 
Ready Reserve rather than place the obligations for service in it upon a smaller 
percentage of our young men.”103  In other words, if more men chose to fulfill their 
responsibility to the military, the overall time-requirement for each man eventually would 
be lowered.  Results from a Gallup opinion poll commissioned by the Pentagon seemed 
to bear out Hershey’s admonition.  It found that three-quarters of men between the ages 
of sixteen and twenty thought that military service, whether active duty or with the 
Reserves, was “something to do if [they] must and get it over with.”  Forty percent 
claimed that if they had to serve, they were “going to get it over as quickly as possible 
and get out.”104  Recruitment efforts that emphasized a kinder, friendlier military fell flat 
in an environment where it was still possible to escape military service altogether.105  
Subsequent manpower policies would strengthen rather than reduce this already existing 
ambivalence to military service among many American men. 
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By 1957, the Department of Defense and Selective Service were looking for 
different ways to entice men to join the Reserves and fulfill their military obligation.  
Hershey proposed changes to the six-month program meant to attract men otherwise ill-
disposed to military service.  He suggested reducing the period of active-duty training 
from six months to the Congressionally-mandated minimum of three months and 
“drastically” reducing the seven-and-a-half-year reserve commitment.106 Opinion polls 
showed that of those men who did enlist in the six-month program, close to one quarter 
did so in order to “curtail their active duty military obligations.”107  Further limits might 
lead to more volunteers.   
The Pentagon agreed with Hershey.  In March, the Department of the Army 
announced modifications to its Reserve plan.  The six-month program was opened to any 
man under the age of 26 who had not yet been called for induction, and the number of 
years of service the program required was reduced.  Men under the age of eighteen-and-
a-half would remain in the Ready Reserve for four-and-a-half years, which was later 
reduced to three years, after which they would be transferred to the Standby Reserve.  
Men older than 18.5 would spend six years drilling with the Ready Reserve.   
Additionally, the Army National Guard would henceforth be required to provide 
six months of active-duty training to all of its members.108  This issue had become 
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particularly salient as certain Guard units defied orders and continued to advertise their 
lack of active-duty training as an enticement to potential recruits.  Battery “A” of the 
128th Field Artillery in St. Louis, Missouri, for example, handed out leaflets entitled, 
“Are You ‘Draft’ Bait?” The handout, which garnered the attention of Hershey and of 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Burgess, screamed in capital letters that men could be 
“DEFERRED FROM INDUCTION” without meeting a “stiff selective service college 
deferment test.”  In fact, enlistment would mean that a man could “forget Selective 
Service entirely,” an important perk since, as the leaflet warned men, “Your draft board 
has until age 25 years, 11 months, and 29 days to draft you.  Do you think you will 
escape it?”109  Recruitment literature such as this and the National Guard’s reluctance to 
encourage men to take advantage of the provision of the 1955 Reserve Forces Act that 
allowed for voluntary basic training prompted Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson to 
call the Guard “a draft-dodging business.”110  The notion that military service could be 
minimized was a potent idea that attracted young men and, in the Pentagon’s estimation, 
interfered with recruitment for the six-month program, which, ironically, had also been 
designed to minimize active-duty service.   
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The Army compelled the National Guard to bring its training standards in line 
with the other reserve components and to stop publicly deriding the draft.  But the 
promise of a deferment from induction into the Regular Army combined with military 
service that did not disrupt men’s civilian lives proved ample temptation. Results of the 
new regulations were overwhelming.  By August, the Army had to suspend enlistments 
into the Army Reserve after men flooded recruiting stations.  The other branches of 
service soon did the same, prompting Democratic representative Overton Brooks of 
Louisiana to exclaim, “We are in harvest season and can’t pick the melons.”111  So many 
men either enlisted directly in the Reserves or transferred into the Ready Reserve after 
completing their Regular enlistments that the Army could not handle them all.  Rather 
than requiring weekly drills, as the law demanded, many Army Reservists trained only 
for 30 days during the summer.  But within a year, the numbers had increased so rapidly 
that many men were only called for training every other year.  In 1959, the Ready 
Reserves consisted of 2.5 million men, but less than 1 million drilled regularly with their 
units.112   
By channeling men into special programs, then, the military more than met its 
Ready Reserve manpower requirements while the Selective Service significantly shrank 
the pool of men who were available for induction.  Where there were 300,000 men 
deferred from induction into the active-duty forces as reservists and ROTC trainees in 
                                                
111 House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 1, Review of the 
Reserve Program, Hearings and Papers No. 35, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, 1409, as 
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mid-1955, the number had expanded to 518,000 by mid-1958 and to 849,000 by mid-
1961.  It was over 1 million by 1965.  Gerhardt estimates, therefore, that the reserve 
programs pulled almost 550,000 men out of the I-A (available) category by the late 
1950s, and this number continued to grow.113  The Army, as Assistant Secretary Milton 
testified in 1959, was thrilled.  “There is no doubt in my mind,” he enthused, “that the 
Reserve components of the Army have attained the highest degree of mobilization 
readiness, deployment availability and combat potential in history.”114   
These programs brought men into military service, but it was a limited form of 
service.  Evidence indicates that men joined the Reserves to avoid active-duty service, 
and they were comfortable with this.  When President Kennedy mobilized 148,000 
reservists in 1961 in response to the worsening situation in Berlin, negative reaction from 
those who were called up was widespread and public.115  Drafts boards were swamped 
with reservists wanting to report that they had married, become parents, or acquired more 
dependents.116   Partially in response to the protest Kennedy garnered, President Johnson 
chose not to mobilize the Reserves or National Guard when he escalated the Vietnam 
War in 1965. During that conflict, the Reserve and National Guard were criticized as 
draft havens, with government reports claiming that between 70 and 75 percent of 
Reserve enlistments and up to 90 percent of enlistments in the National Guard were draft-
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motivated.117  Waiting lists for the coveted slots in Reserve and Guard units were long.  
By the end of 1968, the Army National Guard’s waiting list numbered over 100,000.118   
Without question, Johnson’s decision to withhold mobilization of the reserves 
exacerbated the problem, but the reserves had been re-organized in 1955 partially in order 
to channel men away from active duty and conscription.  Service in the various 
components was marketed as means for men to fulfill an obligation for military service 
while avoiding disruption their civilian lives, preventing the discomforts of active-duty 
service, and ultimately avoiding combat.  As Selective Service reported in 1956, a man’s 
service in the reserves, “free of worries from his draft board” was “about as easy as 
required military service” could be.119  Men who enlisted in the reserves during the 
Vietnam War, therefore, had a decade’s worth of tradition on which to fall back as they 
sought methods to avoid placing themselves in harm’s way. 
* * * * * 
The Selective Service identified men’s occupational choices as a second area that 
was prime for channeling.  As argued in chapter two, the Defense establishment had 
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identified science and engineering as fields of great importance to national security after 
World War II and instituted the student deferment during the Korean War to encourage 
men to enter them.  In the decade after the Korean armistice, the availability of student 
and occupational deferments expanded significantly, partially as a way to shrink the pool 
of I-A men and partially to encourage men to enter fields believed to be in the national 
interest.  Both of these rationales helped support the national security state. 
Throughout the 1950s, the perception that the U.S. lacked scientists and engineers 
and was therefore in danger of falling behind the Soviets continued as a topic of national 
discussion.120 In 1955, an interdepartmental committee, chaired by Arthur Flemming, the 
Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, recommended the creation of a 
President’s Committee on Science and Engineers based on the understanding that “the 
struggle for military supremacy” was “being waged” in the fields of science and 
technology.121  Eisenhower constituted such a committee in April 1956 for the purpose of 
“increasing the supply and improving the quality of [America’s] technological personnel” 
and to “assist the Federal Government in identifying the problems associated with the 
development of more highly qualified scientists and engineers.”122  The committee, 
composed entirely of men from private industry, was to make recommendations on how 
public awareness of science could be heightened and how schools’ science curricula 
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could be improved.123  Members, under the leadership of Howard Bevis, the former 
president of Ohio State University, undertook the objective of raising “public action 
through public awareness.” The Committee sponsored “utilization clinics” for educators 
and businesses throughout the country, encouraged local initiatives, helped organize 
National Science Youth Month to promote scientific interest in school children, worked 
with members’ personal contacts to encourage publicity relating to scientific endeavors, 
and even suggested that the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences offer a special 
Oscar award for “films which contribute most to an acceptance of science and scientific 
achievement.”124  It also recommended the creation of a President’s Science Advisory 
Committee to “coordinat[e] and stimulat[e] the nation’s efforts in the development and 
utilization of highly trained manpower” by developing policy, coordinating federal 
programs related to science, and liaising with private industry.125  Eisenhower listened 
and, in the wake of Sputnik’s launch in October 1957, upgraded a pre-existing Science 
Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization to the level of an executive 
office.126 
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The Soviet launch of two Sputnik satellites in late 1957 gave new life to 
Americans’ fears of being overtaken by their communist rival.  Prominent policymakers 
likened the Soviet achievement to Pearl Harbor, blasting the United States out of its 
“intellectual complacency.”  Physicist Edward Teller, the “father of the hydrogen bomb,” 
claimed, “It is as if we had just lost a major battle.”127  Life magazine ran several articles 
on why the United States lost the space race and warning of the Soviet’s “timetable to 
disaster” if the United States did not change its priorities.128  Worries over America’s 
educational system and its potential for scientific advancement abounded.  A 1955 book 
by Rudolph Flesch called Why Johnny Can’t Read – And What You Can Do About It 
“suddenly became a smash best-seller,” and a rash of other titles soon appeared.129  
Admiral Hyman Rickover, who oversaw nuclear research and development for the Navy, 
exhorted the nation to use the shock of Sputnik to marshal itself to “perform educational 
miracles,” just as it had used Japan’s attack in 1941 to mobilize military and industrial 
miracles.  Secretary of State John Foster Dulles hoped the “wave of mortification, anger, 
and fresh determination,” caused by the launch would inspire the “efforts and sacrifices 
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needed to win” the Cold War.130  A poll of American citizens by the Opinion Research 
Corporation found that the public believed “the country’s prime concerns [were] 1) 
catching the Russians in the defense race, and 2) training more and better scientists.”  
Prior to the launch of the two satellites, top worries had been inflation, staying out of war, 
and racial segregation.131  The Eisenhower Administration responded to the immediate 
threat by redoubling efforts to advance America’s space program, but deemed long-term 
solutions to the nation’s perceived “education gap” as more important.   
By the time of the first Sputnik launch, the apparent deficiencies of the American 
educational system already were on the national agenda.  They had been the subject of 
Congressional hearings in 1956 and were a major topic of discussion for the President’s 
Committee on Science and Engineering.132  In the spring of 1957, the President had 
assured the National Education Association that “our schools are strongpoints in our 
National Defense…more important than Nike batteries, more necessary than our radar 
warning nets, and more powerful even than the energy of the atom.”133  Proponents of 
school reform, including President Truman, had long advocated federal aid to schools, 
especially for the construction of new facilities, but for the most part they had been 
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thwarted, caught on the issues of states rights, segregation in southern schools, and the 
separation of church and state, as Catholic parochial schools demanded support as well.   
As a result, federal educational aid had been limited to grants to individuals. The 
G.I. Bill provided educational benefits to veterans, while the National Science 
Foundation awarded scholarships and fellowships to exceptional undergraduates and 
graduate students studying scientific subjects.  It also sponsored summer institutes for 
high school teachers and college instructors, a traveling libraries program, and a traveling 
science demonstration program for high schools.134  But these efforts were severely 
limited.  The launch of the Sputnik satellites gave educational reformers and Eisenhower, 
who had grave misgivings about general federal aid to schools, the opportunity to tie 
national security to a limited bill designed specifically to aid science education.  The 
result was the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which, among other things, 
awarded loans and National Defense Fellowships to undergraduates and graduate 
students studying scientific subjects. It also appropriated funds to states to update 
equipment for secondary science and language labs and to encourage math and science 
education.135  By 1964, 600,000 college and university students majoring in the fields of 
mathematics, science, engineering, and modern foreign languages had received loans 
totaling over $404 million from the federal government under its provisions.136   
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The Selective Service took an active interest in the discourse analyzing the 
relationship between science and national defense, especially since the feeling of 
heightened need for scientists and science teachers coincided with the agency’s 
development of manpower channeling.  That the agency would be responsible for 
deferring the surge of resultant college students was only the tip of the iceberg. In 1955, 
Hershey reconstituted the National Selective Service Scientific Advisory Group only two 
years after dissolving the Scientific Advisory Committee on Specialized Personnel.  State 
Directors began creating similar boards of scientific advisers on the state level as well.  
These groups were charged with offering advice to local and appeal boards on scientific 
matters, especially as they evaluated applications for occupational deferments.  Members 
of the national and state Scientific Advisory Committees were expected to help the 
laymen in local communities translate technical jargon to determine if a man’s job really 
was essential. 
Deferments for scientists and potential scientists took on greater importance in 
such a climate.  In 1955, the Departments of Commerce and Labor revised their lists of 
essential activities and critical occupations, which the Selective Service used to establish 
criteria for occupational deferments.  Local boards generally would not grant an 
occupational deferment if a man or his employer could not demonstrate that the man was 
engaged in a job defined as critical or essential.  The new lists were shorter than those 
compiled in 1951.  The inventory of essential activities dropped from 25 categories to 
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eleven, for example, as many production jobs were eliminated.137  A sense of panic 
amongst those seeking deferments ensued.138  Hershey, however, admitted that although 
certain occupations were no longer vital, deferments nonetheless would “have to be more 
liberal” because the military did not need as many men.  “Whether they’re in the deferred 
classifications or in I-A will probably be a matter of method rather than results,” he wrote 
to Michigan’s state director.139  In other words, men would continue to gain occupational 
deferments as a result of local boards’ leniency, even if their jobs could not be found on 
the lists of the Departments of Labor or Commerce.  Moreover, after much discussion, 
secondary school teachers of math and physical and biological sciences were added to the 
list of critical occupations and “educational services” to the list of essential activities.140   
These changes, rather than limiting the number of occupational deferments, 
opened the door to their expansion.  The number of men deferred for jobs in science and 
engineering grew significantly as more sought degrees in these fields.  According to the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), where 89,452 undergraduates earned bachelors 
degrees in these fields in 1951, 103,653 did in 1962.141  The numbers of masters and 
                                                
137 “List of Essential Activities,” Appendix 12, Annual Report, 1955, 87. 
138 See, for example, “Slash Draft Exemptions: Farmers Now Eligible,” Detroit 
Times, March 2, 1955. 
139 Lewis B. Hershey to Colonel Holmes, March 8, 1955, 127 General Mich, 
1963-1955, box 47, Central Files, RG 147, NARA. 
140 Memo re: Meeting No. 28, Committee on Specialized Personnel, August 17, 
1954, Committee on Specialized Personnel – Minutes, etc., box 71, Papers of the 
Planning Office, RG 147, NARA; Annual Report, 1955, 86-87.  The War Manpower 
Commission began compiling lists of essential activities and critical occupations in 1942, 
and the task was handed over to the Departments of Commerce and Labor after World 
War II. 
141 National Science Foundation, Comparisons of Earned Degrees Awarded, 
1901-1962: With Projections to 2000, NSF-64 (Washington, D.C.: NSF, 1964), 10.  
Available at http://babel.hathitrust.org. 
 213 
doctoral degrees similarly grew.142  While the NSF admitted, “attainment of a degree in a 
given field is not concomitant with continuance of work in that field,” the agency also 
pointed out that a man’s educational background and training were “significant 
determinants of eventual vocational activity.”143  It attributed most of the gains to 
population growth and the rapid expansion of science programs on college campuses.144  
But population growth alone does not account for the rapid rise in occupational 
deferments across the same time period, which increased almost 650 percent between 
1955 and 1963.145  Instead, the national headquarters of Selective Service, instructed 
local boards “to minimize the induction of any registrant in these categories to the point 
where the induction of any individual in these fields will be the exception rather than the 
rule.” Local boards, therefore, became more lenient.  Between October 31, 1956 and 
December 31, 1957, the number of men deferred in Class II-A (non-agricultural 
deferments) jumped from 27,317 to 34,284, a percentage increase that far exceeded either 
the growth rate of the draft-age cohort or that of college-educated men during the same 
time period.146 
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The case of teachers further illustrates this point.  Men and women together 
earned 71,518 bachelors degrees in education in 1951 and 106,359 in 1962.147  Part of 
this increase is, no doubt, because of population growth and the growth of college 
campuses, but these were also years of teacher shortages, which meant publicity and the 
incentive of a growing job market most likely attracted others into the field.  But the 
growing number of occupational deferments granted to teachers cannot be explained by 
the simple existence of more teachers.  According to a June 1955 Operations Bulletin 
from the Selective Service, secondary teachers of math and science were eligible for 
deferments based on the Department of Labor’s list of critical occupations.  Therefore, 
national headquarters recommended that local boards give male teachers of these subjects 
“special consideration” when determining deferments.  By 1958, however, the agency 
had “broadened informally” its policy of deferring only educators in these subjects and 
began to include others as well.  Hershey publicized the national teacher shortage 
regularly, and “fostered by this and other means a policy of liberality in considering 
teachers for deferment.”  Moreover, according to Bernard T. Franck, III, the Chief of the 
Selective Service System’s Office of Legislation, Liaison, and Public Information, it was 
the “practice of National Headquarters” to recommend either postponement of induction 
or deferment for educators “in practically all teaching fields.”148  In 1960, the agency 
officially rescinded the 1955 bulletin, noting that teachers in all fields were in demand, 
even if their specialties did not qualify them as critical according to the Department of 
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Labor.  Local Boards were told that they should forego “any implication that teachers in 
specified fields should receive special consideration.”149   
By the early 1960s, local board members were invited to be as liberal as they 
wished in the granting of occupational and student deferments.  In 1962, the Departments 
of Labor and Commerce revised their lists of critical occupations and essential activities 
again, adding categories for those working in “Missile and Space Systems” and language 
education.  National Headquarters disseminated the lists to the State Directors in a memo 
reminding them, “Deferments shall not be limited to registrants engaged in the listed 
activities or occupations.”150  Understandably, this vague policy perplexed local boards, 
which, for the most part tried to apply the standard of “in the national health, safety, or 
interest” to their deliberations over occupational deferments.  But ultimately, as noted 
above, they deferred more men.  One chairman of a local board explained to a new 
member that the process of deferring was “sort of like an accordion.  Sometimes you 
stretch it out and get generous with deferments and then other times you squeeze it up 
tight.”151  During the first half of the 1960s, the accordion was stretched all the way out. 
 Criteria for student deferments, first implemented in 1951, were similarly relaxed. 
As the age of induction had risen during the later half of the 1950s, fewer and fewer 
college men applied for these deferments.  Most male students preferred to take their 
chances with the draft rather than pushing their age of liability to 35 by applying for 
special consideration.  This reduction prompted Hershey to limit the administration of the 
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Selective Service College Qualification Test (SSCQT) in 1958 to just one sitting per year.  
In 1962, President Kennedy signed an executive order altering regulations governing the 
II-S (student) category.152  Local boards were invited to consider registrants’ 
classification status without holding students to a particular class standing or score on the 
SSCQT.  Selective Service personnel were welcome to consider these factors in 
determining a registrant’s classification, but as long as students could demonstrate that 
they were “satisfactorily pursuing a course of instruction,” they were no longer 
necessary.153  The SSCQT was eliminated entirely during the 1963-64 academic year due 
to lack of interest.  With the relaxed standards, more students chose to take advantage of 
the student deferment, despite the high average age of induction.  The number of students 
receiving a II-S classification was nine times larger in 1965 than it had been in 1961.154  
Finally, the Selective Service lent rhetorical support to the Peace Corps, defining 
it as a program that served the national interest.  Although Hershey was not willing to go 
so far as to accept service in the Peace Corps as the equivalent of military service and 
therefore worthy of exemption from the draft, his agency helped Peace Corps members 
obtain deferments on occupational grounds.155 When, for example, one man’s local board 
turned down his request for a deferment so that he could volunteer in Ghana, officials at 
the Selective Service System’s national headquarters recommended a complete rewrite of 
the man’s application letter.  Rather than simply ask for the deferment, the Selective 
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Service suggested that all requests highlight the Peace Corps as a “civilian 
activit[y]…necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest.”156  
Men were free to pyramid Peace Corps deferments with marriage, fatherhood, and other 
student or occupational deferments if they wished.  The Selective Service wanted 
Kennedy to know that the system would “offer…its full cooperation in the launching and 
operation” of the new initiative.157 
It is impossible to know exactly how many men entered privileged fields in 
education, science, or engineering because of Selective Service policies.  Certainly, the 
agency believed it played a major role. Selective Service crowed, “Selective Service law, 
regulation and policy…contribute heavily to the Nation’s need for teachers and 
adequately trained citizens.”158  Franck explained, “By its liberal deferment policies of 
teachers, the Selective Service undoubtedly has influenced men to remain in teaching 
positions rather than to transfer to some more lucrative calling thereby losing 
opportunities for deferment.”159  In his 1961 Annual Report to Congress, Hershey noted, 
“Many younger engineers, scientists, technicians and other skilled workers would not 
remain in their jobs in the defense effort if they did not have occupational deferments.”160  
Anecdotal evidence confirms that the offer of a deferment did affect at least some men’s 
choices.  For example, twelve of nineteen scientists and engineers profiled in a small 
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study of men working in the weapons industry in 1967 were young enough to have been 
affected by the Selective Service’s policy.  Of these, two openly admitted to choosing 
their jobs, which they had held since before the war in Vietnam escalated, in order to 
receive a deferment.  The reasons the other nine chose their professions were not 
discussed, leaving open the possibility that more were channeled into their jobs as 
well.161   
Regardless of the number of men who actively chose their professions in order to 
avoid military service, the increased availability of occupational deferments is significant.   
First, it illustrates the spread of militarization in American society during the Cold War.  
Legislation like the NDEA defined education at all levels as an arm of national defense, 
but it was deferments in the name of national security that militarized the teaching 
profession.  Deferments for teachers – like those for scientists and engineers – were 
rationalized as a weapon against Soviet dominance and defined as a civic contribution 
equivalent to military service.162 Secondly, occupational deferments allowed an 
increasing number of men to avoid participation in the armed forces.  Whether they 
internalized their jobs as contributing to the safety of the nation or not, they neither 
donned uniforms nor drilled with weapons.  Their lives remained comfortably civilian.  
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However they chose to define their obligations as citizens or their responsibilities as men, 
military service was not part of the process. 
* * * * * 
While the Selective Service overtly admitted it channeled men into particular 
occupational fields, its policies implicitly affected men’s domestic arrangements. 
Whether explicitly stated or not, as during the Korean War, deferments encouraged early 
marriage and fatherhood.  This practice further privileged civilian pursuits and 
unintentionally helped define men’s domestic arrangements as service to the state. 
Historian Robert Westbrook has argued that media during World War II 
encouraged men to join the military and risk their lives because it was their moral 
responsibility to protect their loved ones.  Advertisements for companies from the 
American Red Cross to Dixie-Vortex, which manufactured Dixie cups, capitalized on the 
same formula as Norman Rockwell – the uniqueness of the American home was worth 
protecting.  Wives and children needed to be saved from the evils of fascism and 
totalitarianism, a feat that could best be accomplished in uniform.163  In the post-World 
War II years, civil defense and military manpower policies sent a different message.  Men 
continued to have a moral obligation to protect their women and children, but they could 
more effectively accomplish this goal as civilians rather than as soldiers.164  
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As discussed in chapter two, Eisenhower signed an executive order ending 
deferments for fathers in 1953, just as the Korean War was ending.  Married men had lost 
similar protections from the draft as part of the 1951 revisions to the Selective Service 
Act of 1948. Marriage and fatherhood remained a social value of extreme importance, 
however. Fathers had only lost their privileged status because of the combination of high 
manpower needs, low numbers of available men, and criticism of privileged youth 
pyramiding their deferments into exemptions.  But as manpower requirements eased and 
demographic factors changed, it once again worked to the military’s and Selective 
Service’s advantage to exclude fathers from the draft. 
In 1956, Eisenhower issued an executive order changing the sequence of 
induction so that all eligible non-fathers between the ages of 19 and 26 would be called 
before any otherwise eligible fathers.165  Technically, fathers were not deferred.  They 
remained in the I-A pool, and were therefore considered eligible to be drafted.  With that 
pool growing ever larger, however, this move all but guaranteed that fathers would not 
face conscription except in the event of all-out war.  In essence, therefore, the president 
created a de facto exemption for all men with children. From a military standpoint, the 
new regulation provided the military with “somewhat younger inductees,” since the 
Selective Service called the oldest available men first, and removing fathers from the 
draft pool tended to push the average age of available men downward.  Moreover, the 
military would not have to pay as many family allotments if fewer of its personnel had 
families.  But Hershey also claimed that the order was “designed to strengthen the 
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Nation’s civilian economy.” 166 Whether he believed fathers were more likely to remain 
in stable jobs than non-fathers, enhance the purchasing power of their family units, or 
strengthen the economy in some other way, he did not elaborate.  
The measure garnered very little press attention.167 Wartime fears over the 
pyramiding of deferments had abated, allowing the federal government once again to 
define the maintenance of the nuclear family as more important to the containment of 
communism than widespread military service. “Family life” was added to “industry” and 
“agriculture” as sectors to which the Selective Service owed “essential support…as 
related to the country’s defense posture.”168 It is impossible to draw a clear causal 
relationship between Eisenhower’s order and the American birth rate, but according to 
the 1957 Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service, the number of fathers in the 
I-A category more than doubled between fiscal 1956 and 1957, increasing at an average 
rate of 18,200 per month.169 Whether intended or not, this policy may well have 
channeled men into fatherhood. 
By the latter portion of John F. Kennedy’s presidency, the Selective Service had 
so many qualified men that it actively sought methods to justify their removal from the 
pool of eligibles.170  On March 15, 1963 Kennedy signed an executive order returning 
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fathers to the III-A (dependency) category, where they had been until 1953.171  This 
action restored official deferments to men with children and eliminated at least 336,446 
men from the I-A manpower pool.172  Ostensibly, Kennedy acted in order to “produce a 
pool…more realistic as a potential source of military manpower,” since the I-A category 
was artificially inflated by the inclusion of fathers who, if examined further, would 
ultimately be excluded from induction for reasons of hardship.173  But the ruling made no 
distinction between those families that faced genuine privation and those that did not.  In 
actuality, therefore, moving all fathers to the dependency category projected a cultural 
assumption that all families were economically and emotionally dependent on a male 
head-of-household and sent the message that married men should not be required to 
perform military service.  They were already performing valuable service to their country 
as fathers. 
Hershey and Kennedy continued to look for ways to reduce the number of men 
liable to the draft.  In response to an August 1963 inquiry from Kennedy, Hershey 
reported that the number of men available for induction could be reduced by one-fifth if 
the president modified the order of call so that all eligible single men would be drafted 
before any married men without children.174 The Selective Service’s General Counsel had 
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already ruled that limiting the liability of this group would violate the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act of 1951, since the law specifically removed the President’s 
authority to defer married men without children. Associate General Counsel Gilbert 
Winter wrote, “the placing of these married nonfathers in a separate lower sequence of 
selection would have the same effect” as a deferment, except that “it would be more 
permanent” since “under present conditions they would never be reached for selection.”  
In essence, the action would therefore “actually afford them a prohibited deferment.”175  
Nevertheless, Kennedy complied with Hershey’s request.176  
Once more, the stated rationale for the new executive order was to lower the 
average age of induction, since married men tended to be older than single men, but its 
subtext was that married men were more important to the nation as civilians than as 
soldiers; single men could more easily be pulled out of civilian life without disrupting 
society.177 Young men got the message. A 1966 Department of Defense study found that 
marriage rates jumped considerably among young men in the age brackets most 
vulnerable to the draft in the months following the change in regulation. Marriage rates 
were 7.5 and 10.9 percent higher for 20- and 21-year-olds, respectively, between October 
1963 and June 1964 than they had been during the previous two years. Marriage rates for 
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all other age groups remained static.178  When President Johnson rescinded Kennedy’s 
order in August 1965, couples rushed to marry before their marriages would no longer 
protect husbands.179  Again, the Selective Service’s own policies undoubtedly channeled 
at least some of these men into early marriages, thus privileging domestic masculinity in 
the name of national defense. 
* * * * * 
The policy of manpower channeling was not without its critics, even before draft 
calls rose in 1965.  Some academics and politicians had begun remarking on the 
inequities of the system during the first part of the decade, a message that also trickled 
down to individual citizens who saw those inequalities in their own communities.  In 
1963, for example, the members of Local Board 56 in Findlay, Ohio wrote a letter of 
protest to Hershey, complaining of the Selective Service System’s liberal and 
“undemocratic” policies that forced them to perpetuate “rank injustice” and “class 
injustice” as they granted “blanket deferments for students, teachers, etc.”  As a result, 
they saw themselves as “automatons,” unable to make independent decisions.180  They 
enclosed an editorial from the Toledo Blade that espoused similar opinions.181  The 
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Indianapolis Star had made similar claims a full five years earlier.182  But these 
objections were remarkably few and far between. 
The Selective Service made no secret of its social and civil defense goals through 
the late 1950s and 1960s. Hershey spoke and wrote openly of the social engineering 
function of manpower channeling in meetings, articles, letters, and testimony before 
Congress for close to a decade before the heightened draft calls of the Vietnam War made 
the practice controversial on a broad scale.  Media outlets were aware of the practice.  
The Indianapolis Star complained in 1958, “Selective Service is not a method of 
channeling all, or even half of our young men into the service of their country.  It is 
merely a device for making a random selection of the relatively small number of men to 
be conscripted.”183  That same year, the Washington Post covered a speech Hershey 
delivered at an event honoring the District of Columbia’s local board members in which 
he openly discussed channeling.184  Certainly all those who attended the Selective 
Service’s Orientation program between 1960 and 1965 were aware of it.  In 1963, an 
anti-military flyer circulating in New York City also used the term.185  Yet these 
examples were exceptions.  Despite Hershey’s outspokenness, most reporters did not find 
the policy important enough to report on it. Channeling, as a practice, did not register 
with most Americans until the Vietnam War brought the inequities of the system more 
visibly to the fore.   
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In January 1967, Peter Henig of the Ann Arbor, Michigan chapter of Students for 
a Democratic Society wrote a scathing article on channeling in the organization’s 
newsletter, New Left Notes.186 In it, he quoted widely from a 1965 Selective Service 
memo that originally had been included in information kits put out for high school 
guidance counselors and other interested parties.187  In it, the agency denied compelling 
people “by edict…to enter pursuits having to do with essentiality and progress,” but it 
acknowledged using “pressure” as the “indirect way of achieving what [was] done by 
direction in foreign countries.” Rather, the Selective Service used the “club of induction” 
to “drive” individuals “out of areas considered to be less important to the areas of greater 
importance in which deferments were given.”188 
The memo’s words sparked outrage among anti-war activists from the political 
Left, who, unsurprisingly, used them as an example of state-sponsored elitism and 
military imperialism. Activist Michael Ferber, founder of the Boston-based Resistance 
and one of the Boston Five arrested for anti-draft activity, labeled the practice “a kind of 
indirect totalitarianism” and wrote that it provided members of his organization with the 
resolve “to oppose not only the draft but the system of coercion it serve[d].”189 But many 
from the political Right were horrified as well.  To conservatives, the practice infringed 
on individuals’ liberty and sounded too much like communist interventionism.  
Conservative economist and professor at the University of Chicago Milton Freidman 
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became one of the draft’s greatest foes.  He argued that conscription was “used as 
weapon…to discourage freedom of speech, assembly, and protest,” and that “a voluntary 
army would permit young men…to plan their schooling, their careers, their marriages, 
and their families in accordance with their own long-run interests” rather than allowing 
the fear of conscription to guide these choices.190 In hearings before the House Armed 
Services Committee in May 1967, Pennsylvania Republican Richard Schweiker and 
Wisconsin Democrat Robert Kastenmeier both used channeling and the inequities it 
exemplified to argue for a complete overhaul of the law governing the draft.191  Once 
criteria for deferments were tightened, however, protest against military service 
increased. Most men had become comfortable with deferments and did not want to see 
them rescinded.   
Activists’ and politicians’ anger at the high-handedness of channeling added fuel 
to the fire of Americans’ discontent with the federal government and the draft.  As 
historians from David Cortright to Beth Bailey have argued, the anti-military sentiment 
engendered by the specific circumstances of the Vietnam War was a major reason the 
Department of Defense shifted from conscription to an All-Volunteer Force in 1973.192  
But channeling, as both a pragmatic solution to the growing pool of available men and an 
ideological means to ensure more men served their country in the spirit of civic-
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republicanism, already had helped devalue military service even before the United States 
deployed ground troops to Indo-China. This policy simultaneously militarized civilian 





“The Most Important Human Salvage Operation in the History of Our Country”: 
The Military Establishment and the War on Poverty, 
1961-1969 
 
 When newly sworn-in President John F. Kennedy delivered his inaugural address 
to the nation on January 20, 1961, he reminded his fellow citizens of their proud heritage 
of freedom and their responsibility to support democratic movements abroad.  “The torch 
has been passed to a new generation,” Kennedy admonished – a generation “unwilling to 
witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always 
been committed…at home and around the world.”  Protecting human rights, however, 
would require a show of national strength, including a strong defense establishment. 
Weakness, Kennedy believed, would beget war, for, in his words, “only when our arms 
are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be 
employed.”  “We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any 
friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty,” he assured the 
American citizenry.1   
 But national strength came from many sources.  Over the course of Kennedy’s 
presidency, the fear that the United States was somehow falling behind the Soviet Union 
accelerated.  What had started with the successful Soviet test of an atomic bomb in 1949 
and gained momentum with the launch of the Sputnik satellites in 1957 expanded beyond 
the military and engineering sectors in the early 1960s.  Government officials and the 
public alike started to focus on the problem of poverty amidst American affluence.  
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Policy makers turned to social scientists for responses to the problem of poverty, and 
together, members of these groups began to untangle the threads of unemployment, poor 
education, lack of health care, powerlessness, racism, and hopelessness that seemed to 
trap nearly one fifth of all Americans in a seemingly permanent underclass.2   
The Kennedy administration addressed these issues tentatively as part of its New 
Frontier.  Lyndon Johnson continued the fight when he launched a full-scale War on 
Poverty as part of his Great Society initiative.  Liberal supporters of these programs 
believed it was America’s moral responsibility to guarantee its citizens equal economic 
opportunity, but they also supported these initiatives as a way to reinvigorate America’s 
sense of national greatness.  The strength required to remain an international beacon of 
freedom, to maintain American preeminence, and to win the Cold War depended on 
healthy citizens and a vital economy.   
Between 1961 and 1969, agencies and departments throughout the federal 
structure – both on the national and the state level – conducted studies and piloted 
programs designed to alleviate the suffering of individuals, train and retrain the un- and 
underemployed for a modern job market, create new jobs, diminish discrimination, 
provide healthcare to those without it, and empower the powerless.  The passage of the 
Economic Opportunity Act in 1964, which created the Office of Economic Opportunity 
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to spearhead many of these initiatives, was the high point of the effort.  But the 
Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW); Labor; Agriculture; Commerce; 
and – perhaps surprisingly – Defense all had their roles to play as well. 
This chapter examines how military manpower policy was used as weapon in the 
War on Poverty, which I define broadly to include its origins in the Kennedy 
administration.  Programs, both voluntary and compulsory, conducted through the 
Selective Service and the Department of Defense, were designed to identify and 
rehabilitate young men who could not pass their mental or physical pre-induction and 
induction exams.  Since these men overwhelmingly hailed from the lowest echelons of 
society, planners hoped that remedial education, health care, and job skills training would 
allow them to break the cycle of poverty that kept them – and their families – from 
contributing as American citizens in ways the policy community defined as meaningful.  
Rehabilitation programs run with the help of the Selective Service and Armed Forces 
Examining Stations (AFES) aimed to fit men for future civilian or military service, while 
Project 100,000, a measure instituted by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 
attempted to provide low-aptitude soldiers, sailors, and marines with skills they could use 
after their enlistments ended.  
Taken together, these programs indicated a shift in how the defense establishment 
reflected national values. As the broader policy community turned its attention toward 
strengthening the nation’s economy and alleviating poverty, so too did defense planners.  
Their initiatives were similar to the universal military training proposals of the previous 
generation in that they were designed to enhance the overall health and productivity of 
American men. Unlike the push for UMT, however, the programs of the 1960s did not 
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call for universal service across social classes.  Instead, they explicitly targeted victims of 
poverty, especially minority men.  Moreover, their goal was to provide poor men with the 
healthcare and skills they would need to get and hold good jobs in their civilian lives.  
New initiatives were to help these men achieve full economic citizenship outside of the 
military.  Earlier proposals for UMT had touted vocational training as one benefit of 
military service, but had not isolated it as the main purpose of such training.  The 
programs of the 1960s, therefore, exclusively focused on helping marginalized men 
conform to a civilian breadwinner ideal in a way that earlier proposals had not. 
This chapter argues that these programs contributed to the reframing of national 
service in two ways.  First, rehabilitation programs run through the Selective Service and 
AFES as well as Project 100,000 emphasized economic productivity as male citizens’ 
main responsibility to the nation. Only the barest lip service was paid to the civic 
republican obligations of military service.  The rhetoric of universal obligation to serve 
was all but dropped as these programs zeroed in on poor and minority men.  Middle-class 
men were free to pursue other paths toward economic citizenship in the name of national 
service without remedial help provided through the induction system and by the military.  
Secondly, and relatedly, the strong connection these programs made between poverty and 
military service provided another justification for middle-class men to avoid donning a 
uniform.  The policy of granting deferments for college education and occupations that 
required post-secondary degrees combined with publicity linking the armed forces with 
poor and minority men added one more layer of removal between military service and 
citizenship obligations for middle-class men.  Ultimately, these policies further separated 
military service from the obligations of masculine citizenship in the United States. 
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* * * * * 
 Military manpower policy has been linked to Americans’ physical and economic 
well-being since at least the end of the nineteenth century.  The “closing” of the frontier, 
the simplification of the tasks performed by working-class men as a result of 
mechanization, and the sedentary, office-based lifestyles of middle- and upper-class men 
caused intellectuals great worry by the 1890s.3  Politicians and other public figures – 
most notably Theodore Roosevelt – advocated “the strenuous life” as a remedy to the 
neuroaesthenia and softness that seemed to plague American men. As scholar Gail 
Bederman has argued, “Ideologies of manliness were…similar to – and frequently linked 
with – ideologies of civilization.”  If America was to evolve as a world power, reasoned 
intellectuals of the era, then its male population needed to perfect itself.4  Historian 
Kristen Hoganson demonstrated that such concerns were one of the major causes of 
American involvement in the Spanish-American War, as military service was seen by 
many as a way to reinvigorate the country’s manhood.5  
                                                
3 See, for example, T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and 
the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); 
David Axeen, “’Heroes of the Engine Room’: American ‘Civilization’ and the War with 
Spain,” American Quarterly 36, no. 4 (Autumn, 1984): 481-502; E. Anthony Rotundo, 
American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern 
Era (New York: Basic Books, 1993), ch. 10; Michael Kimmel, Manhood in America: A 
Cultural History (New York: Free Press, 1996), ch. 4; Martin Summers, Manliness and 
its Discontents: The Black Middle Class and the Transformation of Masculinity, 1900-
1930 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 251-253. 
4 Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and 
Race in the United States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).  
Quote. p. 27. 
5 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics 
Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1998). 
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 World War I appeared to confirm fears that the U.S. was becoming a nation of 
weaklings, as 34 percent of men were rejected from military service for physical 
incapacity alone.6  It also marked the beginning of the military establishment’s concern 
with the quality of American manpower, as the draft forced the armed forces to integrate 
large numbers of poor farmers, urban workers, and immigrants into their operations.  The 
discovery that seven percent of conscripts could not speak English and 25 percent were 
illiterate in all languages fueled new calls for programs to “Americanize” immigrants and 
legislation to restrict immigration.7 
During World War II, federal concern over military rejection rates – and the state 
of male bodies – climbed.  The military rejected just over one third of all volunteers and 
draftees examined between November 1940 and August 1945.8  The Selective Service 
struggled to settle on standards stringent enough to meet the military’s need for capable 
men but that were sufficiently lenient to fill the armed forces’ manpower quotas.  By the 
                                                
6 J. Howard Beard, “Physical Rejection for Military Service: Some Problems in 
Reconstruction,” Scientific Monthly 9, no. 1 (July 1919): 5. 
7 John Whiteclay Chambers, II., To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern 
America (New York: Free Press, 1987), 251.  During World War I, the military turned to 
intelligence testing as a way to quickly classify men for officer training and determine the 
proper placement for draftees.  By the end of the war, 200,000 men per month were being 
administered either the Alpha test for literate men or the Beta test for men who could not 
read or write in English.  Both tests, although purported to measure “native intelligence,” 
rather than educational attainment, required significant American cultural knowledge.  
Poorly-educated, minority, and foreign-born men performed significantly worse on these 
exams than well-educated, white, native-born men.  See Daniel J. Kevles, “Testing the 
Army’s Intelligence: Psychologists and the Military in World War I,” Journal of 
American History 55, no. 3 (Dec. 1968): 565-581.  Quote, p. 576. 
8 Between November 1940 and August 1945, 35.8 percent of all men examined – 
or approximately 6.5 million men – were rejected for military service.  During the first 
year, before standards were lower, the rejection rate was 52.8 percent.  See Christina S. 
Jarvis, The Male Body at War: American Masculinity during World War II (DeKalb, Ill.: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 19, 61-63.   
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end of the war, mental standards had been lowered so far as to admit men who were 
functionally illiterate.9 
Officials in the Selective Service, especially Colonel Leonard Rowntree, the 
agency’s medical director, viewed many of the maladies keeping men from fulfilling 
their obligation to serve in the military as remediable.  Men with certain dental problems, 
vision defects, hernias, sexually transmitted diseases, and who were either over- or under-
weight could benefit from basic medical help, he reasoned.  During the first part of World 
War II, the agency considered several ideas for voluntary and compulsory rehabilitation 
programs, including partnerships with the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National 
Youth Administration to bulk up underweight men.10  Most of these proposals never 
came to much, especially because they relied on the voluntary participation of young men 
who may or may not have had access to local medical care.  The Selective Service 
                                                
9 At the beginning of World War II, the Army accepted men whose test scores put 
them at roughly the equivalent of a fourth grade education, but beginning in August 1942, 
a quota system was implemented so that up to ten percent of new accessions could be 
illiterate. See James M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military 
Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 
1971), 46-47; Janice H. Laurence and Peter F. Ramsberger, Low-Aptitude Men in the 
Military: Who Profits? Who Pays? (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1991), 20. The term 
“mental standards” is somewhat misleading.  It is the phraseology used by the Selective 
Service, which classified men as IV-F if they did not meet “physical, mental, or moral” 
qualifications.  However, while this encompassed men who were mentally disabled, it 
also referred to men who did not meet educational standards or did not score highly 
enough on aptitude tests. 
10 For more information, see Rachel Louise Moran, “Body Politic: Government 
and Physique in Twentieth-Century America,” (Ph.D. Diss.: Pennsylvania State 
University, 2013), ch. 5.  It should be noted that the Civilian Conservation Corps also 
operated in partnership with the U.S. Army, which was responsible for operating and 
staffing its work camps.  See Michael W. Sherraden, “Military Participation in a Youth 
Employment Program: The Civilian Conservation Corps,” Armed Forces and Society 7, 
no. 2 (Winter 1980): 227-245. 
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abandoned its own pilot programs for a large-scale, national rehabilitation program in 
1942, deeming the job too large.11 
The Selective Service did, however, continue to pursue relationships with other 
federal and local agencies in its quest to create voluntary rehabilitation programs.12  
When Congress established the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation within the Federal 
Security Agency in 1943, the Selective Service sought out a partnership with the new 
unit.  Along with state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies, the Office of Vocational 
Rehabilitation helped men find state- and federally-funded medical care in their local 
communities.  The agreement reached between the Selective Service and the Office of 
Vocational Rehabilitation led to procedures whereby the Selective Service furnished the 
names of rejectees to state rehabilitation agencies “so that eligible individuals might be 
prepared for employment in critical industries.”13  State directors, moreover, were 
instructed to liaise with state VR agencies.  Local board offices were to be supplied with 
instructional literature on the VR services available in their states.14  While the program 
was beset by troubles, including massive backlogs of names and rejectees’ failure to 
                                                
11 Richard H. Hanes to James A. Crabtree, March 2, 1949, 002 National Security 
Resources Board, 1948-63, box 21, Central Files, 1948-1969, RG 147, Records of the 
Selective Service, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, 
Maryland [hereafter, RG 147, NARA]; “Former Rehabilitation Programs Recalled in 
Which Selective Service Played a Role,” Selective Service 14, no. 8 (Aug. 1964): 4. 
12 See, for example, Betty Birmingham Moorehead, “The Work of a Family 
Welfare Agency in Investigations for Selective Service Boards Where Deferment is 
Requested because of Family Problems” (M.S.S.S. Thesis: Boston University School of 
Social Work, 1944). 
13 Cooperative Relationship Memorandum No. 9 (Revised), February 18, 1949, 
attached to Phyllis W. Francis to Richard H. Eanes, July 11, 1958, 002 National Security 
Resources Board, 1948-63, box 21, Central Files, 1948-1969, RG 147, NARA. 
14 State Director Advice No. 73, February 9, 1949, attached to ibid. 
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follow up on services, the relationship between the two agencies lasted in some form 
until 1961.15 
Moreover, as argued in chapter one, proposals for universal military training 
were, at least in part, a response to perceptions that American men had grown soft.  
Common training, according to some of the plan’s proponents, would enhance national 
security by strengthening the nation’s male populace.  Physical activity combined with 
military training would ensure men’s ability to mobilize quickly and effectively against 
any foe, should the need arise. UMT’s secondary benefits, including remedial healthcare 
and vocational training, would also guarantee that all men had the means to contribute to 
America’s growing post-war economy.  Trained individuals, equipped with healthy 
bodies and the occupational skills necessary in a modern, mechanized economy, would 
strengthen the civic foundation of the United States.   
The military establishment, therefore, was firmly connected to programs – both 
proposed and realized – designed to enhance the welfare of individuals and the nation 
through the first half of the twentieth century.16 The armed forces were vitally concerned 
with the quality of the men who would fill their ranks.  Potential soldiers required good 
physical health, educational ability, and an understanding of national values in order to 
                                                
15 The Office of Vocational Rehabilitation was moved to the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare when the new cabinet position was created in 1953.  
Cooperative Relationship Memorandum No. 9 (Revised), February 18, 1949, attached to 
ibid.; Dear General Hershey, December 2, 1963, attached to memo card, Miss Switzer to 
Mr. Nestingen, 12-3-63, Selective Service Rejectees, Box 2, entry UD-UP 3, RG 235, 
Records of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [Hereafter RG 235], 
NARA. 
16 Moreover, military service in the U.S. has been connected to other types of 
welfare programs since the Revolution.  Service earned veterans certain benefits, 
including pensions for themselves and their families, medical care, and housing.  This 
project, however, is concerned with the benefits connected with the ability to serve and 
does not directly address veterans’ benefits.  For more, see introduction. 
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succeed in modern warfare.  Ideally, the thinking went, these qualities should be nurtured 
from childhood, but this was not always possible in the diverse, growing population of 
the twentieth-century United States.  The federal government, including the military, 
needed to step in to build strong, dedicated, focused men, who could take the lessons they 
learned in the military back into their communities after discharge.  So, when federal 
initiatives turned toward strengthening the nation’s populace and alleviating poverty in 
the 1960s or in the postwar period, it seemed natural that the defense establishment 
would have a part to play. 
* * * * * 
The end of the Korean War brought anxiety over national strength into sharper 
focus.  Even though, by most measures, the United States was doing remarkably well – 
unemployment was relatively low, the economy had grown overwhelmingly since the end 
of World War II, standards of living for most Americans continued to rise, and the U.S. 
was an undisputed world power – fear remained.17  The United States had just lost its first 
war.  Up to one-third of men registered with the Selective Service had not qualified for 
                                                
17 The economy grew at a staggering pace in the 15 years after World War II.  For 
example, the gross national product increased by 56 percent between 1947 and 1960, 
growing from $282.3 billion to $439.9 billion.  Similarly, personal consumption 
increased from $195.6 billion to $298.1 billion between 1947 and 1960. Over four 
million jobs were created between the same years, growing from 60,168,000 jobs in 1947 
to 64,520,000 in 1960. However there were periodic recessions and the percentage of 
unemployed grew from 3.9 percent in 1947 to 5.7 percent in 1960. See Robert M. 
Collins, “Growth Liberalism in the Sixties,” 13, in The Sixties: From Memory to History, 
ed. David Farber (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Gladys 
Roth Kremen, “MDTA: The Origins of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 
1962,” Department of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/mono-
mdtatext.htm. 
 239 
military service.18  A handful of American prisoners of war refused repatriation after the 
armistice, leading to worry that Americans were mentally weak.19  The Soviet Union 
appeared on the brink of technologically eclipsing the U.S.  The mass media, through 
movies and publications, capitalized on and spread fear that the nation’s citizens were 
somehow not strong enough for the possible fight ahead, that America’s strength and 
manhood were on the decline, and that the U.S. could be easily infiltrated by 
communists.20   
                                                
18 Bernard D. Karpinos, “Fitness of American Youth for Military Service,” The 
Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 38, no. 3 (July 1960): 213-267. 
19 Virginia Pasley, 21 Stayed: The Story of the American GI’s who Chose 
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Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Michael S. Sherry, The Shadow of War: 
The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); 
Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War American and the Disillusioning 
of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995); John D’Emilio and Estelle B. 
Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America ( New York: Harper and 
Row, 1988), ch. 10; Suzanne Clark, Cold Warriors: Manliness on Trial in the Rhetoric of 
the West (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000); Robert Corber, 
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As a result, the movement to improve national strength that developed in the 
1950s and 1960s was unique because of the way it responded to the threat of the Cold 
War.  A strong, well-educated population came to be understood as a weapon against 
communism.  As historians have shown, a particularly masculine cult of toughness and 
strength arose within political and foreign policy circles during the 1950s.21  Policy-
makers, like John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, and Robert McNamara 
attended elite private boys’ boarding schools and Ivy League universities, where they 
were members of selective fraternities and secret societies.  Their sex-segregated, upper-
class upbringings inculcated in them a culture of manliness that was forged through a 
series of ordeals – “the ordeal of boarding school, the ordeal of nature, and the ordeal of 
battle.”22  Exhibiting weakness in this environment was unacceptable.  Strength of body 
and mind were essential, as was a refusal to be “soft” on communism.23  They, therefore, 
saw physical fitness as something of immense importance. 
Fear that Americans’ level of physical strength was falling behind that of their 
European competitors intensified through the 1950s in a phenomenon sociologist Jeffrey 
Montez de Oca has termed the “muscle gap.”  He traced its rise in American print media 
between 1945 and 1965 and found that unease over the state of American men’s bodies 
compared to those of other nations originated in the aftermath of World War II, grew 
                                                
21 Donald J. Mrozek, “The Cult and Ritual of Toughness in Cold War America,” 
257-267, in Sport in America: From Wicked Amusement to National Obsession, ed. 
David K. Wiggins (Champaign, Ill.: Human Kinetics, 1995).  
22 Robert D. Dean, “Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic 
Politics of Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 29-62.  Quote, 
pp. 31-32. 
23 K.A. Cuordileone, “Politics in an Age of Anxiety: Cold War Political Culture 
and the Crisis in American Masculinity, 1949-1960,” Journal of American History 87, 
no. 2, (Sept. 2000): 515-45. 
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following the Korean War, and spiked significantly in 1961 as Kennedy took office.24  
Articles expressed apprehensions similar to that expressed by Marine Colonel Lewis 
“Chesty” Puller, when he told the men under his command, “Our country won’t go on 
forever, if we stay as soft as we are now.  There won’t be an America.  Because some 
foreign soldiers will invade us and take our women and breed a hardier race.”25   
Even though the U.S. was not actively engaged in a hot war by the late 1950s, 
concerns over America’s viability centered on its lack of fitness and pervaded media and 
policy circles, especially after doctors Hans Kraus and Sonja Weber released the results 
of a study comparing the fitness levels of American and European children in 1955.26  
They found that close to 58 percent of American children aged six to sixteen failed at 
least one of a series of six strength and flexibility tests, while only 8.7 percent of 
European children failed.  “It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion,” fretted Harvard 
professor Jean Mayer in the New York Times, “that our motorized, mechanized, ‘effort-
saver’ civilization is rapidly making us as soft as our processed foods, our foam rubber 
mattresses, and our balloon tires.”27  John B. Kelly, a former Olympian and Franklin 
Roosevelt-appointed U.S. Director of Physical Fitness during World War II, warned that 
the Soviets spent $5 billion annually on physical fitness programs, “an expenditure 
                                                
24 Jeffrey Montez de Oca, “’As Our Muscles Get Softer, Our Missile Race 
Becomes Harder’: Cultural Citizenship and the ‘Muscle Gap,’” Journal of Historical 
Sociology 18, no. 3 (Sept. 2005): 152. 
25 Quoted in ibid., 148. 
26 Specifically, the European children were from Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. 
27 Jean Mayer, “Muscular State of the Union,” New York Times, Nov. 5, 1955.  
Mayer also pointed out that in 1940, the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory did a “classic step 
test” on male draftees and found that their physical endurance was no better than that of 
girls from Wellesley who were given a similar endurance test. 
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exceeded only by their defense budget.”28  President Eisenhower, who had advocated 
universal military training after World War II as a remedy for American unfitness, found 
the results “even more alarming” than he had thought.29  In 1956, he established the 
President’s Council on Youth Fitness (PCYF) to encourage children to exercise and 
develop healthy bodies so that the U.S. would not fall further behind the other nations of 
the world.30   
In 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first Inter-Continental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM) and low-orbit satellites. Fear that the U.S. was falling behind the Soviets, 
therefore, was thoroughly enmeshed in heightened concern over the nation’s fitness and 
security.  As demonstrated by chapter three, efforts to develop American bodies existed 
alongside measures to augment the country’s educational system, expand the fields of 
science and engineering, and grow the economy, all in the name of national defense.  
America in the late-1950s, therefore, was a nation simultaneously at the peak of its 
strength and wracked by self-doubt.   
* * * * * 
John F. Kennedy capitalized on these fears as he campaigned for the presidency.31  
Through stump speeches and publications, he painted a picture of a country and a people 
                                                
28 “Grace Kelly’s Dad Urges Physical Fitness Program to Aid U.S. Youth,” 
Philadelphia Tribune, March 3, 1956. 
29 “Condition of Youth Alarms Eisenhower,” Washington Post, July 12, 1955.   
30 Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10,673 on July 16, 1956.  It established the 
President’s Council on Youth Fitness and a Citizens Advisory Committee, designed to 
offer guidance to the PCYF. For more on the PCYF and its subsequent campaign for 
fitness, see Moran, “The Body Politic,” ch. 6. 
31 Christopher A. Preble, John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap (DeKalb, Ill.: 
Northern Illinois University Press), 7. 
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“in trouble,” of a “tired” America, trapped in a period of “relative decline.”32  He worried 
that if the nation did not take immediate measures to halt the slow slippage of American 
prestige, the people would one day take stock and realize that their nation had been 
overtaken by its communist foe, “like the slow rotting of a great tree…which ultimately 
blows over from the first small wind that passes.”33 If the newly independent nations of 
the world felt “that the sun of the West [was] setting and that the sun of the East [was] 
rising,” that the United States was “unable to solve [its] problems,” they would cease 
looking toward the U.S. for leadership, and all would be lost.34 
Strength, according to Kennedy and the men he surrounded himself with, was the 
key to American greatness – strength of character, strength of body, strength of 
conviction – and the nation’s full potential could not be reached without a well-equipped 
military and an expanding economy.35  National vigor, therefore, had to be restored 
through better national defense, renewed economic growth, and a firm pledge to use 
American “moral and spiritual strength” to wage “war on poverty and misery and 
disease,” all of which Kennedy vowed to accomplish as president.36   
These three areas for improvement were intimately linked.  In terms of defense, 
Kennedy believed the U.S. had fallen far behind the Soviets in the production of ICBMs 
                                                
32 Kennedy, Speech, September 2, 1960, Fairgrounds, Bangor, Maine, JFKLink, 
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33 Kennedy, Speech, September 6, 1960, Pocatello, Idaho, JFKLink, 
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34 Ibid. 
35 Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign 
Policy (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001) and Cuordileone, 
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36 Kennedy, Speech, October 5, 1960, Fordham University, Bronx, New York, 
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and that this so-called “missile gap” was an untenable weakness.  He made the gap a 
major issue in the 1960 presidential race.  Eisenhower tried to assure voters that no such 
missile gap existed and that American nuclear stockpiles were far superior to the 
communist enemy’s.  He could not, however, reveal his evidence, which was gleaned 
from the top-secret U-2 spy plane reconnaissance program.37  Democrats used 
Republican foreign policy failures, including the perceived missile gap, as a major point 
of attack throughout the 1960 campaign, and continued to use the fears the gap 
engendered as a justification to enlarge the American ICBM stockpile once Kennedy was 
elected.38  
President Kennedy also rejected Eisenhower’s New Look Strategy, deeming the 
doctrine of massive retaliation dangerous.  According to the new president and his 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, the threat of nuclear retaliation was not 
adaptable to the brush wars popping up around the world in the wake of decolonization, 
nor did long-range bombers make much sense after the Soviets had successfully tested its 
first ICBM .  Moreover, nuclear weapons were not always an appropriate response to 
                                                
37 Sherry, In the Shadow of War, 217-219, 232; Preble, John F. Kennedy and the 
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international tensions, as Kennedy learned in the early days of his administration through 
the Bay of Pigs debacle and the Berlin Crisis.39  Instead, the president initiated a new 
guiding strategy that came to be known as “Flexible Response.”  While nuclear weapons 
remained important, the Kennedy administration shifted the military’s method for their 
delivery from bombers to missiles.  The Department of Defense reversed Eisenhower’s 
cuts to conventional forces.  It expanded active forces across all branches of service by 
171,000 between 1961 and 1965, a move that required greater manpower procurement 
efforts.  It also cut the size of the reserves by 50,000, and devoted special attention to 
counterinsurgency forces, like the Army’s Green Berets, which could be deployed 
quickly to the world’s hot spots.40  According to the official history of the Department of 
Defense, the Pentagon chose the strategy of flexible response, including a buildup of 
ICBMs, because counterforce was seen as a “more humane alternative to the 
indiscriminate doctrine of massive retaliation.”  It gave American armed forces the ability 
“to target military installations while sparing heavily populated cities.”41   
Historian Christopher A. Preble, however, interpreted Kennedy’s decision 
differently.  He argued that Kennedy’s defense strategy was tied to his economic plan.  If 
the populace remained fearful of Soviet dominance, then voters would be more likely to 
approve increased defense spending, which, in turn, would boost the economy and further 
bolster America’s position as a super power.42 Where Eisenhower had “soft-pedaled talk 
of recession,” the Kennedy administration emphasized the nation’s economic woes.  In 
                                                
39 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 294. 
40 The Army and Marine Corps, which used infantry troops, received the lion’s 
share of the increases.  See Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 253-259. 
41 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 309. 
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1961, Labor Department officials pointed out that with 5.4 million people out of work, 
unemployment had reached its worst levels since World War II.  More than half of the 
nation’s 150 leading production centers had unemployment rates over six percent.43  
Walter Heller, the Chair of Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisers, told Congress in 
May 1961 that the economy would have to expand by more than 3.5 percent per year just 
to hold the status quo of 6.8 percent unemployment.44   
The postwar American economy especially depended on the vitality of the 
defense sector.  The defense manufacturing industry had been hard hit by cuts related to 
Eisenhower’s New Look program.  Where more than 50 percent of the Department of 
Defense’s procurement budget had gone to weapons, ammunition, tanks, automotive 
hardware and production equipment in 1953, the Pentagon expended only 13 percent of 
its budget on the same items in 1961.45  Almost a quarter of the nation’s aviation workers 
lost their jobs between 1957 and 1960 as contracts dwindled.46 Something needed to be 
done or Americans risked falling farther behind the Soviets.  Kennedy believed that  
“defense contracts [could be used] to strengthen the economy as well as strengthen the 
country.”47  Within the first few months of his presidency, he increased defense spending 
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45 Preble, John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap, 134. 
46 Ibid., 7. 
47 Seymour E. Harris, “Economics of the Kennedy Years,” 65, in John F. 
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by $7.2 billion; domestic expenditures rose by only $2.3 billion. 48   Moreover, in his first 
message to Congress on defense, the president proposed an $890 million increase over 
Eisenhower’s proposed $42.9 billion defense budget for fiscal 1962, much of which 
would go toward developing Polaris, Minuteman, and Skybolt missiles.49   The spending, 
as part of a larger system of growth economics, worked.  The recession the new 
administration had been so worried about ended by February 1961 and the economy 
began a slow recovery.50 
Kennedy’s election also set a new tone for discussions of the nation’s moral 
responsibility and what kinds of citizens it would take to support those obligations.  As 
Kennedy explained in his speech accepting the 1960 Democratic nomination, “We must 
prove all over again whether this nation – or any nation so conceived – can long endure – 
whether our society –with its freedom of choice, its breadth of opportunity, its range of 
alternatives – can compete with the single-minded advance of the Communist system.”51  
The U.S. needed more than strong national defense and a thriving economy.  National 
success would stem from those things that could be obviously measured against the 
Soviet Union – GNP, unemployment rates, numbers of missiles – but also from the 
intangibles, like its commitment to freedom, liberty, and equal opportunity.  Capitalism 
and democracy had to prove that they were superior.  Poverty had to be eradicated, 
                                                
48 Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy,129. 
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Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1961. 
50 The major part of Kennedy’s economic plan was to increase economic output, 
which was accomplished through tax credits, the introduction of manpower development 
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Defense spending was a major component of this plan.  See Collins, “Growth 
Liberalism,” 18-22. 
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schooling improved, legal discrimination quashed. The “slippage” in American 
“intellectual and moral strength” had to be reversed, for only then would the newly 
emerging nations around the world legitimately turn to the United States, with its 
democratic system and talk of freedom, as an example to emulate.52 
Historians have criticized the Kennedy administration for its slow response to 
many of the pressing social problems of his presidency, especially his record on civil 
rights, but poverty was of early concern to the president.53  Conditions he encountered on 
campaign trips to Appalachia disturbed him, and he worried that “the blight of West 
Virginia” would spread across the country.54  The issue became more visible in policy 
circles with the publication and success of Michael Harrington’s The Other America in 
1962 and a 1963 New York Times article on Kentucky coal miners that launched an 
occasional series on American poverty.55  According to Harrington, close to 50 million 
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people, almost one quarter of the population lived below the poverty line, trapped in a 
“culture of poverty,” characterized by poor education, poor healthcare, poor housing, 
poor nutrition, few jobs, and structural discrimination that had led to political 
powerlessness and general hopelessness.56   
This situation rankled members of Kennedy’s administration, especially Heller, 
but also Robert Lampman, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers; Wilber 
Cohen of HEW; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Assistant Secretary of Labor; Kennedy’s 
Special Counsel and Adviser, Theodore Sorenson; and William Cannon of the Bureau of 
the Budget.  Together, they started a Saturday morning discussion group that soon 
became the Interagency Task Force on Poverty.57  This group generated the idea of using 
the government to spur community action programs, an initiative that would become one 
of the core features of Johnson’s War on Poverty.  More immediately, Kennedy’s 
domestic agenda came to focus on rehabilitation of particularly depressed areas, 
educational reforms, aid to senior citizens, job training, and remediation of the particular 
problems faced by the nation’s youth.58   
                                                                                                                                            
Unintended Consequences of Liberal Reform (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005). 
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58 Kennedy had difficulty passing bills designed guarantee more workers a 
minimum wage, increase federal aid to public education, and extend medical insurance to 
the elderly.  However, he was able to get the Area Redevelopment Act, which targeted 
depressed areas for economic and industrial development, and a Housing Act, to extend 
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One of the areas that the administration zeroed in on was the military rejection 
rate. The Interdepartmental Committee for Children and Youth, a task force charged with 
following up on the recommendations of the 1960 White House Conference on Children 
and Youth, began to examine the issue in 1961.  It worried that men who were turned 
away when they tried to enlist because they could not meet the military’s minimum 
qualifications would be damaged emotionally, economically, and socially.59  The Social 
Security Administration, meanwhile, with the cooperation of the Selective Service, also 
began investigating how 40,000 men rejected from military service for illiteracy had 
fared over past decade.  By examining Baltimore’s Old-Age, Disability, and Insurance 
(OASDI) records, the Administration hoped to determine the rejectees’ economic and 
social standing, working on the assumption that those who had been turned away would 
be poorer, on average.60   
But it was a memo sent by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz to Kennedy that 
truly made the plight of military rejectees a national issue.  Wirtz sent Kennedy the memo 
in early September 1963, following a report by the President’s Committee on Youth 
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Employment, explaining that close to one quarter of all men failed their induction exams 
for “mental reasons,” meaning they scored too low on the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT).61  To Wirtz, such a high rate of failure on the test, which measured basic 
literacy, mathematics, spatial relations and mechanical skills rather than IQ, was 
indicative of a much larger social problem.  He estimated that little more than ten percent 
of those rejected were, “in fact mentally retarded.”  Instead, these results indicated that 
schools were failing American students, especially African Americans, who failed at a 
rate more than three times higher than that of white men. Wirtz called the failure rate a 
“national disgrace,” and pointed out that men rejected from military service frequently 
became “a long-run burden to their communities” because they spent years “drifting.” 
Their poor educations and low skill levels, which according to the test were not even at a 
seventh-grade level, often kept them from contributing meaningfully by holding a job and 
earning a living.  Moreover, he pointed to the Selective Service as an “incomparable 
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asset” in locating the “25% or more” of the population that would “unquestionably cause 
75% or more” of the nation’s “social and economic problems.”62  
As a result of Wirtz’s proposal, Kennedy officially established the President’s 
Task Force on Manpower Conservation on September 30, 1963.  The study group, 
chaired by Wirtz and composed of Hershey, McNamara and HEW Secretary Anthony J. 
Celebrezze, was charged with examining why close to fifty percent of all men called in 
the draft failed their preinduction exams either for physical or mental reasons and with 
proposing solutions.63  In his statement, Kennedy repeated Wirtz’s warnings that such 
high failure rates portended a social and economic crisis.  “A young man who does not 
have what it takes to perform military service,” he fretted, “is not likely to have what it 
takes to make a living. Today's military rejects include tomorrow's hard core 
unemployed.”64  The media agreed that something had to change.  The Boston Globe 
called the rejection rate “dismal” and a “crisis.”65  The Hartford Courant termed it 
“ominous.”66   
During the Kennedy era, therefore, fitness, the economy, and national security 
became inextricably linked.  Men who could not serve the military could not advance 
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America’s economic position, creating a double burden for the nation as it struggled to 
stay ahead of the Soviet Union.  In Kennedy’s words, “Softness on the part of individual 
citizens…strip[ped] and destroy[ed] the vitality of a nation.”  Unfitness, posed “a menace 
to… security” by keeping men from physically fighting the enemy with the necessary 
vigor and threatening “the activities of peace” as well as “those of war.”67  
* * * * * 
 In January 1964, the President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation issued its 
report, One-Third of a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military 
Service.  Through a study of statistics provided by the Department of Defense and 
Selective Service, the task force confirmed the earlier finding that almost fifty percent of 
draftees failed their preinduction exams and approximately one-third of all young men 
turning eighteen could not qualify for military service.68   
Members found that of the men who failed for physical reasons, 75 percent could 
benefit from medical treatment.  They acknowledged that some of the conditions 
considered defects by the armed forces, including not meeting height requirements, 
would not be considered problematic in the civilian sector, but they argued that most of 
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the men who failed could live fuller lives if they received help.  Ten percent of the 
rejectees had conditions, including tuberculosis, syphilis, hernias, and cleft palates, that 
could be cured completely.  Another 20 percent could achieve significant relief from 
conditions like epilepsy, asthma, and heart disease with significant treatment.  Amputees, 
the partially deaf, and other men who could benefit from long-term medical service, 
constituted another 25 percent of the physical rejectees.69  These findings indicated a 
deficiency in the nation’s health system.  Men who should have known of their 
infirmities frequently did not, possibly signaling inadequate access to health care, and 
many of those who knew could not afford services. 
More disturbingly, the data on men who failed their aptitude tests combined with 
the results of a nation-wide survey of 2,500 recent rejectees indicated disturbing 
geographic variability and that mental rejectees were overwhelmingly from backgrounds 
of poverty.  While fewer than five percent of men from states like Minnesota, Utah, 
Montana, and Vermont failed mental aptitude tests, the rate was higher than 30 percent in 
all of the southeastern states, topping out at over 50 percent in Mississippi and South 
Carolina.70 Four out of five of the men surveyed had dropped out of school, and only 75 
percent had finished elementary school, compared to 95 percent of all American men 
between the ages of 20 and 24.71  The report estimated that the unemployment rate for 
these men was four times the national average and their poverty rate was at least twice 
that of the rest of the country.72   The men who failed their induction or preinduction 
exams had poor access to decent schools and health care.  More than half of their fathers 
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had never finished eighth grade, and only 20 percent of their fathers were skilled workers.  
The rest were either unemployed, or employed in agricultural, unskilled or semiskilled 
jobs, all of which meant that the rejectees’ families overwhelmingly lived in poverty.73  
One-fifth of the rejectees’ families had received public assistance in the previous five 
years, when on average, only 4.2 percent of children in the U.S. received benefits from 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.  One-third of the men came from 
broken homes.74  One-Third of a Nation was a striking indictment of many American 
institutions: the health care system, schools, and economic safety net.   
The results also indicated the particularly difficult time faced by African 
American men.  Black rejectees had completed more years of schooling than their white 
counterparts, were more likely to have dropped out in order to support their families, and 
yet were more likely to fail the mental aptitude tests, illustrating both their dire economic 
straights and the especially poor quality of their often segregated schools.75  On average, 
they were more likely to be unemployed, and those who did work earned more than 
$1000 less per year than the national average and more than $600 less than the white 
rejectees.76   
The report pointed out that many of the rejectees, both black and white, had 
already been in the labor force for many years.  They had dropped out of school at a 
young age and they worked “in jobs which offered little or no advancement opportunities 
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and which could be filled by persons with a minimum of education and training.”  
Therefore, it was “difficult to envisage these jobs making it possible for them to save for 
contingencies, and to raise families in a manner that would permit their sons and 
daughters to do better.”77  Thus, they had been born into poverty and were likely to pass 
that poverty on to their children.  They were trapped in a vicious cycle.  As Wirtz wrote 
in his letter of transmittal to the President, “Far too many of these young men have 
missed out on the American miracle.  This level of failure stands as a symbol of the 
unfinished business of the Nation.”78 
Yet, explained the report, America’s business could be completed.  Eighty percent 
of the mental rejectees surveyed claimed that they would participate in programs offering 
job training and/or basic educational skills.  African Americans were even more eager for 
remediation, with over 90 percent asking for such services.79  And members of the task 
force felt that it was high time that the United States offered help to these men.  “The 
profile of the medical and mental rejectee that has emerged from the studies,” they wrote, 
“leaves no question as to where the national interest lies in this situation.”  Both “national 
defense” and “national welfare…clearly require[d] that a conservation program be 
undertaken by the Federal Government, with the fullest possible cooperation of State and 
local bodies.”80 
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79 President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation, One-Third of a Nation:A 
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The task force recommended taking several steps in order to maximize 
rehabilitation opportunities.  First, members suggested that all men be fully examined and 
appropriately classified at age 18, when they first registered with the Selective Service, so 
that defects could be identified and services rendered earlier.  Second, they wanted AFES 
personnel to apprise all rejectees of why they had failed their preinduction exam rather 
than simply tell them that they were not fit for military service.  Third, they 
recommended that units within the Departments of Labor and HEW coordinate to create 
referral programs whereby rejectees could be sent, on a voluntary basis, for appropriate 
help within their home communities.  This would particularly affect the Public Health 
Service, Office of Education, Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, and Welfare 
Administration in HEW and the Manpower Administration and Bureau of Employment 
Services in the Department of Labor.  Together, these offices could create “a systematic 
program of experimental and demonstration projects…to develop new techniques for 
diagnostic testing, basic education, vocational and psychological counseling and methods 
for motivating rejectees.”81  Fourth, they advocated the creation of Manpower 
Development and Training Advisory Committees consisting of representatives from local 
Selective Service boards and members of local educational and welfare organizations that 
could “assume leadership in organizing community action to work with young men 
rejected for military service.”82 
According to the task force members, one of the main advantages of these 
recommendations was that they could all be carried out through programs that already 
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existed or that were pending before Congress.83  No new legislation would be required, 
and additional expenditures would be relatively low.  Yet, they explained, “When…the 
program is in full operation, the additional investment in human resources will be repaid 
many times in higher tax revenues flowing from rejectees who will be working at higher 
wage levels, and in lower welfare and social costs to the Nation resulting from their 
rehabilitation.”84  In other words, a minor financial outlay now would be paid back many 
times over in the future, as it would enable this huge group of men – estimated to 
approach 600,000 per year by 1965 – to “become effective citizens and self-supporting 
individuals.”85 
One-Third of a Nation was significant for several reasons.  President Lyndon 
Johnson used its release to fire one of the opening salvos in his War on Poverty, and its 
findings added evidence to the argument that such a war was necessary.86  But it was also 
noteworthy because it proposed using the military system to identify and remedy social 
problems.  It signaled a new concern on the part of the military establishment – including 
the Selective Service, the director of which was on the task force – with poverty.  Any 
new rehabilitation programs that stemmed from the report would use an infrastructure 
designed to procure military manpower to prepare men for full economic citizenship as 
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civilians rather than to be soldiers.  The resources of the Selective Service and the 
Department of the Army, which administered the AFQT and ran the AFES, would be 
diverted toward the new War on Poverty. 
Equally important, the report established the problem of poverty as distinctly 
male. It identified the AFQT as the most efficient available means to identify those 
Americans who could most benefit from rehabilitation because the test was the only 
“major post-school examination” administered in the United States.87  While the report 
admitted that more Americans than those who failed induction exams could use 
government services, it singled out military rejectees as those “most in need.”88  Only 
men took the exam, meaning any programs stemming from the test’s failure would be 
open only to men.  No equivalent test would be used to locate women with physical and 
educational deficiencies.  The report’s authors assumed that offering remediation to men 
would uplift women and children too, illustrating how ingrained was the notion that 
breadwinning was a masculine responsibility.  Full participation in the workforce 
remained a male prerogative.89 
* * * * * 
 Johnson took the findings of One-Third of a Nation seriously.  On January 5, 
1964, less than two months after taking office, he ordered the Selective Service and the 
Department of the Army to make plans to examine young men as close to their eighteenth 
birthdays as practicable. He also asked the agencies of the federal government to examine 
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the problem and develop programs designed to rehabilitate those men who failed.90  The 
explicit purpose of such rehabilitation was to outfit men with the skills they would need 
in order to get and hold a job in the civilian sector.  While it was never specifically stated, 
however, men whose health improved as a result of treatment would be reclassified as 
eligible for service.91 While several agencies had been studying the issue already, 
discussion within the Selective Service, HEW, and the Department of Labor stepped up 
after Johnson’s announcement.  Officials of these agencies founded an Interdepartmental 
Task Force on Selective Service Rejectees to coordinate proposals and programs.92  By 
July 1, when 18-year-olds started to be called for their preinduction exams, a national 
referral program through the Department of Labor had already been in operation for five 
months.  It was, according to Wirtz, “the most important human salvage program in the 
history” of the United States.93 
 The new program had its precursors in a pilot initiative conducted by the Public 
Health Service in Philadelphia, New York, and Denver in 1961 that had been based on 
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the earlier “explorations” of the ICCY.94  These three demonstration projects referred 
men rejected from the military for physical and psychiatric reasons to local social 
services, including vocational rehabilitation offices, hospitals, and universities.  In the 
second half of 1963, units within the Department of Labor and HEW started discussing 
plans to widen referrals to men who failed mental aptitude tests as well.  One proposal, 
stemming from the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration in HEW, suggested placing 
demonstration projects in Appalachia, where there were “larger numbers of school 
dropouts, culturally deprived youth, and underdeveloped human resources.”95  Even 
before the report of the President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation issued its 
report, therefore, military rejection was understood as a problem of the poor and 
rehabilitation programs as a possible remedy for structural poverty in the United States. 
 In February 1964, the Department of Labor, with the cooperation of HEW, the 
Selective Service, and state and local agencies, launched the first phase of a national 
rehabilitation project for men who failed the AFQT.  It was aimed at the estimated 63,000 
unemployed and underemployed men who the Department expected to be rejected from 
the military because of educational deficiencies between February 1 and June 30, 1964.  
Officials planned to add 18-year-olds to the target population once AFES started 
                                                
94 National Committee for Children and Youth, Experimental and Demonstration 
Manpower Project for Recruitment, Training, Placement, and Followup of Rejected 
Armed Forces Volunteers in Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C.: Final Report, 
2; Rehabilitation of Physically Rejected Registrants, December 13, 1961, Interoffice 
memos (Admin Corres.) 1958, box 109, Selective Service System, Training and 
Conference Files, Inter Office memos to Conference Three, Entry UD 20, Training and 
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95 Proposed Demonstration Projects: vocational Rehabiliation of Disabled Persons 
who are Disqualified for Military service, n.d. attached to Memo card, Miss Switzer to 
Mr. Nestingen, 12-3-63, and attachments, Selective Service Rejectees, Box 2, entry UD-
UP 3, RG 235, NARA. 
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examining them, as per Johnson’s order.  Finally, they hoped to begin working through 
the backlog of 3.5 million men between the ages of 18 and 26 who had been rejected 
prior to February 1964.96  Local draft boards were asked to “encourage all educationally 
deficient rejectees,” whether employed or not, to report to public employment service 
offices, where they would be further evaluated to determine which services would be 
most beneficial.  Men in the program were to “receive intensive counseling, testing, job 
development, and referrals,” with a special emphasis on employment counseling.97  By 
early March, the Department of Labor had the cooperation of the related state agencies in 
all states except Louisiana, which came on board that summer.98 
 At the same time, however, HEW and the Department of Labor began to look for 
more efficient methods to refer men to available services. In mid-February, they 
experimented with a joint program in Salt Lake City, Utah.  Rather than rely on local 
boards to notify men via letter, the Public Health Service, Vocational Rehabilitation 
Administration, and Bureau of Employment Services all stationed counselors directly at 
the Salt Lake induction center.  Counseling personnel could contact rejectees 
immediately and in person and then conduct follow-up interviews at a later date.  The 
pilot program proved such a success, with 100 percent of rejected men volunteering to 
                                                
96 John F. Henning to Ivan A. Nestingen, February 19, 1964, attached to Ivan A. 
Nestingen to John F. Henning, March 20, 1964, ibid.. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and Department of Labor 
Coordinating Committee Meeting, March 2, 1964, MDTA-DHEW-Labor Coordinating 
Committee (Minutes of Meetings), box 4, ibid. 
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participate in follow-up services, that the model was extended to Detroit, Newark, 
Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, New Haven, and Columbia, South Carolina.99 
 Regardless of how men were identified, the process of finding them, notifying 
them, and referring them to appropriate services was an immense undertaking.  It 
involved the coordination of multiple national and state level offices.  Clients for the new 
programs were to be identified through the Selective Service, which was responsible for 
issuing preinduction notices and forwarding men along to AFES for examination. The 
Department of the Army conducted physical examinations and administered the AFQT.  
In general, HEW was to handle programs for men who were rejected for physical reasons 
through its Vocational Rehabilitation Administration and the Public Health Service.  The 
Department of Labor was to handle men who were rejected for mental reasons, primarily 
through its Bureau of Employment Services.  There was considerable overlap in goals, 
however, so care had to be taken to avoid redundancies.  Moreover, local programs were 
funded through grants from the national offices, but administered on the state and local 
levels.  So, for example, in 1965, Rhode Island’s AFES hosted four “overlapping 
programs” at the same time: a Public Health Service health referral program, a national 
study of mental rejectees conducted by the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, a 
Rhode Island Department of Educational Services training and placement program, and a 
state-administered Department of Vocational Research demonstration project.  This last 
initiative, designed to “immediately expand the range” of VR services available to 
rejectees, “facilitate early identification of medical, vocational and educational 
                                                
99 Ibid.; Minutes of DHEW-BES-OMAT Coordinating Committee Meeting, 
March 16, 1964, MDTA-DHEW-Labor Coordinating Committee (Minutes of Meetings), 
box 4, ibid. 
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handicaps,” and “develop and test new techniques and contexts for rehabilitation 
counseling,” was funded by a grant from HEW’s Rehabilitation Services 
Administration.100  In other states, non-governmental institutions, including universities, 
evaluated the programs, adding another layer of bureaucracy.101 
Funding for the programs came primarily from appropriations for the 1962 
Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) and its subsequent amendments.102  
The original measure, a Kennedy initiative, was proposed as a partial solution to the 
problem of automation, which had been a subject of concern throughout the 1950s.  
Increased mechanization in a variety of fields had made many manufacturing jobs 
obsolete, leading to the layoff of large numbers of factory workers whose job skills were 
not relevant in an increasingly service-oriented economy.  According to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, white men between the ages of 25 and 54, who frequently had family 
responsibilities that prevented them from moving to find jobs, were particularly hard 
hit.103  Rising unemployment, especially among breadwinners, was seen as problematic 
because it strained the economy, but also because it prevented the United States from 
living up to its full potential as a world power.  As early as 1955, Secretary of Labor 
                                                
100 Rhode Island Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, “Why I-Y: A Research 
Study of the Rehabilitation of Selective Service Rejectees in Rhode Island,” 1967, 2, 5. 
101 In Tennessee, for example, the Tennessee State Department of Vocational 
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103 Kremen, “MDTA.” 
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James P. Mitchell had warned, “The United States’ margin of advantage in the Cold War 
is slipping.”  The only prevention was a program to “develop and use” the nation’s 
skills.104 
As passed in 1962, the MDTA provided funds through both the Department of 
Labor and HEW for institutional and on-the-job training. HEW was responsible for 
disbursing funds to state vocational agencies, but the Department of Labor had to approve 
individual programs and paid weekly allowances to participants.  The law required 
participants to be unemployed, male, heads-of-household with prior work experience, as 
its original purpose was to retrain redundant workers, allowing them to succeed in new 
types of employment and therefore better their families. The legislation assumed that men 
were most able to accomplish this goal of full economic participation for families.105 In 
1963, the law was amended to allow anyone from families where the primary male 
breadwinner was unemployed to participate and lowered the minimum age of participants 
from 19 to 17.106  With these changes, Selective Service rejectees, who generally did not 
yet have dependents, could take part.107 
The Selective Service and AFES examinations, therefore, became one of the 
major sources of participants for all MDTA programs by 1964.108  Once men received 
                                                
104 National Manpower Council, Improving Work Skills of the Nation: 
Proceedings of a Conference on Skilled Manpower (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1955), 149, as quoted in Kremen, “MDTA.” 
105 The Impact of Federal Antipoverty Policies, 32. 
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19, 1963.  Women could also take part in the program, but the vast majority of clients 
continued to be men. 
107 U.S. House of Representatives,  Amendments of Manpower Development and 
Training Act of 1962, H. Rpt. 861, 88th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 1963, 1-3.  
108 Under the 1963 amendments to the MDTA, up to 25 percent of all men 
receiving literacy or occupational skills training could be under the age of 22.  Most other 
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their referrals from either their local boards or from counselors at AFES stations, they 
were funneled into programs that served other youth as well.  HEW and Labor officials 
hoped such training would create “new attitudes in families of the underprivileged.”  Men 
who failed the military entrance exams were seen as a particularly rich source of 
candidates because, as One-Third of a Nation indicated, they were likely to be poor and 
they were all men.  Even after the MDTA was amended, its primary aim remained to lift 
all Americans out of poverty by providing services to current and future heads-of-
household.  As HEW’s 1965 report on the status of the program explained, “A new home 
and orientation comes to an entire household when its head finds a way to break through 
the self-perpetuating cycle of poverty and deprivation that comes from lack of skill.”  Job 
training, therefore was the best way to encourage both self-respect and economic 
citizenship.  “To feed, clothe, and house himself and his family – to have the material 
base of dignity – a man must have the opportunity to work,” claimed HEW.109 
The results of the referral programs were mixed.  Without question, they offered 
services and opportunities otherwise unavailable to many men rejected from the military.  
Job training, literacy classes, and referrals for medical treatment no doubt altered the 
course of some men’s lives.  The National Committee for Children and Youth (NCCY), 
an organization that provided rehabilitation service to men who had tried to volunteer for 
military service but who had been rejected, for example, crowed about its successes in 
                                                                                                                                            
clients of MDTA programs were identified after they voluntarily registered with local 
Employment Service offices.  See Institute of Management and Labor Relations, The 
Selection of Trainees under MDTA, Rutgers University, 1966, 2. 
109 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Education and Training: 
The Bridge Between Man and His Work: Third Annual Report of the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to the Congress on Training Activities Under the Manpower 
Development and Training Act, April 1, 1965, x, 2. 
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Washington, D.C. and Baltimore.  It declared its final report in 1967, “a valedictory.”  
The report used case studies to illustrate the life-changing effects of the program.  
Clorester W., Sandy Z, Stephen J., Michael E., Larry W., Larry T., and Larry P. – all 
from poor or working-class families and all either high school dropouts or experiencing 
significant academic delay – managed to pass the Armed Forces entrance exams after 
receiving intensive literacy and numeracy tutoring through the NCCY.  As a result of 
these successes, Clorester became “a very happy young man,” Michael “achieved his 
ultimate goal,” Larry W. was “very proud,” and Larry T. would be able to “work as a 
motor mechanic” after discharge.  The NCCY had seen such success in its three years of 
operation that it had expanded its program to Chicago, St. Louis, San Antonio, Los 
Angeles, and Rochester, N.Y. and was poised to make the entire program permanent 
through the Bureau of Employment Services in the Department of Labor.110  The NCCY 
program was unique, however, in that it was open only to men who had failed their 
entrance exams after volunteering for enlistment.  Participants had not been identified 
through the draft, so they were particularly motivated to raise their test scores in order to 
enter the military.   
Other demonstration projects proved less attractive to the men they were intended 
to help.  The Department of Labor had originally estimated that it would be able to help 
approximately one half of all rejectees, but the results of pilot programs in several states 
                                                
110 National Committee for Children and Youth, NCCY Youth Services Project: 
Final Report to the Office of Manpower Policy, Evaluation and Research, United States 
Department of Labor, 1967, v, 75-81.  Quotes, pp. v., 76, 78, 79, 81. 
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fell well short of the half-way mark.111  A vocational rehabilitation program at the Rhode 
Island AFES found that only 12.7 percent of the men rejected for military service were 
eligible for VR services, and of those, only about 2/3 accepted the proffered help.  In 
total, only 417 of the 8,824 men rejected by the Rhode Island AFES between January 
1965 and May 1967 accepted services.112  The results of a pilot study in South Carolina 
were no better.  This project, which centered on the five counties around the AFES at 
Fort Jackson, offered physical rehabilitation in addition to VR services, yet in the three 
years of its existence, only 7.7 percent of the total number of men rejected, or 165 men, 
were accepted for services, and of these, only 112 accepted help.113  These numbers were 
particularly dismal given that the program offered hospital care, including surgery when 
needed.114  Moreover, South Carolina, which rejected close to 66 percent of its potential 
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draftees as compared to Rhode Island’s 35 percent, was seen as one of the major potential 
beneficiaries of the national initiative.115 
The two studies listed several reasons for men’s failure to participate, including 
poor communication between counselors and potential clients and staffing deficiencies, 
but the major, overarching problem identified by both was the fact that the programs 
were tied to military service.  Correcting their defects would have made the men eligible 
to be drafted. Both programs spanned the years of major escalation of the Vietnam War.  
Men who were found acceptable for military service, especially through the draft rather 
than enlistment, were highly likely to find themselves assigned to infantry units stationed 
in Southeast Asia.  VR personnel in South Carolina termed this threat an “intangible” that 
“pervade[d] the entire study.”  “This hypothesis,” they concluded, might “help explain 
why [53.5 %] of rejectees failed to answer the several letters sent to them by the 
Counselor-Coordinator.”116  Rhode Island researchers similarly believed the “loss of 
about one in three between screening and actual service would not be expected to be as 
large if the examining program was a routine one without relationship to military 
induction.”  The report emphasized, “Many [men] preferred to retain their disability 
rather than risk later military induction by undergoing corrective treatment.”117   
A third project, a health referral program in Tennessee with similarly poor 
participation rates, denied that the draft had anything to do with men’s failure to accept 
services.  One of its counselors concluded, however, “The program would be much more 
                                                                                                                                            
Carolina report, 56 of the men who accepted any type of treatment were black and 56 
were white.  See ibid., 30. 
115 Ibid., forward; “Why I-Y,” 8-9. 
116 The Unfit Majority, 33. 
117 “Why I-Y,” 10, 31. 
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effective if the counselors could be located somewhere completely independent of the 
examining station.  The majority of the boys…are either…elated to have been rejected, or 
terribly frightened.”118  He did not elaborate on why the men were happy following their 
rejections, but it is fair to assume that the fact that they could no longer be compelled to 
serve in Vietnam was at least part of the answer. 
The war affected these programs in other ways as well.  As it escalated, AFES 
stopped examining men as they turned 18, focusing instead on evaluating the men who 
faced immediate induction.  Between July 1964, when the Army first started examining 
18-year-olds, and January 1965, AFES evaluated an average of 30,000 of these men per 
month, in addition to the usual load of men about to enlist or be conscripted.  In 
September 1965, after all of the service branches began to use to Selective Service to fill 
their ranks, AFES examined only 11,953 18-year-olds.119  By January 1966, the number 
had dropped so low that Selective Service, which since mid-1964 had published a 
monthly article featuring the number of 18-year-olds the system examined, ceased 
running the column.  Examination stations were too busy inducting soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and marines to be able to devote extra resources to the War on Poverty.  Older 
men who failed their AFQT’s continued to be referred to pilot programs for another two 
years, but it appears that funding for this particular Great Society initiative petered out 
after 1968. 
                                                
118 The Tennessee program, which operated at the AFES stations near Memphis, 
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Nevertheless, these referral programs are important.  First, the failure of men to 
participate in them, especially during wartime, indicates that many of the targeted men 
were not all that eager to serve in the military, even if they could have learned job skills 
or gained free medical care along the way.  They did not want to qualify for military 
service.  Whatever they felt their obligations were as citizens or as men – supporting their 
families, defending their nation, or something else – survival took precedence.  These 
men, who were overwhelmingly from poor and minority backgrounds, joined the college-
educated of their age cohort in looking for ways to avoid military service.120 
Second, these programs illustrate the military establishment’s willingness to 
participate in social welfare programs at a moment when domestic issues were of 
paramount importance to the rest of the policy community.  The Department of Defense 
and Selective Service System, as members of that community, reflected the values of the 
day.  In that regard, they came to focus on helping men achieve full economic citizenship.  
They committed resources to help other federal agencies train the nation’s least 
privileged men to become breadwinners.  Developing domestic strength through a strong 
economy and full employment became a goal of national defense alongside the projection 
of military might – at least until the Vietnam War eclipsed the Great Society as the 
primary priority of the Johnson administration.   
* * * * * 
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As might be imagined, Hershey involved himself in the discourse on physical 
fitness, national security, and service to the state from the beginning.  He sincerely 
believed that disqualifying a man from military service did both the man and the nation a 
disservice.  By declaring a registrant IV-F (unfit for service), he wrote, “the Government 
gives him some evidence from which he can infer that he is relieved from further 
obligation to serve his Government in the Armed Forces,” a patent fallacy in Hershey’s 
civic-republican philosophy of citizenship.121  Eliminating a man from the manpower 
pool as a result of remediable defects robbed him of the “self confidence and vigor” that 
would follow from full participation in the military and robbed the government of that 
man’s possible defense contributions.122  The problem of unfitness, both physical and 
mental, therefore, was of the utmost concern to the Selective Service. 
Hershey supported Eisenhower’s goals for the PCYF.  “It behooves us to 
eradicate those conditions which make the United States less effectual in peace or in 
war,” he told a 1956 meeting of the President’s Conference on the Fitness of American 
Youth in Annapolis, Maryland.  “It is not enough that a schoolboy should be taught to 
arise and salute the flag but he should be taught that he must be physically and mentally 
capable of service to the flag which cannot be satisfied with a salute.”  In order to 
accomplish this goal, Hershey lobbied for the creation of “facilities available to everyone 
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for the correction of correctable defects,” for it was the “responsibility of the lower 
echelons of Government to assist the needy citizen.”123  
When Kennedy and then Johnson asked him to take part in the War on Poverty, 
Hershey threw the full weight of his agency behind the initiative.  He sat on the 
President’s Task Force for Manpower Conservation and fully endorsed the committee’s 
findings.  He lent the resources of the Selective Service to the referral program for 18-
year-olds, appearing before Congress in the fall of 1964 to ask for supplemental 
appropriations in order to complete the task.124  He highlighted the Selective Service’s 
role in the War on Poverty at the 1965 annual meeting of state directors and the bi-annual 
regional conferences for reserve officers attached to the agency, going so far as to require 
personnel to attend lectures by officials with the Office of Economic Opportunity, HEW, 
and the Department of Labor.125  When Johnson asked Hershey to sit on the President’s 
Committee on Manpower and the Economic Opportunity Council, he readily agreed.126  
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Space Administration; and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission.  See 
 274 
As a member of the latter group, he solicited suggestions from the entire Selective 
Service System on how to best meet the problem of poverty, writing an article in 
Selective Service, mailing a letter directly to the reserve officers assigned to the agency, 
and issuing a State Director Advice memo.  Within two months, he had already heard 
from 70 of the 134 Reserve and National Guard units attached to the Selective Service 
and from local boards and state offices across the country.127   
Hershey also proudly described the agency’s other contributions.  By March 
1965, it had established a library of reference material on poverty at national 
headquarters; “classified, sent for physical examination, and referred as appropriate to the 
Department of Labor for counseling” approximately 80,000 18-year-olds; sent letters 
referring another 250,000 older registrants to rehabilitation services; participated in at 
least 20 pilot programs through AFES; put fliers from the newly created Job Corps in 
over 4,000 local boards; and discussed deferment options with representatives of the 
Volunteers in Service for America (VISTA) program.  Moreover, many State Directors 
had joined advisory committees on the state level.128  The agency took part in the Youth 
Opportunity Program to offer summer jobs to disadvantaged youth.129  Hershey wanted 
his agency to be front and center in the War on Poverty. 
Hershey’s biographer, George Q. Flynn, argued that as a “conservative 
Republican,” Hershey “was uncomfortable serving as an agent of social reform,” and 
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implied that Hershey participated in Great Society programs in order to keep his agency 
politically relevant.130  Such an interpretation, however, overlooks the implications of 
Hershey’s civic republican mindset.  Hershey strongly believed that service to the state 
was every male citizen’s responsibility, but as shown in chapter three, his definition of 
“service” evolved through the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Military service was best, but 
in a technological age when nuclear war threatened the nation’s survival, men could serve 
the state through their occupational choices.  Scientists and engineers were vital, as was a 
successful educational system to train them.  The U.S. also needed a strong economic 
base and a functioning civil defense structure.  These needs could only be met with a 
healthy, educated civilian populace.  As he told the readers of Selective Service, ensuring 
national success was a task “far too big for anything less than a combined coordinated 
drive by…government at all levels and nongovernment at all levels, and citizens 
everywhere” to help the nation’s “youth so they [could] help themselves.”  The Cold War 
could not be won unless all young men came “to accept the full responsibilities of 
American citizenship,” including “the will to work” and “confidence that the Nation 
[was] worth the best they [could] give.”  “It must be realized by us all,” he exhorted his 
readership, “that our very survival is at stake.  The responsibilities [of citizenship] must 
be shared by all.  The burden is too heavy for the few.”131  Training men for national 
defense, whatever form that defense took, was an obligation of the federal government, 
even if that meant a war on poverty.  By defining social welfare as a security issue, the 
Republican Hershey was able to support a Democratic president’s initiatives.  Indeed, 
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growth of the federal government in the name of defense was a hallmark of the Cold War 
era Republican Party.132 
As part of his crusade to make civilians understand their responsibility to the 
nation, Hershey campaigned for a new system of classification that would shift those men 
whose physical or mental condition could allow them to participate in civil defense, if not 
the armed forces, into a separate category of call.  He believed this new rating would  
“tell a young man what he [could] do rather than give him basis for believing that he 
[could] … escape his obligations because of his unacceptability.”133 Hershey introduced 
the idea as early as 1956 and finally succeeded in January 1962, when the I-Y category 
was added to the Selective Service classification system.  It encompassed all men with 
minor physical defects and those who did not meet the heightened mental standards of 
peacetime but who would have qualified for military service under wartime standards. 
Approximately forty percent of the men who had previously failed their pre-induction 
exams were moved from the IV-F category into the new I-Y classification.134  By early 
1964, approximately 100,000 new I-Y men were being added to the manpower pool each 
year.135 
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Early in 1964, in keeping with his desire to use the armed forces to improve 
American men, Hershey proposed inducting I-Y men into the military for two-year terms, 
during which time they could be offered basic literacy courses, receive corrective medical 
care, and be trained in “teamwork and responsible citizenship,” all “without 
overemphasis on military training.”  After the initial term of enlistment ended, he 
proposed that they be transferred into the Reserves, a move that would have the added 
benefit of bolstering reserve programs with extra men each year.136  Secretary of Labor 
Wirtz, and Dr. Stafford Warren, Kennedy’s Assistant to the President for Mental 
Retardation, had proposed a similar “para-military” program a few months earlier as they 
discussed rehabilitation options for military rejectees.  Even the Commissioner of the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, Mary Switzer, thought this a policy decision 
that “should be considered most carefully,” as the military had the camps, personnel, and 
“vast training experience,” necessary for such an endeavor.137  By the second half of the 
1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara had picked up on the proposal. 
* * * * * 
Aside from propagating the Vietnam War, former Ford executive McNamara was 
probably best known within the Department of Defense for bringing to the Pentagon 
modern management techniques, including computerized data collection and top-down 
leadership.138  But he was also committed to using the resources of the Defense 
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Department to achieve social aims. Writing in 1968, as he left office, he explained, “the 
Department’s primary role of combat readiness is fully consistent with innovative 
programs designed to utilize…its potential for significantly contributing to the solution of 
the nation’s social problems.”139  Within three years of his appointment, he had “actively 
committed the huge defense complex to the struggle against domestic social problems,” 
based on the conviction that the nation’s security lay “not solely or even primarily in 
military force, but equally in developing stable patterns of economic and political growth 
both at home and in the developing nations throughout the world.”  In the end, he argued, 
“poverty and social injustice  …endanger[ed]… national security as much as any military 
threat.”140 
Based on this belief, McNamara initiated a new battle in the War on Poverty in 
August 1964.  Borrowing from Wirtz and Hershey’s ideas, he proposed a new Special 
Training and Enlistment Program (STEP) to be run through the Army at Fort Leonard 
Wood in Missouri.  It would allow up to 10,000 volunteers per year who would otherwise 
be ineligible for military service to choose to have their period of basic training stretched 
from the usual eight weeks to 14 as a condition for acceptance into the armed forces.  The 
extended training interval would include basic instruction in English, math, social studies 
and science.  Soldiers who, after that time, still could not achieve a passing score on the 
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AFQT would also receive special classes during their advanced individual training. Those 
with medical defects, including men who were over or underweight would receive 
specialized medical attention.  If, after their training, Army officials deemed individual 
STEP men acceptable for service, they would finish their enlistments as privates.  If not, 
they would be discharged as veterans without penalty.141   
Johnson supported the plan wholeheartedly as another way to solve the problem 
of youth unemployment, telling his Secretary of Defense that McNamara could “do it 
better than the social scientists.”  McNamara, however, faced opposition from the Army, 
which regarded STEP as a plan to turn its training posts into “moron camps,” and from 
Congress.142  Georgia Democrat, Senator Richard B. Russell, the Chair of the 
Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was particularly 
opposed, as he feared the induction of large numbers of southern African Americans.143  
Russell worried about the harm that would ensue to the Southern economy if too many 
black agricultural workers were removed from farms through induction.  He also believed 
that arming black men was dangerous.  Although requests for supplemental 
appropriations for the program passed the House, they failed in the Senate, amidst 
worries that STEP would duplicate the purpose of the Selective Service referral program 
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and skepticism that the military was the proper venue for social programs.144 Ultimately, 
Congress banned the Department of Defense from using any of its fiscal 1966 or 1967 
budgets to finance the program.145 
McNamara, however, continued to look for a way around congressional strictures.  
He firmly believed that military service could benefit the nation’s disadvantaged.  He 
argued that a stint in the armed forces could offer “the hapless and hopeless victims of 
poverty….a sense of personal achievement, a sense of succeeding at a task, a sense of 
their own intrinsic potential.” Military service could free them from the “squalid ghettos 
of their external environment” and the “internal and more destructive ghetto of personal 
disillusionment and despair.” Such liberation would return men to civilian life “equipped 
with new skills and attitudes” that would help them “break out of the self-perpetuating 
poverty cycle.”146 A program to rehabilitate men who had been rejected from military 
service could bolster national security by eliminating a source of social unrest and benefit 
American combat readiness by boosting the number of men in uniform.  
First, he used the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam and its attendant rise in 
draft calls to reduce induction standards for both volunteers and inductees.147  Prior to 
1965, prospective recruits needed to pass the AFQT, defined as a score over 30 out of 
100.  All men who scored between 10 and 30 were rated by the Army as Category IV and 
declared ineligible for service except during a national emergency, a standing that came 
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with a I-Y Selective Service classification.  Once the new standards were fully 
implemented in 1966, high Category IV men who scored between 16 and 30 and had 
graduated from high school were admitted to the military, while those without diplomas 
were administered the Army Qualification Battery (AQB), a second set of aptitude tests.  
If they passed two of seven subject areas with scores of 90 or above, they were deemed 
eligible for service.  Men in the lower half of Category IV, those who scored between 10 
and 15 on the AFQT, also could enlist or be drafted if they scored over 90 in two AQB 
areas and scored in at least the 80th percentile on the verbal and arithmetical portions of 
the AFQT combined.148  Officials justified the reduction in standards by claiming that 
allowing more men to enlist would reduce the military’s dependency on conscription, 
since it would allow more volunteers to enlist.  This move had particularly political 
ramifications once Johnson revoked the protected status of childless married men in 
August 1965.  If more previously ineligible men were able to volunteer, fewer married 
men would have to be conscripted.149 
When McNamara learned that the Marine Corps “recycled” recruits who failed 
basic training – that is, it sent them back to the beginning to start over, rather than 
discharging them – he decided to try this process on a grander scale.150 In August 1966, 
in a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars annual convention, McNamara 
announced the Defense Department’s intention to bring up to 100,000 previously 
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ineligible men into the military each year in order to “salvage” them, “first to productive 
military careers and later for productive roles in society.”151  Project 100,000, as it came 
to be known, would “rescue” poor, and especially minority men, from the “poverty-
encrusted environments” in which they had been raised.152  This new program would 
focus on Category IV men and reduce the standards for admittance to the military even 
farther. “New Standards” men, as participants were named, were considered eligible for 
service if they had graduated high school and had AFQT scores over 10, roughly the 
equivalent of a fifth grade education.  Men who had not graduated from high school only 
had to pass one AQB rather than two if they scored between a 16 and 30 on the AFQT or 
two AQBs if their AFQT score was between 10 and 15.153  New Standards men were 
admitted into all branches of military service, both through enlistment and the draft, using 
a quota system.  Overall, an average of 22.3 percent of all new accessions into the 
military – up to 26 percent in the Army – had to be Category IV men.154  
Project 100,000 differed from the STEP proposal in a number of ways.  First, 
New Standards men were not concentrated at one particular training center.  Instead, they 
were distributed throughout the military training infrastructure, receiving their basic 
training at 18 different posts around the country.  They were assigned to advanced 
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training based on their basic training performance and interviews.  Second, they were not 
told they were part of a special program.  The Defense Department kept copious records 
on their performance and evaluated both the men and program constantly, but the men 
themselves were officially unaware of their difference from the rest of their colleagues.155  
Third, they did not receive dedicated literacy or numeracy training as STEP men would 
have.  In fact, Defense officials specifically emphasized that “Project One Hundred 
Thousand [was] not a literacy project.”156  These differences allowed the Department of 
Defense to circumvent the Congressional stipulations that forbade the use of defense 
budgets for special education programs.  The branches of service had to integrate 
enhanced training into already existent programs.157   
Moreover, McNamara wanted the program to function as a pedagogical 
laboratory. “By pruning from existing courses all nonessential information,” he explained 
to the VFW, “we have found that we can not only substantially shorten the training 
period, but…we can dramatically boost the students’ success at learning.”  Since 
traditional educational methods were “largely irrelevant to actual on-the-job performance 
requirements,” the Defense Department was experimenting with “carefully designed 
programmed instruction” to allow “the student to proceed at his own individual pace, 
rather than merely be herded along at an arbitrarily determined group pace.”158  Literacy 
training, therefore, would be folded into skills training that all trainees received, and New 
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Standards Men would be evaluated using a “job-related curriculum, practical exercises, 
modern instructional media, and performance tests.”159  Anyone who failed to perform 
adequately by the end of their period of basic training would be “recycled” back to the 
beginning to try again or sent to motivational platoons for men with disciplinary 
infractions.  The Army Directorate of Personnel Studies and Research was made 
responsible for studying the “capabilities, training needs, and uses of soldiers with low 
aptitudes.”160 
In total, all branches of service added a combined total of 354,000 New Standards 
men to their active duty rosters between 1966 and 1971, when the program ended.  
Ninety-three percent of them were defined as low-aptitude.  The rest had physical 
ailments that the program planned to remediate.161 Their demographic profile was 
striking.  Approximately half volunteered and half were drafted.162  Seventy percent came 
from backgrounds of poverty and 60 percent from single-parent families.  Less than 20 
percent had graduated high school, and 40 percent read at a sixth grade level or less.163  
More than half came from the southern states, and of these, 65% were African American. 
Overall, more than 40 percent of New Standards Men were black, at a time when only 9.1 
                                                
159 Project One Hundred Thousand, RG 330, NARA. 
160 “Army Studies Capabilities of Soldiers,” Selective Service 16 (Dec. 1966): 1. 
161 See Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Veterans’ 
Affairs Committee, Readjustment of Project 100,000 Veterans: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 
House of Representatives, Serial 101-38, 101st Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 1990, 1. 
162 Lisa Hsiao, “Project 100,000: The Great Society’s Answer to Military 
Manpower Needs in Vietnam,” Vietnam Generation 1, no. 2 (spring 1989): 16. 
163 Lawrence M. Baskir and William Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The 
Draft, The War, and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 129. 
 285 
percent all new soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen each year were African 
American.164  
According to researchers Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, military 
recruiters specifically targeted poor, black neighborhoods to find volunteers. For 
example, of the 125 men black recruiters in Oakland, California enlisted in one year, 120 
were from poor neighborhoods, and of those, 90 percent had AFQT scores that classified 
them as Category IV.  An advertisement in Hot Rod magazine, a publication aimed at an 
urban readership, read, “Vietnam: Hot, Wet and Muddy – Here’s the place to make a 
man.”165  A high proportion of poor and black men were both expected and desired.  One 
early memo referenced the hope that Project 100,000 would be close to 60 percent 
black.166  
Supporters of Project 100,000, most notably former Assistant Secretary of Labor 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, saw the program as a savior for black men.  In his infamous 
report, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, Moynihan identified “the 
utterly masculine world” of the armed forces as a vital corrective to the “disorganized and 
matrifocal” family environment in which most young black men were raised.  “A world 
away from women…run by strong men of unquestioned authority, where discipline” was 
“harsh…but orderly and predictable” and where rewards were “granted on the basis of 
performance,” could help offset the “tangle of pathology” that imposed a “crushing 
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burden on the Negro male.”167  That 67.5 percent of black men were denied the 
opportunity to serve in the military because they could not pass entrance exams was a 
heinous situation, according to Moynihan.  High standards denied these men access to the 
G.I. Bill, federally-backed mortgages, life insurance, civil service preference, veterans 
hospitals and pensions.  Moreover, these men lost out on valuable skills training and 
employment.  In a 1966 article in New Republic, Moynihan argued that if African 
Americans served in the military in proportion to their numbers in the population and if 
the unemployment rate for young black men was correspondingly reduced, then “the 
unemployment rate for non-white males in the relevant age group [in 1964] would have 
been lower that that for whites.” In light of this, he claimed, the use of the military as “a 
socializing experience for the poor” was America’s “best hope” for “turning out equal 
citizens.”168 
On the opposite end of the political spectrum, southern congressmen lifted their 
opposition against using the armed forces for social engineering projects.  Senator 
Russell, who had prevented STEP from proceeding in 1964, now advocated the lowering 
of standards so that “damn dumb bunnies” couldn’t escape the draft.169  To these 
politicians, it was safer to send a black man to Vietnam than to leave him to the civil 
rights movement, especially as cities across the nation erupted in violence in 1967.  Local 
boards throughout the South were able to use the policy changes instituted by McNamara 
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to draft African Americans well out of proportion to their representation in the population 
as a whole, just as more men were being sent into harm’s way.170   
McNamara appears to have split the difference.  He continued to advocate the 
program as a means to offer young men educational skills and economic reward.  “If so 
massive a number of our young men were educationally unqualified for even the least 
complicated tasks of military service,” he asked the crowd at the National Association of 
Educational Broadcasters 1967 convention, “how could they reasonably be expected to 
lead productive and rewarding lives in an increasingly technological and highly-skilled 
society?”  Project 100,000 offered undereducated men “the Defense Department’s 
experience in educational innovation and on-the-job training” in an “atmosphere of high 
motivation and morale.”  But he also claimed that these men would become a danger to 
society if a solution to poverty were not found.  Without a “strong sense of their own 
worth and potential, they, their wives, and their children would almost inevitably be the 
unproductive recipients of some form of the dole 10 years from now.”  More importantly, 
he warned that “if unchecked and unreversed,” the “inner ghetto of the poverty-scarred 
personality” would “fester into explosive frustrations of bitterness and violence,” a 
meaningful reference after the wave of urban rioting that had taken place that summer.171   
The results of the program were mixed.  The Department of Defense touted its 
successes.  Approximately 96 percent of New Standards men successfully completed 
their basic training requirements, compared to a 98 percent completion rate for all those 
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who had entered the military under the earlier, higher aptitude standards.  Eighty-eight 
percent of these men completed their basic course without remediation, and of those who 
did not, most only needed two additional weeks of training.  Additionally, in the Army, 
87 percent of New Standards men who were sent for special skills training qualified for 
their specialties, compared to 92 percent of the training population as a whole.  Finally, 
after 12 to 15 months of military service, more than 90 percent received a rating of 
“excellent” in their conduct and efficiency evaluations.172  But interpreted differently, this 
meant that New Standards Men failed basic training at twice the rate of all soldiers and 
were three times more likely to need extra help.  The failure rate was also “deceptively 
low,” since the Army, which demanded less of its recruits than the other services, 
received the plurality of New Standards men.  Closer to ten percent of the first group 
Project 100,000 airmen couldn’t pass Air Force basic training.173  New Standards men 
also failed advanced training in more complex subjects such as electrical repair, 
communications, and clerical specialist at significantly higher rates than higher aptitude 
men.  The washout rate for some subjects ranged as high as 44.6 percent.174 
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The Department of Defense expected this type of result.  One report explained, 
“as anticipated, New Standards men perform significantly better in combat-type training 
courses and the simpler technical courses.”  They excelled in specialties that stressed 
“practical work” and that did not require skill in mathematics or reading.  Men who were 
dropped from particular specialties were not immediately discharged.  Rather, they were 
“reassigned to other courses on on-the-job training more suited to their aptitudes.”175  In 
other words, New Standards men were more likely than the military population as a 
whole to be assigned to combat roles.176  
Records on the number of Project 100,000 men who were killed or wounded in 
action do not appear to have been kept.177  However, casualty rates for African 
Americans, who disproportionately constituted the enrollment of Project 100,000, were.  
Between 1965 and 1966, the proportion of the active duty military that was black rose 
from 9.1 percent to 9.9 percent, and African Americans constituted 12.1 percent of all 
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armed forces accessions by 1967.178  Much of this increase can be attributed to the 
lowering of induction standards.179  African American military personnel were more 
likely to have been drafted than to have enlisted and more likely to have been assigned to 
the infantry, both because volunteers were more likely to be able to choose their specialty 
and because low educational levels tended to limit their choices.180  By 1967, the Army 
was close to 20 percent African American. Thirteen percent of Army personnel stationed 
in Vietnam were black, but 21 percent of soldiers killed-in-action that year were African 
American.181  Democratic New York Congressman Adam Clayton Powell characterized 
Project 100,000 as “genocide,” exclaiming that the “brutal” program was “nothing more 
than killing off human beings that [were] not elite.”182  Powell’s New York colleague, 
Shirley Chisholm, agreed.  She scathingly told the House Armed Services Committee that 
the program’s only benefit was to ease “the draft among the middle class whites.”183 
 On the whole, the military failed to meet McNamara’s stated goal of social 
betterment through military service.184  Most New Standards men left the armed forces 
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without having received the promised training, as the skills needed for combat did not 
transfer to civilian life.  Instructors, funding, and facilities could not be located to 
implement basic education classes, and only 17,000 of the men were able to take 
advantage of those that were available.185  By 1968, the Continental Army Command had 
banned Project 100,000 personnel from 137 of 237 advanced training courses because it 
claimed the men learned too slowly to meet prerequisites.  Only five of the remaining 
available courses were restructured to better meet their learning styles.186  Additionally, 
New Standards men were court-martialed more than twice as often as their counterparts 
and were twice as likely to be discharged early, frequently on less-than-honorable 
grounds.187  The Pentagon under McNamara’s successor, Clark Clifford, continued to 
                                                                                                                                            
earlier analyses, including Baskir and Strauss’s, used Department of Defense data dating 
only from the years 1966 to 1969.  Since the program lasted until 1971, however, they 
argued that they were the first to assemble a complete picture.  They found that New 
Standards men “performed 87 to 95 percent as effectively as the controls who had much 
higher aptitudes.”  Moreover, although these men tended to advance through the 
paygrades more slowly than their higher aptitude counterparts, 85 percent of them 
“received a rating that classified their performance as good, highly effective or better.”  
Only six percent of the men in Project 100,000 reenlisted after their initial tour or duty -- 
Two-thirds of the total were found ineligible to reenlist, even if they wanted to, because 
they could not score highly enough on aptitude retests – but as of September 1983, 8,262 
of the New Standards men were still on active duty. A 1974 study cited by Sticht, et al., 
indicated that 68 percent of New Standards Men used the benefits to which they were 
entitled under the G.I. Bill in 1974, including educational benefits.  They also earned 
more and were employed more frequently than a control group of non-veterans with 
similar aptitude scores.  Researchers Janice H. Laurence and Peter F. Ramsberger, in a 
survey of 311 veterans, found exactly the opposite to be true. Similarly mixed results 
were evident in the studies cited in Congressional hearings held in 1990.  See Sticht, et 
al., Cast-Off Youth, 37-65.  Quotes, p. 52; Statistics, pp. 56, 62; Laurence and 
Ramsberger, Low-Aptitude Men in the Military, 55-61, 94-100, 109-123; Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee, Readjustment 
of Project 100,000 Veterans.   
185 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 127. 
186 Hsiao, “Project 100,000,” 17-19. 
187 Across the services, .7 percent of men faced court-martial, but among New 
Standards men, the number was 1.7 percent.  Numbers were higher in the Army, where 
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defend the program, but Melvin Laird phased it out after he was appointed Secretary of 
Defense in 1969.  Laird cited the general American draw-down from Vietnam and the 
Pentagon’s imminent shift to an All-Volunteer Force as reasons.188  Dissent from officials 
within the military also played a role in the program’s demise.189 
* * * * * 
McNamara and his supporters in the Pentagon conceived of Project 100,00 as a 
way to use the military as a venue to teach American men how to participate fully in 
American society.  Similarly, Hershey, Wirtz, and other warriors against poverty wanted 
to use the tools provided by the military procurement system to rehabilitate poor men’s 
defects so that they could become breadwinners and full participants in the American 
polity. For the most part, these programs did not achieve their goals.  In addition to 
sending many participants to the battlefields of Vietnam rather than training them for 
useful work in the civilian world, they, ironically, loosened the connections between 
military service and male citizenship obligations for many middle-class men.    
Publicity surrounding the Project 100,000 and the rehabilitation programs 
explicitly linked the military with poverty and minority status.  Publications from the 
                                                                                                                                            
3.7 percent of New Standards men were court-martialed, a status considered a felony in 
the civilian world.  The overall attrition rate for New Standards men was approximately 
20 percent.  While exact records do not appear to have been kept, these included men 
who were court-martialed, who received dishonorable or bad-conduct discharges as the 
result of judicial action, and, those who got general discharges for the inability to meet 
requirements. Although this last category was not considered punitive, it did prevent 
those in this category from taking full benefit of veteran’s benefits.  See “Lower 
Standards Satisfy Military,” New York Times, Jan. 27, 1970; See Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee, Readjustment of 
Project 100,000 Veterans, 9, 12. 
188 “Pentagon to Phase out Project 100,000,” Boston Globe, March 26, 1971. 
189 See “Low-IQ Recruit Plan Stirs Complaints,” Washington Post, June 29, 1969; 
Hsaio, “Project “100,000,” 20; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 127-128. 
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New Republic to the New York Times to the Muscatine [Iowa] Journal referred to 
participants as “rejects” in need of “salvation” and likened the military to a social service 
organization.190  The Chicago Tribune, reported on Clifford’s continuing support of 
Project 100,000 by discussing the new Defense Secretary’s “plan…to improve American 
life” through judicious use of his department’s budget.  “By applying its conscience,” the 
paper reported, “the Pentagon can provide ghetto employment…and education for 
thousands of young men ill-equipped for work.”191 Such coverage juxtaposed the military 
with the civilian options open to more well-to-do men.  The Baltimore Evening Sun, for 
instance, opened an article on the NCCY’s rehabilitation program in Baltimore by 
highlighting a recent CBS news story about “a private classroom in which young men 
were being taught how to evade the draft by cunning and devious means.”  Meanwhile, in 
an echo of Michael Harrington, men from “the other America,” who suffered in 
conditions of “unemployment, poor health, semi-literacy, and bleak subsistence,” 
struggled to volunteer.   Those who utilized the NCCY services, however, “felt new self-
respect” and became new taxpayers able to “share the load,” as “new [men] in 
uniform.”192  Private counselors taught middle-class boys how to stay out of the military, 
while federally-funded programs helped the poor learn how to enlist.  The military might 
have been sold as a way to achieve “a stable job, status, and independence,” but what 
                                                
190 “McNamara’s Salvation Army,” New Republic, Sept. 10, 1966, 13-14; Bob 
Horton, “Long-Range Study to Decide the Effect of Now Accepting Some Service 
Rejectees,” Muscatine Journal, Dec. 13, 1967; see note 172, above, for examples from 
other publications, including the New York Times. 
191 “Clifford Tells Ghetto Aid Plan,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 27, 1968. 
192 John E. Eslinger, “Rejected by the Services,” Evening Sun, Oct. 25, 1965, 
reprinted in National Committee for Children and Youth, Experimental and 
Demonstration Manpower Project for Recruitment, Training, Placement, and Followup 
of Rejected Armed Forces Volunteers in Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C.: 
Final Report,145. 
 294 
about the men who already had these things?193  Such publicity did not mention what the 
Army might offer to them other than an opportunity to work and live with members of 
American society with whom they were thought to have little in common. 
More concretely, Project 100,000 and reduced entrance standards had an 
incontrovertible effect on who faced conscription during the years of the Vietnam War.  
As more men qualified to volunteer for military service, the various branches of service 
required fewer conscripts to meet their monthly accession quotas.  Of the men who were 
drafted, approximately 50,000 per year were earmarked for Project 100,000, meaning 
they had to be from Category IV.  As these generally poor and minority men filled open 
slots, the Selective Service needed fewer white, middle-class men.  Concurrently, middle-
class men had greater access to occupational and student deferments, which were rescued 
from the chopping block when Congress revised the draft law in 1967 and 1969.194  Men 
with economic resources had far less to fear from conscription and, after Johnson asked 
all 18-year-olds to be examined as soon as practicable, rarely even had to submit to an 
early preinduction exam.  Because it was assumed that all college students would receive 
a II-S deferment, young men who claimed they would soon start university training, even 
in the absence of written confirmation, were not subject to the early exams, and therefore 
not referred to remediation programs even if they could have benefitted from 
                                                
193 Isolde Weinberg, “He’s in the Army Now – and Happy to Be There,” 
Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1965. 
194 Graduate students, except those in specific science, engineering, and medical 
fields, lost their deferments in 1967, but Congress retained the deferment for college 
students despite increasing criticism. See conclusion for more detail. 
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rehabilitation.195  This exacerbated the inequities based on social class that already 
existed within the Selective Service System. 
Where publicity surrounding UMT a generation earlier had emphasized the 
democratic nature of military training and the common citizenship classes all men would 
take, the programs of the Great Society era focused specifically on the rehabilitation of 
poor men.  The rhetoric of citizenship, patriotism, and duty almost completely vanished 
from the discourse over these programs.  A few internal memos and Selective Service 
discussed rehabilitation as a way to spread the burden of military service into the poorer 
classes in a more equitable manner, but planning was accompanied by no such discussion 
about the wealthier classes.196  Instead of using military service to teach a common form 
of masculinity based on duty, honor and strength, the programs of the 1960s focused on 
building economic and military strength by creating breadwinners and soldiers among 
those previously ill-equipped to fill those obligations of citizenship.  Men equipped to 
support their families already had the ability to contribute to national security. 
The development of these programs indicated the extent to which national 
security had, by the early 1960s, come to be defined as a function of economic and 
domestic strength as well as the ability to use force abroad.  That the Selective Service 
                                                
195 “States Examine First Groups of 18-Year-Olds,” Selective Service 14 (July 
1964): 4. 
196 See, for example, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), “Project 100,000: Characteristics and 
Performance of ‘New Standards’ Men,” June 1968, attached to memo: New Mental 
Standards Effected December 1, 1966, December 2, 1966, box 126, Entry UD 20, 
Training and Conference Files, RG 147, NARA; Project One Hundred Thousand, 
attached to memo: From Mr. Greenberg to Mr. Moskowitz, Feb. 27, 1967, Project 
100,000, box 2, entry 14, UD-04W, accession 72A1942, RG 330, NARA; Lewis B. 
Hershey, “SS Personnel are Invited to Join Poverty War,” Selective Service 15 (Jan. 
1965): 1-2. 
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and Department of Defense would, through various rehabilitation programs and Project 
100,000, participate in the War on Poverty demonstrated just how intertwined economic 
and military security had become and how far the Selective Service had gone toward 
defining civilian pursuits as service to the nation.  But as the situation in Vietnam 
demanded increasing numbers of soldiers after 1965, the rehabilitation aims of the 
programs got lost.  The referral programs shrank, and Project 100,000 became a method 
to procure military manpower rather than to bolster poor men’s possibilities in the 
civilian labor market.  As the Vietnam War drew down in the early 1970s and Lyndon 
Johnson’s successor, Richard Nixon, showed less interest in eradicating poverty, Project 
100,000 became obsolete.  In its explicit focus on preparing poor and minority men for 
economic citizenship, however, it had unintentionally thinned even further the 






Vietnam and Beyond 
 
Military manpower policies between the end of World War II in 1945 and the 
shift to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 separated military service from ideals of 
masculine citizenship in the United States, a connection, that, as this dissertation has 
shown, was never quite as strong as dominant cultural narratives of the citizen-soldier 
have implied.  Manpower policies, especially those that governed deferments, widened 
the definition of service to the state and encouraged men to meet their responsibilities for 
national defense as civilians, even in times of emergency.  They emphasized men’s 
breadwinner role and responsible fatherhood over military service and defined economic 
independence as a contribution to national defense, ironically, weakening the citizen-
soldier ideal in the process.  These findings provide context for the anti-war and anti-draft 
protest of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Vietnam War exacerbated points of friction 
that already existed.  The war highlighted assumptions about masculinity and citizenship 
as well as inequities in the draft system that had existed for a generation. Thus, when 
draft calls rose in order to support a war that many Americans did not agree with, men 
used the channels that the Defense establishment had already created for them to avoid 
serving in the armed forces. 
The separation was not universal.  Most Americans, most likely, never realized 
the slow cultural shift that had been occurring for twenty years.  For example, in 
September 1965, Harvey J. Fischer, a 55-year old man from Largo, Florida, in an act of 
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sheer disgust, mailed a clipping from his local newspaper to President Lyndon Johnson.1  
The article blasted the current generation of military-aged men.  “Never have so many 
American boys tried so many ruses to get out of serving their country,” it claimed.  
Without citing any statistics or quoting any government officials, it accused young men 
of failing to register, refusing to report for physicals, destroying draft cards, marrying 
prematurely, taking jobs they did not want, and going back to school for subjects they 
cared nothing about, all in order to avoid military service.  “Those who ask what they can 
do for their country often seek the answer outside of the armed forces,” worried the 
reporter, who concluded, “Men of draft age…simply don’t seem to understand the 
necessity for manning the frontiers of freedom half a world away.”2 
This article deserves comment for a number of reasons.  First, it was ordinary.  
The sentiments it – and by extension Mr. Largo – expressed were not unique to the 
people of Florida’s Gulf coast.  Rather, the idea that men were shirking their citizenship 
responsibilities by refusing to serve in the military would become a common refrain in 
articles, on TV, and around kitchen tables across the nation over the next eight years.3  
Those who characterized young men who took advantage of deferments as shirkers held 
tight to a civic-republican understanding of military service.  But the article also stands 
out because it acknowledged an evolving definition of service in its oblique reference to 
President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural speech.  Even as the reporter rejected the 
implications of the shift for participation in the military, by the time the article was 
                                                
1 Harvey J. Fischer to Mr. President, September 29, 1965, Frev-Frier, box 154, 
Central Files, 1948-69, RG 147, Records of the Selective Service, National Archives and 
Records Administration, College Park, Maryland [hereafter RG 147, NARA]. 
2 “A Need for Patriotic Young Men,” n.d. no publication title, attached to ibid. 
3 See, for example, J.N. Drury to Mr. President, November 11, 1965, Dupr-
Dwyer, J., box 154, Central Files, 1948-69, RG 147, NARA.  
 
 299 
written, the Peace Corps, VISTA, and various other initiatives created as part of the War 
on Poverty provided civic-minded young people myriad ways to perform community 
service under the auspices of the federal government.  Finally, the article was revelatory 
because of its timing.  In the month it was published – September 1965 – American 
combat troops had been in Vietnam for less than six months.  Draft calls had started to 
rise that January and were continuing to grow, but the machinery for inducting men had 
not yet reached it height.  Antiwar protest, though a news staple, was still a fairly 
marginal phenomenon in 1965. 
In fact, the article that angered Fischer so greatly was part of a larger wave of 
criticism of the draft that had been building for several years.  Although a bill for the 
renewal of the Universal Military Training and Service Act had sailed through Congress 
in the spring of 1963 – it passed the House by a vote of 378 to three – its passage 
occurred amongst “general criticism that the law was unfair.”4  On the local and state 
level, seemingly capricious decisions made by draft boards made good copy and alerted 
the public to the potential for abuse within the system.5  Editorials and letters to the editor 
calling for draft reform appeared in newspapers with increasing regularity. They argued 
that the system placed an undue burden on men in their early twenties, who had to wait 
                                                
4 “House Votes 378 to 3 to Keep Draft,” Baltimore Sun, March 12, 1963.  For a 
description of the renewal process, including Congressional hearings, see Harry A. 
Marmion, Selective Service: Conflict and Compromise (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1968), 1-2. 
5 See, for example, George Garrigues, “Identity of Draft Board Kept Secret,” 
Nov. 26, 1962; James Howard, “5 Quit Draft Board in Row,” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 1, 
1962; “A Congressman Can Be Too Obliging,” Editorial, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 2, 
1962; Robert Howard, “Inject Spoils Politics into State Draft,” Chicago Tribune, May 17, 
1962; Bill Gold, “You Don’t Look Like the Criminal Type,” The District Line, 
Washington Post, June 17, 1963; Martin Nolan, “He’s Married…And Drafted,” Boston 




years before they knew for certain whether they would be drafted or not.  Articles also 
pointed out the inequities of a system that did not draft all men and in which men with 
wives and children or with educational and monetary resources could easily gain 
deferments.6 It was the fact that men were taking advantage of these deferments that 
vexed Fischer so badly.   This dissertation has shown how and why these mechanisms 
developed and argued that they unintentionally made it easier for American men to avoid 
military service, thus separating military service from ideals of masculine citizenship. 
* * * * * 
By 1964, conscription in America was already in trouble.   In February, newly-
belted, heavy-weight champion boxer Cassius Clay (soon-to-be Muhammed Ali), a man 
at the height of his physical prowess, was found unfit for military service for “mental” 
reasons, criticism escalated still further.7  The groundswell of discontent prompted 
                                                
6 See, for example, John K. Arnot, “End the Draft,” Chicago Tribune, Jan. 1, 
1963; Nicholas J. Budinger, “Would End Draft,” Voice of the People, Chicago Tribune, 
March 16, 1963; Hanson Baldwin, “New Attitude on Peacetime Draft,” New York Times, 
March 8, 1963; “Subject to Draft,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune, July 25, 1963; 
“Questions About the Draft,” Hartford Courant, July 31, 1963; John G. Esty, Jr., “The 
Draft: Many Threatened, Few Chosen,” New York Times Magazine, Oct. 20, 1963; “Start 
Draft Sooner, Public Tells Military,” Boston Globe, Dec. 4, 1963; “Draft Age Under 20 
Favored by Majority,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 4, 1963; B.D. Ayres, Jr., “Manpower 
Excess Seen Causing Stress in Nation’s Draft System,” Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1964; 
Jack Anderson, “Are We Becoming a Nation of Draft Dodgers,” Boston Globe, Jan. 19, 
1964; Kathryn R. Strom, “End the Draft,” Chicago Tribune, Feb. 2, 1964. 
7 Clay, who converted to Islam in February 1964 and changed his name to 
Muhammed Ali shortly thereafter, passed his physical exam in January, but failed a first 
round of aptitude tests in February.  After winning the heavy-weight title and amidst 
public outcry that he had faked his original test scores, he was retested under the watchful 
eye of an Army senior psychologist in March.  Once again, he did not meet the Army’s 
mental standards and was classified IV-F. When aptitude standards were lowered in 
1966, Ali once again became eligible for induction.  He applied for a deferment claiming 
to be a minister, but his application was denied.  In April 1967, he refused induction and 
was subsequently found guilty of draft evasion.  The Supreme Court reversed his 
conviction in 1971, but not before he was stripped of his titles and boxing license. See 
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Johnson to order Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to initiate a full study of the 
draft with the purpose of determining whether the Army still required conscription to fill 
its ranks.8 
In September, Arizona Senator and Republican presidential nominee Barry 
Goldwater launched his campaign for president by vowing to end conscription. He 
claimed that Johnson’s approach to military manpower procurement infringed on 
                                                                                                                                            
“Army Insists Clay Didn’t Fake Tests,” Washington Post, April 21, 1964; “Clay’s Army 
Test Draws Criticism,” New York Times, April 15, 1964; B. T. Harrison, “Muhammed 
Ali Draft Case and Public Debate on Vietnam,” Peace Research 33, no. 2 (2001): 69-86; 
Herman Graham, III, The Brothers’ Vietnam War: Black Power, Manhood, and the 
Military Experience (Gainesville, Fl.: University Press of Florida, 2003), ch. 5.  For 
further examples of articles calling for draft reform, see Norman Elfstrom, “Draft Critic,” 
Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1964; Uncle Dudley, “Overhaul the Draft,” Boston Globe, 
April 20, 1964; “Overhauling the Draft,” Editorial, Washington Post, April 23, 1964; 
“Views on Ending the Draft,” Editorial, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1964; “The Draft: 
Is it Necessary?,” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 1964; “Elimination of Draft is 
Urged by Senator,” Baltimore Sun, June 30, 1964; “The Voluntary Way,” Editorial, 
Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1964.   
8 Johnson did not give a specific reason for ordering the study, other than the fact 
that the law was fifteen years old, but at least one newspaper connected the study to 
Muhammed Ali’s case. According to Historian James M. Gerhardt, however, the 
Pentagon study was a holdover from the Kennedy administration.  After Kennedy 
changed the order of call for married men without children, he ordered a more detailed 
review of the nation’s manpower needs.  This led to the creation of a study group in the 
Defense Department’s manpower office, which Johnson called on for the report in April 
1964. The Pentagon completed its Defense Manpower Study in July 1965, but did not 
release the document’s findings to the public.  Several portions had to be extensively 
rewritten to reflect the military’s changing needs stemming from the Vietnam War.  Its 
results, however, were discussed publicly at hearings before the House Armed Services 
Committee on Selective Service in 1966.  The report was critical of manpower 
channeling as the most efficient means to fill both civilian and military manpower needs.  
See “Johnson Asks Study of Way to End Draft,” Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1964; 
“Johnson Orders Study to Assess Need for Draft,” New York Times, April 19, 1964; 
“Cassius Spurs Study of Draft,” Boston Globe, May 10, 1964; James M. Gerhardt, The 
Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1975 
(Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 286-287, 362. 
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American liberty and weakened the United States.9  Moreover, in his first campaign 
speech, he claimed that the practice of using “military services for political and social 
schemes [was] to drift closer to war on an ebbing tide of military strength.”10  Social 
engineering through manpower policy, he felt, detracted from the military’s main purpose 
of national defense. Johnson swiftly dismissed the draft as a campaign issue, citing the 
Pentagon study then underway, but the fact that Goldwater raised the question when he 
did indicated a cultural shift.11  When Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson 
had made the same promise to end the draft in 1956, he had been ridiculed.  Goldwater 
did not receive the same level of criticism.  Moreover, although conscription failed to 
become a major issue in the 1964 campaign, pundits and politicians did not disregard 
Goldwater’s proposal.  Influential New York Times military affairs editor Hanson W. 
Baldwin, for example, called for broader discussion about conscription.12  Members of 
Congress criticized the draft almost two dozen times from the floor during the 1964 
congressional session.13 
Indeed, debate over the purpose and necessity of the draft escalated over the next 
nine years, spurred by the military’s greater need for manpower during the Vietnam 
                                                
9 For more, see Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the 
Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 409-411. 
10 “Text of Goldwater’s Speech Formally Opening Presidential Campaign,” New 
York Times, Sept. 4, 1964. 
11 “Johnson Rejects Draft as an Issue for His Campaign,” New York Times, Sept. 
6, 1964. 
12 Hanson W. Baldwin, “Should We End the Draft?” New York Times Magazine, 
Sept. 27, 1964. 
13 According to Gerhardt, congressmen brought up the need for draft reform 
approximately the same number of times during the 1964 session of Congress as they had 
in total during the previous ten years.  See Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 286. 
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War.14  As conscription touched more lives, the system’s inequities, which had already 
been a subject of public concern for at least two years, became more pronounced.  Public 
discontent with the mechanisms of Selective Service became entangled with 
dissatisfaction over the war itself.  Many anti-war protestors targeted the Selective 
Service, arguing that if the draft could be stopped, the military would not be able to fill its 
ranks or prosecute the war in Vietnam.15  But many politicians, educators, planners, and 
scholars – including those who supported America’s war aims – also looked for ways to 
reform or end entirely America’s system of conscription.  Universities issued statements 
against student deferments.16  National conferences that attracted scholars, policy experts, 
and politicians were held in 1967 in Washington, D.C. and at Antioch College in Ohio 
and the University of Chicago.17  Scholarly studies critical of the Selective Service began 
to appear, as did similar books meant for a general audience.18  The federal government 
                                                
14 The Selective Service set a monthly quota of 5,400 men for January 1965.  By 
December, this number had jumped to 40,200.  By 1968, approximately 340,000 men 
were being inducted each year.  United States Selective Service System, Annual Report 
of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1967 to the Congress of the United 
States pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service Act as Amended 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 86; Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, 274. 
15 Michael S. Foley, The War Machine: Draft Resistance during the Vietnam War 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 67, 72-75. 
16 Cornell University, Wayne State University, San Francisco State University, 
New York University, and the Universities of Iowa, Michigan, and Buffalo were among 
those to criticize student deferments.  See Marmion, Selective Service, 77. 
17 Ibid, 77.  The conferences in Washington, D.C. and the University of Chicago 
published their proceedings.  See June A. Willenz (ed.), Dialogue on the Draft: Report of 
the National Conference on the Draft (Washington, D.C.: American Veterans Committee, 
1967) and Sol Tax (ed.), The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
18 See, for example, Marmion, Selective Service; Tax, The Draft; Willenz, 
Dialogue on the Draft; Bruce Chapman, The Wrong Man in Uniform: Our Unfair and 
Obsolete Draft – and How We Can Replace It (New York: Trident Press, 1967); Jean 
Carper, Bitter Greetings (New York: Grossman, 1967); James W. Davis, Jr., and Kenneth 
M. Dolbeare, Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System (Chicago, 
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convened two independent panels to study the question of draft reform and held multiple 
sets of hearings.19 In 1967, Congress replaced the Universal Military Training and 
                                                                                                                                            
Markham Publishing Company, 1968); Roger W. Little (ed.), Selective Service and 
American Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969); David F. Bradford, 
Deferment Policy in Selective Service, Research Report Series No. 113, Industrial 
Relations Section, Department of Economics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, 1969); James 
Finn (ed.), A Conflict of Loyalties: The Case for Selective Conscientious Objection (New 
York: Pegasus Press, 1968); Jerome H. Skolnick and Elliott Currie (eds.), Crisis in 
American Institutions (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970); Andrew O. Shapiro 
and John M. Striker, Mastering the Draft: A Comprehensive Guide for Solving Draft 
Problems (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970); George Walton, Let’s End This 
Draft Mess (New York: David McKay, 1967); Peter Barnes, Pawns: The Plight of the 
Citizen-Soldier (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).   
19 President Johnson convened the National Advisory Commission on Selective 
Service, under the chairmanship of Burke Marshall, the former Assistant Attorney 
General and head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department.  The House 
Armed Services Committee, meanwhile, created the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military 
Manpower Procurement, chaired by Mark Clark, a retired Army General.  Both published 
their findings in February 1967.  Both recommended a continuation of the draft, but they 
differed in their recommendations for reform.  The Marshall Commission recommended 
moving to a lottery, while the Clark commission did not.  They also differed in their 
approaches to deferments and the constitution of local boards.  See National Advisory 
Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? 
February 1967; Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, Report to 
the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 
28, 1967; George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of 
Kansas, 1993), 198.  For examples of hearings, see House Committee on Armed 
Services, Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service System: 
Hearings Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966; 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Manpower Implications of Selective 
Service: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967; House Armed 
Services Committee, Selective Service Extension 1967: Hearings Before the House 
Committee on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967; Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Amending and Extending the Draft and Related Authorities: Hearings Before 
the Armed Services Committee, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967; Senate Judiciary Committee, 
The Selective Service System: Its Operation, Practices, and Procedures: Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969; House Armed Services Committee, Special 
Subcommittee on the Draft: Hearings on H.R. 14001 and H.R. 14015, To Amend the 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967 to Authorize Modifications of the System of 
Selecting Persons for Induction into the Armed Forces Under this Act, 91st Cong, 1st 
sess., 1969; Senate Armed Services Committee, Random Selection System for Induction 
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Service Act with the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, which eliminated some 
deferments and reversed the order of call so that the youngest rather than oldest available 
man would be called first.20  Criticism continued, however, so in 1969, Congress 
amended the two-year-old Military Selective Service Act to allow selection to take place 
via lottery.21   
These changes did not stem the tide of protest.  By 1970, public opinion had 
turned against both the war in Vietnam and the draft.  President Richard Nixon vowed to 
end conscription as the war wound down, and conservative economists, including Milton 
Friedman and Walter Oi of the University of Chicago and Martin Anderson of Columbia 
University, gained the president’s ear.  These men argued that the military should 
compete for personnel on the open market, just like any other employer.  Paying fair 
wages and offering benefits to volunteers would create a more stable force structure, 
create less turnover, protect the nation better, and, ultimately, cost less than a military 
based on conscription.  Moreover, they characterized conscription as an unfair “time tax,” 
exacted inequitably from men who were drafted but not from those who remained 
civilians.22 
                                                                                                                                            
into Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 91st Cong, 1st 
sess., 1969. 
20 Johnson signed P.L. 90-40 on June 30, 1967.  The law also extended student 
deferments to all college students but forbade students from using a dependency 
deferment after graduation.  It also eliminated deferments for graduate students except 
those in fields defined as essential to national health and safety. 
21 Nixon signed P.L 91-124 on November 26, 1969.  The lottery drawing was 
scheduled for December 1, 1969, with inductions based on its results to begin on January 
1, 1970.  Problems with the lottery drawing and implementation of its results led to 
further revisions in the regulations and a second drawing over the next two years.  See 
Flynn, The Draft, 246-249. 
22 See Bernard Rostker, I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force 
(Arlington, Va.: RAND Corporation, 2006), 32-36, 52-58,  
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The Department of Defense began to study the feasibility of moving to an All-
Volunteer Force in January 1969, and in March, Nixon announced the creation of the 
President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, under the chairmanship of 
former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Jr.  Its members also included Friedman and 
economist Alan Greenspan.  Oi was one of its researchers. When the Commission 
released its report in February 1970, it unanimously recommended the move to an All-
Volunteer Force.23  Nixon, at the urging of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 
simultaneously urged the renewal of the Military Selective Service Act when it was due 
to expire in 1971 and ordered the Department of Defense to begin making plans to shift 
to an All-Volunteer Force.24  Through the policy of Vietnamization, which turned the war 
over to Vietnamese soldiers, American troops began to withdraw from Southeast Asia.  
This drawdown, combined with pay increases and other new incentives offered to 
volunteers, created a smaller need for draftees.  In January 1972, draft calls were reduced 
to zero.  In June, Nixon declared that conscripts would no longer be sent to Vietnam, and 
in July 1973, the law was allowed to expire.  Conscription, at least for the foreseeable 
future, had ended in the United States. 
* * * * * 
                                                
23 For more on the Gates Commission, see Rostker, I Want You! 76-89; Thomas 
S. Gates, Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 
Washington, D.C., February 1970. 
24 U.S. House of Representatives, Draft Deferments: Message from the President 
of the United States Relative to Reforming the Draft System, H. Doc. 91-324, 91st Cong., 
2d sess., April 23, 1970.  Congress complied with Nixon’s wish, extending the 
President’s authority to order inductions for a further two years, rather than the usual 
four.  The 1971 renewal also made changes to mechanism governing the lottery.  Rather 
than assigning manpower quotas to each state and letting local boards work through the 
order of call independently as the 1969 amendments required, the 1971 extension created 
a centralized procurement system, so that all men across the country with the same lottery 
number would be called at the same time.  See Flynn, The Draft, 256. 
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 In his study of the draft, historian George Q. Flynn outlined various scholarly 
theories as to why the draft failed.  Some scholars, most notably political scientist Samuel 
Huntington, explained Flynn, argued that technological advances had made mass citizen 
armies obsolete.  Other theorists posited that the growth of global communication, trade, 
and transportation networks combined with the promise of international law caused 
nationalism to weaken.  As the possibility of global citizenship arose, the notion of 
fighting to protect any particular state seemed anachronistic.  Pacifists and anti-
militarists, according to Flynn, argued that the threat of nuclear annihilation made the 
draft obsolete, as the existence of large armies led to war rather than prevented them.  
Meanwhile, the resurgence of conservatism, which counted the limitation of federal reach 
as one of its major tenets, made economic theories that the draft unfairly taxed those men 
who were conscripted particularly attractive.  Still other scholars believed that poor 
management within the Selective Service caused American discontent.  Flynn, himself, 
argued that the “political and cultural context” of the Vietnam era “favored volunteers 
over draftees” and ultimately killed the draft.25  While these explanations all have merit, 
they fail to provide a complete picture.  As I have shown, by the time of the Vietnam 
War, American men felt comfortable accepting deferments and “shirking” their military 
duty because two decades worth of military manpower policies had communicated the 
idea that men did not need to serve in the military in order to fulfill their obligations of 
masculine citizenship.  
When plans for universal military training failed, it became clear that the armed 
forces would neither want nor need all American men.  Even though the law held all 
                                                
25 Flynn, The Draft, 259-261.  Quote, p. 261. 
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qualified men liable for military service, all men would not serve.  While this was not a 
new phenomenon in American military history, the circumstances under which the draft 
existed during the Cold War were unprecedented. Policy makers justified continuing 
conscription as part of a militarized peace, rather than as a measure to meet an immediate 
emergency.  There was no “for the duration,” since planners believed the Cold War 
would continue indefinitely.  In this context, preserving a vital domestic economy and 
society remained as important as national defense.  Manpower policies had to maintain – 
and advance – the civilian economy; stimulate the development of new technology; train 
the next generation of scientists, engineers, and educators; and encourage balanced 
childrearing in addition to providing personnel for the military.  So long as there was a 
selective draft, the definition of “service” to the nation in the name of defense had to 
expand. This is why the addition of a student deferment and the expansion of 
occupational deferments in the midst of the manpower crisis of the Korean War occurred. 
After the Korean War, as the population of draft-eligible men expanded and the 
size of the military contracted, it was especially incumbent upon military planners to 
define civilian occupations and domestic arrangements as in the national interest.  The 
practice of manpower channeling made sense in a republic with an active draft.  The 
contradictions inherent in a system that expected military service from all young male 
citizens but in fact required that sacrifice from only a few were great.  Manpower 
channeling became a way of selling the continuing operation of Selective Service to the 
public and Congress – the constituencies that kept the system functioning – at a time of 
low draft calls.    
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As this dissertation has demonstrated, however, manpower channeling and the 
rehabilitation programs that developed as part of the Great Society were not simply 
cynical acts of self-preservation for an obsolete system.  The men who developed them, 
including Lewis B. Hershey and Robert McNamara, appear to have genuinely believed 
that their policies would benefit the nation as a whole.  Hershey’s civic-republican 
convictions shaped the entire Selective Service System, from its decentralized 
organizational structure to his judgment that every man owed service of some kind to the 
United States.  When it became clear that the military did not want all men, he opted to 
expand his definition of service rather than reject his most deeply-held beliefs.  Similarly, 
historians and activists alike have alleged that McNamara created Project 100,000 as a 
way to more easily expand the armed forces during the Vietnam War with men he 
considered socially expendable.  But McNamara’s STEP proposal predated the Vietnam 
escalation, and he proposed both programs within the context of the War on Poverty.  
Other federal agencies, which were generally considered to have had the best of 
intentions, worked with the military establishment, including the Department of Defense 
and Selective Service, to try to better the lives of America’s poor.  In both cases, planners 
saw these social engineering programs as weapons in the Cold War against communism.  
Channeling, in theory, provided for civil defense, weapons research and development, 
educational advancement, and healthy families.  Ideally, rehabilitation programs, 
including Project 100,000, rescued families from poverty, allowed men to earn full 
economic citizenship, and fulfill their obligations to the nation’s defense by contributing 
meaningfully to its economic growth.   
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Ironically, these social engineering policies militarized the civilian sector but 
weakened the position of the armed forces in American society by undermining the 
citizen-soldier ideal.  World War II had lent the symbol of the citizen-soldier new 
imagery.  Men’s mass participation in that conflict undergirded the myth that American 
men would readily bear arms in the name of national defense.  After 1941, therefore, the 
American citizen-soldier could appear as either the Revolutionary-era Minuteman or the 
World War II G.I.  Both versions implied honor, duty, courage, and the willingness of 
American men to sacrifice in order to defend their homes, families, and nation.  In the 
years following World War II, however, the armed forces called progressively fewer men 
to serve.  Military manpower policies encouraged men to remain civilians and defined 
their occupations or domestic arrangements as the equivalent of military service.  
Whether or not deferred men acknowledged their behaviors as benefitting the defense 
establishment, they did not don uniforms.  Military service for many became simple to 
avoid, and avoidance easy to justify.  Hershey’s 1949 warning that if the Selective 
Service allowed a man to become too comfortable in his civilian job, it would take “three 
Selective Service Systems to bomb him loose” proved prescient.26  When the United 
States went to war once again in 1965, most men neither rushed to the colors nor calmly 
waited to be drafted.  Instead, they sought means to legally avoid military service through 
deferments.  The rhetorical pull of the citizen-soldier seemed to affect many fewer men 
than it had a generation earlier. 
Finally, this project demonstrates the intimate connection between military 
manpower policy in the years under study and ideals of masculinity and citizenship as 
                                                
26 Selective Service: Present and Future, January 5, 1949, 032-GEN, 1963-1948, 
box 26, Central Files, RG 147, NARA. 
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well as how this connection changed over time.  Plans for universal military training in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s broke apart over public and political disagreements over 
whether UMT was the best method to protect and defend the United States.  But debates 
were also riven by different perceptions of manhood and citizenship.  Proponents 
believed military training would forge men out of boys and offer common training that 
would unite the nation’s men in common citizenship.  Opponents, on the other hand, 
thought that a year of training would corrupt impressionable boys.  Further, they argued, 
UMT would regiment American manhood and rob it of the independence and liberty that 
formed the essence of American citizenship.  By the mid-1960s, when Project 100,000 
once again made the meaning of military service the subject of public debate, planners 
focused on the economic and educational benefits of that service for poor men, but 
virtually ignored the military as a venue for common citizenship education.  Service 
could provide poor men with the means to earn financial independence and thereby meet 
their responsibilities as breadwinners to their families and fulfill their citizenship 
obligations to the nation.  The language of a universal, civic-republican military 
obligation had all but vanished from the discourse.  The narrowed focus on economic 
citizenship for poor men, combined with the growth of deferments that were more easily 
available to wealthier men, weakened the connection between military service and 
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